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Investigations of fatigue life, and safe-life and fail-safe design
concepts as applied to Space Shuttle structure are summarized. The
results are evaluated to select recommended structural design cri-
teria to provide assurance that premature failure due to propagation
of undetected crack-like defects will not occur during shuttle
operational service.
The Space Shuttle booster, GDC configuration B-9U, is selected as
the reference vehicle. Structural elements used as basis of detail
analyses include wing spar caps, vertical stabilizer skins, crew
compartment skin, orbiter support frame, propellant tank shell
structure. Fatigue life analyses of structural elements are per-
formed to define potential problem areas and establish upper limits
of operating stresses. Flaw growth analyses are summarized in para-
metric form over a range of initial flaw types and sizes, operatin_
stresses and service life requirements. Service life of i00 to 500
missions is considered. Desian provisions to satisfy crack arrest
and residual strength requirements under fail-safe approach are
determined for selected elements. A parametric range of residual
strength from 1.0 to 1.2 times limit load is investigated. An
estimate is made of capabilities of various inspection methods to
detect crack-like defects. This estimate is used as the basis to
evaluate effects of applying candidate safe-life criteria to the
reference vehicle. Effects considered include structural weight,
required insoection methods, and in-service inspection frequency.
Relative merits of safe-life and fail-safe design approaches are
compared for applicable structural elements.
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FOREWORD
This report summarizes the results of the studies conducted
under contract NAS8-27269, Establishment of Design Criteria for
Acceptable Failure Modes and Fail Safe Considerations for the
Space Shuttle Structural System. The study was conducted by the
Space Division of North American Rockwell Corporation for the
Marshall Space Flight Center of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. The work was performed over the period of
June 15, 1971, to May 15, 1972.
The numerical results and comparisons given in this report
are expressed in the International System of Units as the primary
system. In most cases, the customary English units are also
indicated. The customary units were used in the engineering
analyses conducted under this study.
North American Rockwell personnel who participated in the
investigation include: R. W. Westrup, study manager and principal
investigator; J. P. Sanders, fatigue and fracture analysis;
J. E. Collipriest and R. M. Ehret, fracture properties data and
two-dimensional crack growth analysis methods; and J. Mamon,
inspection methods and flaw detection capabilities.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
i. i BACKGROUND
The space shuttle missions will subject structures to repeated sequences
and combinations of loading and environmental conditions that are unprecedented
in the history of aircraft and space vehicles. Although the total flight time
associated with the design goal of i00 missions for the space shuttle opera-
tional life may be relatively small compared to that of contemporary commercial
aircraft, the incidence of repeated high-stress load cycles may remain as a
very significant consideration for structural design. This is due to several
factors, including the presence of aerodynamic surfaces on booster and orbiter
vehicles and the consequent response of the vehicle to wind shear and gust
during ascent and entry, the asymmetric configuration and high thrust levels
during boost, and the high maneuver load factors anticipated during entry.
In addition, repeated cycles of large temperature excursions and, in some
cases, associated thermal stresses will occur because of aerodynamic heating
and the loading and depletion of cryogenic propellants.
Three general design approaches have evolved over the last two decades
to prevent aerospace structures from failing catastrophically because of
repeated load cycles: (i) fail-safe design, (2) safe-life design based on
conventional fatigue considerations, and (3) safe-life design based on
fracture mechanics considerations. The following brief discussion of these
approaches includes a tentative evaluation of potential applicability to
space shuttle structure.
The fail-safe design concept is based on the premise that a crack may
develop and grow in the structure because of fatigue nucleation, material
defects, or accidental damage; the growth of the crack will be eventually
arrested, however, and a stable condition maintained by suitable design
provisions. The residual strength of the structure in this weakened condition
must be equal to or greater than a prescribed value, which is frequently taken
as limit design load. It is presumed that the damage will be detected and
repaired before catastrophic failure occurs during operation. This design
philosophy has been extensively applied to the fuselage and main-wing structure
of current jet transport aircraft. This basic approach may also have useful
application to many of the structural elements of the space shuttle, excluding
such areas as propellant tanks. However, before it can be determined that this
is the most appropriate criteria for a given structural element, consideration
must be given to the specific characteristics of the shuttle with respect to
accessibility for thorough inspection, engineering and economic feasibility
of damage detection and repair, potential impact on the two-week turnaround
time, etc.
i-i
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Safe-life design using conventional fatigue methods recognizes local
stress concentrations due to detail design characteristics such as joints,
fittings, section discontinuities, etc. However, it does not consider the
potential of undetected crack-like defects existing in the structure before
the start of operational service. The useful life of structural elements
determined by fatigue test is comprised primarily of the number of cycles
required to nucleate a crack, rather than cycles required for crack propa-
gation to a critical value. This approach has also been widely applied to
design of military and commercial aircraft over the last 15 years. Good
results have been obtained in many cases, particularly for some of the
current commercial jet transport aircraft which exhibit minimal structural
maintenance problems in airline operation. However, the serious structural
problems or failures encountered by some recent high-performance military
aircraft after only limited operational service dramatically illustrate that
conventional fatigue methods may not adequately guard against premature
fracture. This is particularly true for structural designs involving higher
operating stresses, lower toughness materials, and material forms or fabri-
cation processes that involve a higher probability of inherent crack-like
defects or reduced capability to detect such defects. It is apparent,
therefore, that it would be dangerous to apply this approach to space shuttle
structure without corollary application of safe-life criteria based on
fracture mechanics considerations. However, it is desirable to survey cyclic
stresses on typical structural elements of the space shuttle to determine the
general magnitude of potential fatigue problems and appropriate criteria to
assure a fatigue-resistant design.
Safe-life design based on fracture mechanics considerations is predicated
on the assumption that crack-like defects may exist in the structure prior to
operational service and the design must be developed so that such defects will
not gro_ to critical dimensions during the operational life. This is accom-
plished by selecting materials and operating stresses such that (i) flaws of
critical initial size are large enough to assure detection by non-destructive
inspection or (2) it can be verified by proof test that no flaws of critical
initial size exist in the structure. Some investigators in the field believe
that no inspection program can be considered 100-percent reliable, and that
proof-test verification is mandatory. The fracture mechanics approach to
safe-life design has been applied rather extensively to space vehicle pressure
tanks in recent years. Proof-test verification was accomplished on nearly
all of the Apollo lunar module pressure vessels and on the propellant tanks
of booster stages in the Saturn V vehicle. Unfortunately, serious difficulties
appear to exist when rigorous proof-test verification criteria are applied
directly to space shuttle structure. Proof testing of unpressurized structure,
such as wings, fuselage shell, etc., may be impractical because of several
factors, including schedule delay, cost, limited accuracy of load simulation,
and scars to flight structure caused by attachment of test loading equipment.
Valid proof testing of pressurized structure, such as main propellant tanks
and crew compartment, will also be difficult and may be impractical. Integral
_nn_ design will produce complex load inputs much different than internal
_ressurization. Body bending and shear loadings on the shuttle vehicle will
be much greater than for the Saturn V vehicle. Thus, it may be difficult to
conduct a valid proof test by internal pressurization only. An additional
problem is related to proof testing of the primary cryogenic propellant tanks.
i-2
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A critical flaw over most of the surface of these tanks will involve a
through-thickness crack rather than a surface crack for the materials and
operating stresses currently being considered in space shuttle preliminary
design. A leak-before-break characteristic is desirable for proof test, but
may not be acceptable for operational service with cryogenic propellants.
The proof-test levels required to verify that no initial flaws exist which
could grow through the thickness of the tank walls (rather than to critical
dimensions as a through crack) may impose unacceptable weight penalties on
the shuttle design.
The preceding considerations illustrate that the design criteria for
space shuttle structure must be carefully studied to achieve the basic
program goals of minimum structural weight, minimum program costs, and
demonstrated high reliability. It is further concluded that no single
structural design approach will be adequate to achieve these primary goals.
The most appropriate criteria will probably contain elements of the fail-safe
design approach, fatigue resistant design, and fracture mechanics considera-
tions which include both proof-test verification and nondestructive inspection
as essential elements. In addition, it may be necessary to establish quality
control criteria for material procurement and fabrication operations and
quality assurance procedures for fabrication, checkout and test, and opera-
tional usage to assure effective fracture control of space shuttle structure
over the entire life history, from raw material to the end of operational
service. It is apparent, therefore, that the results of this study program
will be an important element of the basic requirements and development
approach for the space shuttle during final design, fabrication, and opera-
tional phases.
1.2 STUDY APPROACH
The Space Division will conduct this study using, as a point of departure,
the space shuttle design definition and data that are available from the space
shuttle Phase B study programs. It is believed that this study must be based
on typical space shuttle requirements, missions, and structural configurations,
rather than generalized concepts, for the following major reasons:
1. To assure that parametric studies cover applicable ranges of
variables.
2. To provide realistic focus on problems or limitations associated
with design, material characteristics, fabrication processes,
nondestructive evaluation, verification tests, and flight and
maintenance operations.
3. To make efficient use of analyses and data being developed on the
space shuttle Phase B programs that support certain tasks of this
study.
4. To permit realistic assessment of the impact of candidate design
criteria on structural weight, vehicle performance, maintenance
requirements, and program costs.
i-3
SD72-SII-0046
_4_ Space DivisionNorth Amencan Rockwell
The booster vehicle and mission characteristics developed by Convair
Division of General Dynamics during the space shuttle Phase B study program
have been selected as the baseline for this study. This selection has been
made in conjunction with the NASA/MSFC COR. The booster configuration is
designated as B-9U; the characteristics of the vehicle and its associated
mission are described in Reference i. Typical mission characteristics
are used to define reference spectra of structural loadings and environmental
conditions that serve as the basis of safe-life, fail-safe, and fatigue
assessments. Several major structural elements are selected that serve as
the reference structural configurations. Selection is based on design,
material, fabrication, and inspectability considerations so that a representa-
tive sample of all major structural systems is provided. Failure-mode
characteristics of these selected structural elements under the reference
loading/environment spectra are investigated by means of fracture mechanics
and fatigue analysis methods and data. Parametric studies are performed to
determine the e_fects of variation of load/environment spectra, design
configuration, material combinations, and verification methods on structural
weight, vehicle performance, maintenance requirements, etc., for the candidate
criteria of each appropriate failure-mode approach. Results of the parametric
studies are evaluated to determine the most promising criteria candidates,
and recommendations are made for criteria selection.
1.3 STUDY OBJECTIVES
The study program has the following major objectives:
i= To develop rational design criteria to implement fail-safe and
safe-life considerations of critical primary structure of the
space shuttle.
, To demonstrate that the recommended design approaches and
associated criteria are appropriate, practical, and capable of
providing the desired structural reliability and safety. This
requires consideration of the following factors:
a. Mission requirements
b. Performance requirements
c. Service-life requirements
d. Maintenance requirements
e. Material selection
f. Weight control
g. Reliability
SD72-SH-0046
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3. To develop parametric data for evaluation of the effect of changes
in mission, configuration, material selection, and design approach
or criteria on:
a. Performance
b. Service life
c. Maintenance requirements
d. Weight
e. Reliability
4. To bound the magnitude of potential fatigue problems on space
shuttle primary structure and to determine the general level of
attention and design verification criteria required to assure
a fatigue-resistant structure.
I-5
SD72-SH=O046

_ SpaceDivisionNorth American Rockwell
2.0 BASELINE VEHICLE MISSION AND CONFIGURATION
2.1 PROGRAM OBJECTIVE
The objective of the Space Shuttle Program is to provide a low-cost
space transportation system capable of placing and/or retrieving payloads
in earth orbit. To achieve this objective, a fully reusable system capable
of rapid turnaround and airline-type operation has been defined.
Three missions have been identified as representing the requirements
for the definition of the Space Shuttle System. These missions are (A) "The
design mission, i00 n. mi. due east circular orbit. The design mission
insertion orbit shall be 50 x i00 n. mi. and for purposes of performance
comparison calculations the vehicle shall be considered to be launched from
a latitude of 28.5 degrees north; (B) the reference missions of major
interest are: (I) i00 n. mi. south polar circular orbit; (2) 270 n. mi.
at 55 inclination."
To achieve the objectives of the program, a two-stage vehicle capable
of boost and earth entry with cruise-back to a designated landing site has
been defined. This cycle is accomplished with reasonable acceleration
levels, shirt-sleeve cabin environment, and quick, ground-turnaround time
between flights. The significant elements of these missions are ground
operations, mating of the orbiter and booster vehicles, and liftoff followed
by staging of the two vehicles_ with the first-stage booster returning to
the launch area and the second-stage orbiter continuing on to the prescribed
insertion orbit. Following a series of orbital maneuvers, the orbiter
delivers and/or retrieves its payload and, at the appropriate orbital
position, reenters the atmosphere, acquires the landing site, and completes
the approach and landing. Following safing at the landing area, the vehicle
enters a turnaround cycle consisting of thorough postflight inspection, a
maintenance cycle, installation of a new payload, and mating with the
booster vehicle. This mated system is checked out and returned to the launch
area to begin a new mission cycle.
2.2 MISSION PROFILES
2.2.1 Operational Mission
Mission operations are summarized in Figure 2-1.
operational mission are discussed below.
Major phases of the
Ascent
The ascent phase is defined as beginning with engine ignition and
ending with the initiation of separation. In the ignition/liftoff sequence,
the thrust rises to 50 percent of full thrust and holds at that level until
2-i
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main-stage in all engines can be verified and holddown release is verified.
Upon verification, the thrust is increased at a controlled rate to i00 percent.
The vehicle liftoff occurs when the thrust-to-weight ratio (T/W) is greater
than i.
During the ignition sequence the thrust vector control (TVG) is posi-
tioned to point at the vehicle center of gravity, and it maintains this
position until the booster clears the holddown mechanism. Then the TVC
controls the vehicle to required pitch, yaw, and roll attitudes until the
vehicle clears the service towers. Commands to ensure tower clearance are
either calculated by the onboard guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C)
system or are programmed to a fixed time.
After the vehicle has cleared the service towers, the TVC is commanded
by the GN&C system to provide roll, orienting the vehicle to the correct
azimuth, and pitch, to provide the proper trajectory, such that the vehicle
assumes a wing-level, pilot-side-up attitude and correct azimuth. TVC
continues to control the vehicle to a preprogrammed pitch rate and fixed
roll/yaw attitudes. During the period of 60 to 90 seconds, a yaw plane
acceleration feedback system is switched in to reduce sideslip angle to
minimize the induced roll.
At 125 seconds a closed loop guidance steering command is mixed with
commanded pitch rate and the yaw attitude command to minimize trajectory
dispersions and to steer the vehicle to the desired staging point. As
propellant is depleted, along with increased thrust at altitude, the vehicle
acceleration reaches 3g. At this point, approximately 160 seconds after
launch, the main engines are throttled to maintain 3g for crew comfort and
vehicle design loads. Ascent phase is terminated by initiation of separation
based on indication of propellant depletion. Ascent trajectory parameters
are given in Figure 2-2. The booster weight decreases from 4,188,000 ib at
launch to about 806,000 ib at separation, while achieving a velocity of
10,800 fps at an altitude of 245,000 ft.
Separation
Near booster burnout, a signal from the booster LO 2 depletion sensor
initiates the separation sequences. At depletion sensor signal, the booster
engines are stepped to 50-percent thrust. Concurrently the orbiter engines
are started and brought to 50-percent thrust. _hen both sets of engines are
at 50-percent thrust and propellant depletion is imminent, the restraint
mechanism between orbiter and booster is released, booster thrust decays to
zero, and the orbiter rotates upwards and aft, relative to the booster, on
separation system linkages until the orbiter is freed and accelerating under
its own thrust. The control of all sequencing functions necessary for
separation and maintaining control of both orbiter and booster is accomplished
by software in the main computers of each vehicle.
After separation, the orbiter continues on its orbital mission and the
booster positions itself for entry, using ACPS engines.
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Entry
The booster entry phase starts at separation and terminates when the
booster descends to 20,000 feet and deploys air-breathing engines for cruise
back to the launch site. The entry mode for the B-9U booster is a supersonic
transition. The angle of attack is reduced as Mach number is decreased; the
angle of attack schedule is presented in Figure 2-3. Pitch and bank angle
scheduling is used to minimize the flyback distance to the landing site with
a 4.0g maximum load factor constraint. The entry phase is assumed to be
concluded when the booster descends to an altitude of 20,000 feet.
The baseline entry trajectory is for a 100-n.mi. south polar circular
orbit mission launched from the Western Test Range. Significant events
during the booster entry are listed in Table 2-1. Staging occurs 216 seconds
after launch. During the next 40 seconds the booster banks to a 55-degree
angle and then pitches to a 60-degree angle of attack. That attitude is
maintained until the load factor builds up to a maximum limit of 4.0g, which
occurs 360 seconds after launch, at Mach 8.4. For the next 30 seconds the
angle of attack is modulated downward. A peak dynamic pressure of 409 psf
occurs at the end of the pitch modulation at Mach 6.3 and at an attitude of
30 degrees. Between Mach 6.3 and 2.5 the booster is kept at an angle of
attack of 30 degrees and banked at 75 degrees. After 490 seconds, at
Mach 1.7, the vehicle has turned around 180 degrees and is headed back to
the launch site. The bank angle is reduced to 0 degree. From Mach 2.5 to
i.i the angle of attack is reduced to 5 degrees, which is held through the
transonic region. The subsonic attitude is i0 degrees. By 655 seconds
after launch the booster has come down to an altitude of 20,000 feet, where
the remaining flyback distance to the landing site is 399 n.mi. At the
completion of the entry phase the gross weight of the booster has decreased
slightly to 787,000 lb.
Cruise
The flyback profile is initiated at 20,000 feet, _ere the cruise
engines are assumed to be fully deployed and operating normally; flyback
range is determined from this point. An idle power descent is made to the
optimum cruise altitude; this is the altitude for maximum specific range.
The vehicle is then operated at the best cruise altitude for the duration
of the cruise flight. For the mission with all engines operating in still
air, the idle power descent is made to 14,500 feet, and a cruise climb at
the optimum cruise altitude is performed between 14,500 feet and 18,500 feet.
For the engine out case, the vehicle is operated at the optimum cruise
altitudes between 5000 ft and 13,500 ft. An idle power descent is made
from the end of cruise altitude to sea level for the completion of the
flyback segment.
The flyback range requirement from the 20,000-foot altitude point is
399 n.mi.
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Landing
The requirement for landing performance of the booster is that it land
on a 10,000-foot runway on standard day conditions. This has been interpreted
to include a 50-foot obstacle.
The basic landing technique for the B-9U booster is to approach from a
50-foot obstacle at a three degree glide slope and touchdown at ii0 percent
of the free air minimum velocity for the landing configuration. This results
in a touchdown angle of attack of about 11.5 degrees. The booster has a
3 fps sink rate at touchdown, and there is a three second delay from touchdown
until the nose gear is down and a one second delay from nose gear down until
the brakes are applied. The baseline landing configuration is with 3 degree
elevons, trimmed with the canard at 15 degrees. The entire landing is
executed with the booster in this configuration.
2.2.2 Ferry Mission
Requirements and Criteria
Self-ferry performance requirements are defined as a selected flight
route from KSC to Edwards AFB with several intermediate stope, as illustrated
in Figure 2-4. Two segments from this route appear to require the greatest
ferry capability, i.e.:
I. 300 n.mi. segment from KSC to Robbins AFB requiring takeoff
capability from a 10,000-foot runway under sea level hot day
conditions.
. 235 n.mi. segment from Biggs AFB to Davis_onthan AFB requiring
takeoff capability from 13,600-foot runway at an elevation of
4000 feet under hot day conditions.
In determining self-ferry performance of the B-9U booster, the following
mission profile was assumed:
i. Takeoff over a 35-foot obstacle utilizing the balanced field concept.
2. Climb to cruise altitude at maximum rate of climb against a 50-knot
headwind.
3. Cruise at constant altitude at maximum specific range against a
50-knot head_ind to the point of no return.
. Continue cruise at constant altitude with one engine inoperative
against a 50-knot headwind at maximum specific range from point
of no return to beginning of descent.
5. Descend at L/Dma x at idle power with one engine inoperative against
a 50-knot headwind.
6. Fuel reserves equal to 20 minutes at maximum endurance at sea level
with all engines operating were included.
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B-9U Ferry Configuration
The B-9U ferry configuration is a modification of the baseline configu-
ration that includes a tail cone which eliminates the blunt base region and
improves the aerodynamic efficiency significantly.
Four rocket engines are removed for ferry operations to maintain the
required balance. This results in an overall weight reduction of 8000 pounds.
For ferry performance calculations, the following range of weights was used:
Pounds
%in = 631,828
Wfuel = 143,786
W = 775,614
max
Typical Mission Profile
The characteristics of a typical ferry mission are given in Figure 2-5.
These characteristics are based on the following operating modes.
For ferry takeoff the canard is set at _c = +i0 degrees and control is
provided with the elevon. The ground roll attitude is equivalent to an angle
of attack of _ = -2.7 degrees. At sea level under hot day conditions the
maximum takeoff gross weight is limited to 724,000 ib for a 10,000-foot
runway. At 4000 feet under hot day conditions, the maximum takeoff gross
weight is limited to 765,000 Ib for a 13,600-foot runway.
Climb performance is based on the air-breathing engines operating at
maximum continuous power and the vehicle trimmed at an attitude that results
in a maximum rate of climb at a given gross weight and altitude. A cruise
altitude of 20,000 feet provides maximum specific ground range. Descent
performance is based on operating at (L/D)ma x with idle power.
2.3 BOOSTER CONFIGURATION
2.3.1 General Arransement
The booster is shown in three view in Figure 2-6. The layout shows
the external shape, major component arrangement, and the overall dimensions
of the booster. A perspective cut-away drawing is given in Figure 2-7 which
shows the general arrangement and structural configuration.
The B-9U booster is a low, delta wing vehicle with a single vertical
tail and a small canard surface mounted forward above the body centerline.
The body is basically a cylinder with fairings added to streamline the
intersections with the aerodynamic surfaces.
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Twelve main liquid-oxygen/liquid-hydrogen (LO2/LH2) high-chamber-
pressure rocket engines of 550 thousand pounds sea level thrust each are
installed in a cruciform pattern in the body base. These engines have an
expansion ratio of 35:1 with ±10-degree gimbal provided for thrust vector
control. Twelve turbofan engines, used for the subsonic flyback approach
and landing, are shown in the extended position below the wing and body.
The landing gear is shown in the down position. The dual-wheel,
steerable-nose-gear assembly and the two four-wheel-bogie main landing gear
assemblies are of conventional design. The main gear retracts forward in
a manner to avoid flow interference with the air-breathing engine inlets.
The crew compartment is conventionally located in the forebody. Visors
are used to protect the forward windshields during the boost and entry flights.
Internally the booster is arranged with the LO 2 tank forward and the
LH 2 tank aft. The tanks are of aluminum alloy, and they provide the primary
load-carrying structure of the booster as well as functioning as pressure
vessels. The tank diameter is 33 feet. The tanks are joined by a cylindrical
inter_a_k section that supports the canard pivot point and the forward attach
links to the orbiter. The aft end of the LI[2 tank picks up the cylindrical
thrust skim, which is also 33 feet in diameter and includes truss-type
thrust beams that intersect to form the main engine thrust pad/gimbal support
points. The forward end of the LO 2 tank supports a tapered skirt that
terminates in a bulkhead that supports the nose landing gear (Station 1339).
The main landing gear is supported from trunnion points on external frames
attached co the LII2 tank. All the structural frames are external to the
main tanks. The LH 2 tank is internally insulated. The orbiter forward
attach points are at the aft LO 2 dome/intertank joint and take the axial
loads as well as pitch and side loads, while the aft attach points, which
take pitch and sideloads only, are at Station 2666 in the LH 2 tank region
(Section C-C). The top of the booster is flat in the stage interface
region to fair out the attach frames of the booster and to accommodate the
booster linkage after separation.
The outer heat shield provides an aerodynamic surface for the body,
which varies from a circular cross section at the nose gear station to a
gradually flattening lower surface-transitioning into the wing fillet. The
heat shield is also formed to provide the fairing to the fully pivoting
canard at Station 2024, as well as the fairing for the orbiter interface.
The heat shield is primarily of shallow corrugated frame stiffened panels
utilizing Rene' 41 alloy principally, and titanium alloy in the regions of
lower aerodynamic heating. The heat shield is supported via links from the
primary structure to allow for expansion. The forebody ahead of Station
1479 is supported as an extension of the heat shield itself and moves with
it, except for the nose gear that, as previously explained, is supported
from an extension skirt on the primary load-carrying LO 2 tank.
The delta wing is mounted below the LH 2 tank. The wing carrythrough
spars are reduced in depth in the center section to allow the wing to
overlap the tank in the side view and thus minimize base area. The wing
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attaches to the hydrogen tank frames and to the thrust structure via a series
of links designed to take out relative expansion differentials between the
wing and the body.
The delta wing has a theoretical area of 8451 sq ft and an exposed area
of 5047 sq ft installed at +2-degree angle of incidence to the body centerline
to facilitate cruise and to reduce landing angle within the constraints of
the boost loads on the wing. The leading edge sweep is 53 degrees. The
installation of the JTF22A-4 air-breathing engines in the wing requires a
maximum thickness chord ratio of 10.3 percent at wing Station 507.5 just
outboard of the outboard engine. Installation of these engines below the
body in the center section requires a 7.l-percent theoretical root thickness
at the vehicle centerline. The airfoils are NASA four digit series with
modifications to the leading edge radii and with conical camber at the tips
to improve L/D. The trailing edge of the wing is perpendicular to the body
centerline with elevons segmented into three spanwise parts for varying
degrees of control. The wing structure is primarily titanium alloy with
two main structural boxes. The forward box accommodates the airbreathing
engines. The lower surface of the wing is thermally protected by a system
of dynaflex insulation with metallic radiation cover panels.
The vertical tail is located on the body centerline. It has an area
of 1500 sq ft with a leading edge sweep of 35 degrees to provide orbiter
separation clearance consistent with weight and aerodynamic considerations.
The tail thickness varies from 13 percent at the root to ii percent at the
tip. A 35-percent chord rudder is provided with ±25 degrees of travel.
The base of the rudder is cut off at 15 degrees to provide clearance for
the upper rocket engines. Vent and exhaust lines are terminated at the
fin tip trailing edge. The leading edge of the vertical tail has increased
material thickness to act as a heat sink during the brief period of plume
impingement during orbiter separation.
The canard provides a total exposed area of 504 sq ft. The leading
edge sweep is 60 degrees and the thickness is 14 percent. The entire
surface is pivoted at 56 percent of the root chord and moves 65 degrees
nose down to decouple the effect of the surface during hypersonic entry.
The surface wipes a body fairing to maintain a seal at all points along the
do_ travel. This seal is to minimize entry heating. Upward travel of the
leading edge of the canard is 30 degrees.
The main landing gear retracts forward into the wing fillet region.
The main gear bogies incorporate 60-inch x 20-inch 40 PR tires. The nose
gear has dual 47 x 18 tires.
Four main L02 lines are routed through the lower body main structure/
heat shield interspace, past the main landing gear and aft to the vehicle
base.
The outboard rocket engine powerhead packages are protected by local
fairings tailored to keep the base area reduced to a minimum. A base heat
shield is provided across the entire base station in the plane of the engine
throats.
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The crew compartment is conventionally located. Swivel seats adjustable
for the vertical flight, entry, and cruise flight are provided for the captain
and co-pilot, in conventional locations. The crew compartment is pressurized
for shirtsleeve environment. Heat shields are provided over the windshields,
which are sized for adequate landing visibility at the maximum 15-degree
touchdown angle. Access with the booster in the vertical position is via a
door to the left of the pilot seat. Access with the booster in the horizontal
position is via a door in the compartment floor reached through the nose-gear
wheel well. Aft of the crew compartment are the booster avionics systems
installed in a controlled environment but separate from the crew compartment.
Below the crew and avionics compartments is the nose-gear wheel well. The
attitude control propulsion system (ACPS) engines are installed at Station
1300, eight on each side for yaw and four on top for pitchdown. (Pitchup
and roll are provided by five engines on each wing.) The ACPS engines use
LO2/LH 2 propellants and deliver 2100 pounds of vacuum thrust each.
The flyback JP fuel is contained, as shown, in two compartments under
the body between the main landing gears and in a tank in the nose. The fuel
is fed to the four JTF22A-4 airbreathing engines under the body at Station
3560 and to the four similar engines in each wing.
Four auxiliary power units are installed in the wing root and ahead of
the airbreathing engine bays and are accessible through doors in the wing
upper surface.
The airbreathing engines are installed in podded configurations,
pivoted at the aft support point. Each engine assembly has its own deploy-
ment rotary actuators. Longitudinal doors in the lower surface open to
allow deployment of the airbreathing engines to the subsonic cruise position.
The engines rotate through 180 degrees to the locked-extended position.
Upon engine deployment the engine bay doors close to present a clean surface
for cruise and landing.
2.3.2 Body Structure
The load-carrying body structure consists of five component assemblies
which are bolted together to comprise the assembled structure. They are:
i. Forward skirt structure.
2. Liquid oxygen tank.
3. Intertank adapter.
4. Liquid hydrogen tank.
5. Thrust structure and base heat shield.
All of the components, except the thrust structure, are fabricated
from aluminum alloy. The thrust structure is built of titanium and utilizes
boron-aluminum composite materials for selected structural elements to
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reduce weight and to increase stiffness. The base heat shield is coated
columbium and Rene' 41. Its supporting structure uses titanium, Rene' 41
and tubular members of beryllium.
The wing (including the airbreathing engines), vertical stabilizer,
canard surfaces, nose landing gear, rocket engines and the orbiter are
attached to the basic body structure. The body is a "cold" structure while
the aerodynamic surfaces are "hot" structure. Attachment method allows
for thermal expansion of the hot structures with minimum restraint from
the body. This is accomplished by the use of axially loaded links in
correct number and orientation to carry all load combinations. All links
contain mono-ball end fittings to preclude lateral restraint.
The enveloping body thermal protection system is a "hot" structure and
is attached to the body structure by a series of fixed and linked connections.
Air loads and inertia loads from the thermal protection system shells are
applied to the body structure through these connections. The crew compart-
ment is integrated with tke forward segment of the body thermal protection
system.
Forward Skirt
The forward skirt structure is sho_cn in Figure 2-8. It consists of
two stiffened aluminum alloy shells, one a short cylindrical section, the
other a short conical section, and machined aluminum alloy frames. A
circumferential pattern of tension bolts at the skirt's aft edge attaches
it to the forward end of the liquid oxygen tank. The main trunnion of the
nose landing gear is supported by the forward frame and a truss arrangement
of tubes supports the upper end of the landing gear drag strut from the
two frames. Vertical and side loads from the nose gear are introduced into
the shell by the two frames. Longitudinal loads are introduced directly
into the shell by back-up members behind the main trunnions. Sheet metal
frames stabilize the skin/stringer shell between the machined load-introduction
frames.
A cylindrical JP fuel tank is supported from the forward frame of the
skirt. Vertical support loads are passed to the skirt shell through the
deepened lower segment of the frame; longitudinal loads are carried to
suitable stiffeners on the shell skin. Side load brace tubes are provided
at each end of the tank.
The most forward attac1_ent of the thermal protection system is also
made through the skirt structure. Vertical links on each side and rollers,
in tracks, at the top and bottom carry vertical and lateral reactions from
the thermal protection system into the shell. There is no longitudinal
restraint for the thermal protection system at this station.
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Figure 2-8. Forward Skirt Structure
LOX Tank
The liquid oxygen tank is designed largely by internal pressure
resulting from the high density of the oxidizer and the axial accelerations
of the vehicle. Bending moments are not as great as those further aft in
the liquid hydrogen tank.
The oxygen tank is a welded assembly of 2219T87 aluminum alloy with
forward and aft circumferential bolt patterns for joining it to the forward
skirt and to the intertank adapter structures. Tank wall segments, with
integral stringers, are milled from aluminum alloy plates, age formed to
radius and buttwelded together to make the cylindrical tank section.
2-19
SD72-SH-0046
#J_ Space DivisionNorth Amencan Rockwell
End bulkheads are ellipsoidal (/_ diameter ratio) consisting of gores edge-
welded together. The bulkheads are welded to the ends of the cylindrical
section. Pressurization inlet and vent ports are provided. An access door
is installed in the forward dome. A cylindrical sumpD from which four
liquid oxygen ducts lead to the main propulsion system, is incorporated
in the aft dome.
Stabilizing frames, external to the tank, are spaced at 77-inch
intervals. The frames are built up of a series of V forgings riveted
between an outboard T flange and the longitudinal stringers of the tank.
The V's, in conjunction with the outboard flange and the tank wall, form
a truss-webbed stabilizing frame. The frame is shown in detail in
Figure 2-9.
Since the temperature of liquid oxygen will not liquefy air on the
tank's exterior, no cryogenic insulation is installed.
The forward orbiter attachment station is at the tangency of the
ellipsoidal dome with the cylindrical section of the oxygen tank. A
machined aluminum alloy internal/external bulkhead is integrated with the
tank wail at this station. To achieve maximum bulkhead depth, part of
the bulkhead extends beyond the tank skin to support the forward orbiter
attachment links. A projecting section of bulkhead, on each side of the
booster, provides for two attachments between the booster and the launch
tower. The tower supports the booster during high wind conditions and
reduces body bending.
intertank Adapter Structure
The intertank adapter is a shell structure with a circumferential
bolt pattern at each end to match those on the aft end of the oxygen tank
aud on the forward end of the hydrogen tank. It is of aluminum alloy
construction consisting of integrally stiffened skins and six frames. It
is a mechanically fastened structure since liquid containment is not
required. In addition to carrying body bending loads, orbiter longitudinal
loads are transmitted to the booster via the intertank adapter. See
Figure 2-10.
The forward pair of orbiter launch links, which are also the orbiter
attacl_nent drag struts, are hinged to a longitudinal fitting on each side
of the intertank structure. The forward and aft ends of the fitting are
supported by frames approximately 144 inches apart.
A webbed external bulkhead extends from the intertank shell to the
inboard side of the thermal protection system and forms one of the fixed
supports for the TPS. In addition, the bulkhead serves as a purge system
barrier in the annular space between the shell wall and the TPS.
Two independent canard surfaces are supported by the intertank
structure. The canard spindle extends inboard through the adapter skin
and is supported by a pair of large diameter bearings, one outboard and
2-20
SD72-S11=0046
#_) Space DivisionNorth Amencan Rockwell
\
\
>,
0
. ,..-i
.,-.i
!
_a
2-21
SD72-SH-0046
_ Space DivisionNorth American Rockwell
o
u
u9
o
_O
<
d
I
o_
2-22
SD72=SH-0046
#_ Space DivisionNorth Amencan Rockwell
one inboard. The bearing housings are supported between a pair of frames
inside the intertank structure. The hydraulic actuator cylinders are also
supported by the frames.
The liquid oxygen ducts pass through the skin of the intertank adapter
near the bottom of the vehicle and are routed aft between the body structure
and the thermal protection system.
LH 2 Tank
The liquid hydrogen tank is shown in Figure 2-11. In construction it
is similar to the liquid oxygen tank though the integral T-section stringers
are more closely spaced to develop higher compression allowables. Poly-
phenylene oxide foam bonded to the inside of the tank wall provides cryogenic
insulation and prevents condensation of liquid air on the exterior surface.
External tank stabilizing frames are of the built-up type described
for the liquid oxygen tank.
An access door is provided in the forward bulkhead of the liquid
hydrogen tank.
The orbiter aft support links and the aft separation system links are
attached to the tank shell through two external frames machined from 2219
aluminum alloy plate. A circumferential band of thickened tank skin forms
the inboard flange for each of these frames; the skin band also incorporates
a vertical circumferential rib. A frame web/circumferential rib weld
completes the frame installation. All tank frames for the introduction of
concentrated loads into the tank shell are of similar construction.
Wing attachment is made by three vertical links and one longitudinal
drag link on each side of the body. Three lateral load links also attach
the wing to the tank and to the thrust structure. The links contain spherical
bearings at each end and carry only axial loads. The wing is able to deflect
under load and temperature gradients with minimal restraint from the fuselage.
Thrust Structure and Base Heat Shield
The thrust structure is a stiffened shell and is bolted to the aft end
of the liquid hydrogen tank. It contains two transverse trussed-type
bulkheads spaced 82 inches apart. These bulkheads distribute loads into
the shell structure from the vertical stabilizer, the aft wing attachment
struts, and the gimballed rocket engines. Trusses in longitudinal planes
between the bulkheads comprise four thrust beams to which the rocket engines
are attached. See Figure 2-12.
Intermediate circumferential frames stabilize the shell.
Four fittings, external to the thrust structure shell, support the
booster/orbiter in the vertical launch position.
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Figure 2-12. Thrust Structure
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Spherical segments are installed on each rocket engine to provide a
sealing surface for deflected engine positions. A mating ring and seal for
each engine is supported from the aft structural bulkhead of the thrust
structure. A heat shield consisting of corrugated panels and backed by
insulation material is installed between and supported from the seal rings.
The circumference of the base heat shield is defined by the rocket engine
fairings. The skin extending forward of the base heat shield is part of
the body thermal protection system.
Crew Compartment
Figure 2-13 illustrates the general structural arrangement of the crew
compartment. It is a semi-monocoque structure incorporating rings and
longitudinal stringers. _ere possible, the structure is installed on the
skin exterior. There are four openings in the structure: the windshield_
the aft compartment access hatch, and two hatches opposite the pilots seats.
The module consists of two compartments, the pilots station and the elec-
tronics compartment. These compartments are separated by an internal
bulkhead. The aft end of the module is closed by an ellipsoidal bulkhead.
The electronic compartment is cylindrical in section while the crew compart-
ment is faired to maintain as much curvature as is compatible with the hot
nose structure contour and internal furnishing envelope.
FWD ATTACH
SUPT
TRUSS
WI
INTER-COMPARTMENT
BULKHEAD
CREW ACCESS HATCH
Figure 2-13. Crew Compartment
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The compartment is supported by the hot nose shell structure at four
points: at two points just aft of the crew compartment hatch and at two
points on the frame at end of the electronics compartment. The gap between
the nose structure and the crew compartment at the aft support is spanned
by a pin ended truss. This truss will minimize thermal loads on both the
nose structure and the compartment structure as the outer shell expands.
The structural material of the crew compartment is aluminum alloy
except in those areas where the hot nose structure is in close proximity
to the compartment structure. In these regions, such as the windshield
frame and the pilot's hatches, the structure will be fabricated from
6 AI-4V titanium alloy. With the exception of the glazed areas the entire
compartment is shrouded by a fibrous insulation blanket. The inner door
windows are fabricated from heat tempered glass. The outer door windows
are made from fused silica glass. The windshield is a laminated glass with
an electrically conductive film for anti-icing. The floor and the bulkhead
separating the electronics compartment from the crew station consist of
aluminum alloy honeycomb panels backed up by a grid work of beams.
2.3.3 Aerodynamic Surfaces
Wing
The wing structure is shown in Figure 2-14. The wing structural
arrangement is a fail-safe multi-spar, multi-rib configuration utilizing
open corrugation cover panels on the upper surface and a thermally protected
lower surface. The corrugations are positioned in a chordwise direction to
minimize thermal stresses by accommodating skin expansion relative to the
spar caps. The covers transmit air loads to the spars and reacts wing
torsional loads. The wing has a hot leading edge, two primary structural
boxes, an under-body carry-through and trailing edge elevons. Titanium
alloy 6 AI-4V is used for the wing box structure. Boost phase venting is
accommodated through the gap between the elevon and the fixed trailing edge
upper surface. The wing inboard closing bulkhead redistributes spar shear
loads to wing-to-body support fittings and the wing loads are reacted to
the body through wing-to-body attach links. The corrugated bulkhead shear
web allows for differential chordwise thermal expansion and the attach
links accommodate wing deflection and relative thermal expansion between
wing and body. Twelve flyback airbreathing engines are submerged in the
wing structure during boost and recovery and are deployed for subsonic
cruise and landing.
The main JP fuel tank is located just forward of the wing carry-through
structure between the body TPS and the LH 2 tank. The JP tank is supported
from the LH 2 tank and the HLG support structure and is protected by the TPS.
The tank is constructed of aluminum alloy honeycomb sandwich panels with
aluminum ribs and beams.
Canard
The canard structure is shown in Figure 2-15. The canard is a fully
movable surface. The structural box is a multi-spar, multi-rib configuration
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with corrugated titanium structural skins supported on a welded, corrugated
shear web substructure. The structural skins are protected with a TPS. The
TPS consists of an insulation material and a semi-smooth outer skin supported
from the structural skin by standoffs. The corrugated shear webs of the
spars and ribs accommodate differential thermal expansion. A slotted-hinge
leading edge is used to allow for spanwise thermal expansion relative to the
front spar. The structural box is fixed to a pivot tube at the inboard rib.
The outboard pivot tube/rib attachment is a sliding joint to accommodate
differential thermal expansion between the pivot tube and the outer surfaces.
Bending loads are carried through the pivot tube and reacted through two
bearings supported in the intertank structure. Spherical self-aligning
bearings are employed to allow for structural deflections. Venting is
accommodated through the pivot tube into the intertank structure and then
through the body vent ports.
Vertical Stabilizer
The vertical stabilizer structure is shown in Figure 2-16. The vertical
stabilizer structural arrangement is a three-spar, multi-rib configuration
with integrally stiffened skin/stringer panels. Spar and rib webs are of
corrugated or trussed construction to allow for differential thermal expan-
sion. The rudder is of similar construction. The entire structure is
6 AI-4V titanium except for the leading edge which is Rene' 41. The segment
of leading edge that is subjected to the orbiter engine exhaust impingement
is "heat sink" designed to withstand the increased temperature. Vertical
stabilizer bending loads are reacted through spar-to-thrust-structure attach
fittings at the center and rear spar. Torsional loads are reacted at the
front spar pin joint and the rear spar attach fittings. The APU exhaust
and the hydrogen vent lines are vented at the vertical stabilizer tip.
2.3.4 Body Thermal Protection System (TPS)
Figure 2-17 depicts an overall view of the baseline TPS adopted for
the body of the booster. The TPS is a metallic radiative system which
protects the load carrying primary structure to a peak temperature compatible
with the aluminum structural material and the LH 2 tank insulation. No
insulation is required to accomplish this. The TPS concept consists
essentially of a separate stiffened shell that completely surrounds the
basic primary structure. Support of the TPS shell from the primary structure
is effected by two means. At each of three body stations, 2096, 2458, and
2811, the shell is rigidly attached around the periphery by mechanical
fastening of the shell skin to the outer flanges of deep external primary
structure frames. These attachments provide restraint of the TPS shell in
all three axes. The restraint locations are selected to minimize thermal
displacement of the shell relative to the canard pivot and the orbiter
attachment fittings. The other method of support, in addition to the fixed
supports, consists of a system of swinging links which attach the TPS shell
to the primary structure and permit relative thermal growth longitudinally
between these components. Forward of the fixed restraint at Station 2096,
the entire forward section of the shell, including the hot nose structure,
is free to expand longitudinally relative to the body primary structure.
Support is provided by a link arrangement at Station 1423. The TPS shell
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Figure 2-16. Vertical Stabilizer
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section over the wing is supported by the wing and is free to expand with
the wing. Between the fixed stations, peripheral slip joints accommodate
displacements due to the thermal expansion of the shell and the cryogenic
contraction of the propellant tanks. Swinging links provide support for the
free end of each section of the shell at each slip joint.
Each TPS shell section is essentially a frame-supported semimonocoque
structure with open corrugation-stiffened skins. The primary loading on
this shell structure is the lower surface air pressure induced by the
hypersonic pull-out condition during booster recovery. The panel loads
induced by this pressure are transmitted by the TPS frames to shear into
the side walls of the shell and to be finally transmitted to the body
primary structure by the system of fixed and link supports.
The TPS frames are stiffness critical since excessive in-plane deflec-
tion would cause interference with the propellant tank structure and
subsystem components. A design that incorporates a material of high specific
elastic modulus has therefore been adopted. The basic cross-section of the
frame is an I section of aluminum, pocket milled to minimize web gages and
to provide integral web stiffeners. To each cap of the aluminum section
is attached a cap strip of beryllium to produce a frame design of high
stiffness to weight ratio. The high specific heat of beryllium is also
advantageous in that the beryllium strip adjacent to tile hot outer skin
provides a heat sink to absorb the "flash heating" effect characteristic
of booster recovery and thereby create an acceptable temperature distri-
bution through the frame.
The outer skin of the TPS shell features open corrugations to provide
longitudinal stiffening and to accommodate circumferential thermal expan-
sion relative to the cooler frames by flexing of the corrugations. Attach-
ment of the corrugated skin to the frames is by mechanical fasteners in
each of the "valleys" of the corrugation.
The TPS shell sections are further broken do_ into conveniently sized
panel assemblies by the provision of bolted splices. This arrangement
facilitates panel production, simplifies assembly, and allows periodic
"in service" removal of individual panels for inspection and repair of the
underlying structure and subsystems. As previously noted, individual skin
panels within tile panel assemblies are mechanically attached, a feature
that will permit easy replacement or repair in service. In addition to
these provisions, quick-open access panels will be located where required
for the routine maintenance of subsystems.
2.3.5 Weight Summary
A summary weight statement for the B-9U booster is given in Table 2-2.
Detail weight breakdowns for the wing group, vertical tail group, and body
group are given in Tables 2-3, 2-4, and 2-5, respectively. All weight data
are taken from Reference 2.
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Table 2-2. B-9U Booster Weight Summary
Wing Group
Tail Group
Vertical Tail
Canard
Body Group
LH 2 Tank
L02 Tank
Thrust Structure
Other Body Structure
Induced Environmental Protection
Landing, Docking
Propulsion, Ascent
Propulsion, Cruise
Propulsion, Auxiliary
Prime Power
Electrical Conversion and Distribution
Hydraulic Conversion and Distribution
Surface Controls
Avionics
Environmental Control
Personnel Provision
Contingency
SUBTOTAL (DRY WEIGHT)
Personnel
Residual Fluids
SUBTOTAL (INERT WEIGHT)
Inflight Losses
Propellant - Ascent
Propellant - Cruise
Propellant - Maneuver and ACS
TOTAL BOOSTER WEIGHT AT LIFTOFF
Weight (ibs)
70,875
20,634
13,121
7,513
177,612
67,109
18,405
30,000
62,098
72,031
27_361
130,038
46,404
9,864
3,011
1,438
1,862
7,889
5,468
I_475
985
49,593
626,540
476
11,534
638,550
22,080
3,382,307
143,786
1,500
4,188,223
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Table 2-3. B-9U Booster Wing Group Weight Breakdown
Exposed Wing
Structural Box
Spars
Webs
Caps
Splices
Ribs
Webs
Caps
Upper Covers
Covers
Formers
Lower Covers
Covers
Formers
Engine Bay Formers
Leadin$ Edge
Trailin$ Edse
Secondary Structure
Thermal Protection Skins,
Insulation, and Standoffs
Fairings - Wing to Fuselage
Engine Bay Doors
Door Actuation
Elevons
4,176
6,868
3,506
3,512
1,644
4,378
982
2,558
764
1,081
Weight (ibs)
29,469
14,550
5,156
5,360
4,403
3,996
681
11,678
8,122
1,000
2,108
448
8,379
54,203
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Table 2-3. B-9U Booster Wing Group Weight Breakdown
(continued)
Weight (ibs)
Wing Carry-Through Structure
Structural Box
Spars
Webs
Caps
Ribs
Webs
Caps
Lower Covers
Covers
Formers
Engine Bay Formers
Wing to Fuselage Attach
Fittings
Leading Edge
Secondary Structure
Wing to Fuselage Attach Links
1,669
7,404
2,498
1,835
9,073
4,333
1,650
818
292
540
394
600
15,450
622
600
16,672
TOTAL WING GROUP WEIGIiT 70,875
NOTE: The wing carry-through lower surface coverings and doors
blanked out by the fuselage act as body heat shield structure;
therefore, their weights have been included under Induced
Environmental Protection. The items allocated to Induced
Environmental Protection include:
Belly Skins, Insulation, and Standoffs
Engine Bay Doors
Main Landing Gear Doors
Total
3,765
1,054
2,1os
6,927
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Table 2-4. B-9U Booster Vertical Tail Group Weight Breakdown
Weight (ibs)
Structural Box
Spar Caps
Front
Intermediate
Rear
Auxiliary
Spar Webs
Front
Intermediate
Rear
Auxiliary
Ribs and Bulkheads
Root Rib
Interspar Ribs
Bulkheads
Chordwise Stiffeners
Covers
Hinge Fittings (Integral with Spars)
Tail to Fuselage Attach Fittings
and Fasteners
Leading Edge
Covers
Trusses and Supports
Trailing Edge
Covers
Stiffeners
Ribs
Tip
Rudder
49
351
338
41
146
443
464
196
271
379
835
9,301
779
1,249
1,485
567
4,517
168
536
866
292
574
316
235
30
51
5O9
2,129
TOTAL VERTICAL TAIL GROUP WEIGHT 13,121
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Table 2-5. B-9U Booster Body Group Weight Breakdown
_lain LH 2 Tank
Forward Dome
Aft Dome
Barrel Section
Skin-Stiffeners
Frames
Baffles
Orbiter Attach Structure
Forward Bulkhead
Aft Bulkhead
Load Distribution
(weight required for)
LH 2 Tank Internal Insulation (PPO Foam)
Main LO 2 Tank
Forward Dome
Aft Dome
Barrel Section
Skin-Stiffeners
Frames
Baffles
Orbiter Attach Structure
Forward Bulkhead
Load Distribution
(weight required for)
Weight (ibs)
52,658
4,632
1,650
800
2,900
1,947
1,947
57,290
575
5,350
67,109
9,138
445
2,690
625
1,405
2,902
9,583
1,200
3,315
7,168
18,405
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Table 2-5. B-9U Booster Body Group Weight Breakdown
(Continued)
Nose Section
Forward Adapter Section
Intertank Basic Structure
Orbiter Bulkheads - Intertank Section
Weight (ibs)
Thrust Structure
Skin Panels
Frames
Thrust Beams
Thrust Posts
Ground Fittings
Bulkheads
LO 2 Line Backup
Tank Attach Bolts
9,579
2,470
6,284
3,060
1,332
5,509
2OO
25O
Joints, Splices, and Fasteners
Other Miscellaneous and Secondary Structure
Crew and Avionics Compartment
Engine Heat Protection
Orbiter Attach and Separation Mechanism
Main Landing Gear and Wing Bulkheads
1,316
1,800
5,235
3,655
10,830
10,135
3,652
14,141
5,482
30,000
21,520
TOTAL BODY GROUP WEIGHT 177,612
o Q
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3.0 STRUCTURAL DESIGN LOADS AND CRITERIA FOR BASELINE VEHICLE
3.1 STRUCTURAL DESIGN CRITERIA
Structural design criteria that are pertinent to the present study and
are reflected in the characteristics of the baseline vehicle are summarized
in the following sections. These criteria have been abstracted from
Reference 3.
3.1.1 Design Philosophy
The basic structural design philosophy is that the structural components
and elements shall be designed for minimum weight consistent with the
required service life, degree of damage tolerance, and detail design require-
ments.
The intent of these requirements is to provide a structural system
with the following characteristics:
i. Structures containing no defects or anomalies
a,
bl
Shall withstand ultimate loads and pressures in the
expected operating environment without rupture or collapse
Shall withstand limit loads and pressures in the expected
operating environments throughout its service life without
detrimental deformations
c. Shall possess a nominal safe-life of 400 missions without
fatigue crack initiation.
2. Structures containing defects or anomalies
a. If designed for safe life, it shall withstand the expected
operating loads and pressures in the expected operating
environment without rupture or collapse for a nominal
safe life of 150 missions
b. If designed for fail safe, it shall withstand limit loads
and pressures after the obvious partial failure of any
principal structural element
The use of materials which are considered state of the art and are well
characterized shall be the basic general rule.
When ground handling or test conditions are determined to be more
critical than flight conditions, their effect should be minimized by
investigating alternate ground handling or test methods.
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3.1.2 Design Requirements
Program Requirements
The following program requirements shall be used in establishing
structural design requirements:
i. Design service life shall be i00 missions and i0 years of
operation.
2. The vehicle shall have intact abort capability after liftoff.
3. 550K thrust engines are baseline.
4. JP fuel is baseline for airbreathing engines.
5. The vehicle ascent trajectory load factors should not exceed
3g for passenger-carrying missions.
General Requirements
l. The structure shall be designed to survive the specified number
of missions with a minimum of structural refurbishment, and in
a manner that does not reduce the probability of the successful
completion of any mission. Maximum consideration shall be given
to the cumulative deteriorating effect of repeated exposure to
the critical environmental conditions, such as temperature, creep,
and fatigue.
. The structure shall be designed by flight conditions wherever
possible. The nonflight conditions and environment shall
influence the design to the minimum extent possible.
. The structure shall be designed to have sufficient strength to
withstand simultaneously the limit loads, applied temperature
and other accompanying environmental phenomena for each design
condition without experiencing excessive deformation.
0 The structure shall be designed to withstand simultaneously the
ultimate loads, applied temperature and other accompanying
environmental phenomena without failure.
. The vehicle shall be designed such that destructive flutter or
other related dynamic instability or divergence phenomena shall
not occur on the vehicle, or its components, at any condition
along the design trajectories.
6. Structures designed only for positive pressure shall have
provisions to prevent inadvertent depressurization.
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. Pressurized structure shall be designed so that any leakage
occurring during a mission will permit successful completion
of the mission. In no case shall leakage exceed levels stated
in safety requirements for toxic and explosive fluids, or levels
which might jeopardize system function or rated life.
. Compartment vent and relief provisions shall be designed with
sufficient vent capacity to prevent structural over-pressurization
due to failure of pressurizing systems or components.
. The effects of repeated loads and elevated temperatures shall
be considered in the structural design. The design structural
adequacy of the vehicle in flight shall not be impaired by
fatigue damage resulting from exposure to non-flight and launch
environments.
i0. The effects of accumulative creep deformation shall be considered.
The maximum permissible permanent deformation and creep cracks
shall be defined based on the structural application and material
behavior.
ii. The effects of thermal stresses shall be combined with the
appropriate ultimate load stresses when calculating required
strength. Thermal stresses shall be based on limit temperatures.
12. If the protection against environments afforded by the overall
vehicle design is not sufficient to limit detrimental effects to
specified levels, provision shall be made for protection against
these environments.
13. The structure shall not be designed to withstand loads, pressures,
or environments due to malfunctions that would in themselves
result in failure to accomplish the mission.
3.1.3 Design Conditions
The following phases and conditions in the service life of the shuttle
vehicle shall be investigated for critical loads, temperatures, and
structural response:
Ground Handling
Transportation
Proofing
Towing loads
Jacking loads
Hoisting, mating, erecting, and mooring
Prelaunch/Liftoff
Steady winds, wind shears, and gust
Vortex shedding
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Prelaunch/Liftoff (continued)
Dampers, tower structure, and supports
Launcher system, holddo_cn and release
Propellant loading and tank pressurization schedule
Ground thermal environment and thermal transients
Cargo loading conditions
Engine noise and vibration
Engine ignition transients and thrust buildup
Emergency engine shut-do_¢n and/or rebound
Purge system vent pressures
Boost/Ascent Flight
Steady winds, wind shears, and gusts
Control system characteristics/engine thrust scheduling
C.g. offsets
Thrust oscillations and engine vibration
Aerodynamic pressure distribution
Boundary layer noise
Buffet and separated flow
Aerodvnamic hea_ing
Stagin$/S£paration
Booster engine shut-down
Orbiter engine start
Retro, ullage, and/or RCS engine operation
Separation mechanism activation
Plume impingement
Ent
Heat transfer from external flow field
Shock wave impingement
Aerodynamic loading and differential pressure loads
Steady winds, wind shear, gust
Tank ullage heating and pressurization
Transition and Atmospheric Cruise
Buffet and separated flow during transition
Aerodynamic pressure distribution
Steady winds, wind shears, and gusts
Control system characteristics/maneuvers
Cruise engine noise and vibration
Boundarv layer noise
Transient thermal effects
Tank ullage heating and pressurization
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Landin$
Spin-up and spring back gear loads
Land impact
Symmetric and unsymmetric landing
Taxiing
Braking
Ferry Operations
Engine thrust buildup horizontal takeoff
Engine noise
3.1.4 Loads and Pressures
Loads
Limit loads shall be determined for the vehicle in the mated and
unmated configurations for the conditions identified above.
The following effects shall be accounted for:
I. Vehicle external and internal geometry
2. Vehicle mass distribution, stiffness, and damping
3. Aerodynamic characteristics
4. _atural and specification environments
5. Interactions of propulsion, control, and other vehicle systems
6. Trajectory characteristics
The effects of transient loads shall be included in the determination
of limit loads for all quasi-static and transientphenomena expected in
each design environment. The dynamic loads shall account for the effects
of vehicle structural flexibilities and damping, and coupling of structural
dynamics with the control system and the external environment. The limit
loads shall be calculated by multiplying quasi-static loads by appropriate
dynamic load amplification factors. These dynamic factors can be derived
by comparison to previous data in lieu of detailed dynamic response studies.
Pressures
Design-limit pressures shall be determined as follows:
1. Regulated pressure (i.e., main propellant tanks, personnel and
cargo compartments, ACPS accumulators)
a. Limit pressure shall be based on the upper limit of the
relief valve setting when the pressure is detrimental to
the load-carrying capability of the structure.
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bo Limit pressure shall be based on the lower limit of the
operating pressure when the pressure enhances the load-
carrying capability of the structure.
2. Non-regulated pressure (i.e., vented compartments)
al Upper and lower bounds of pressure shall be established in
a rational manner _len a range of pressure is possible for
a particular structure.
b. Limit pressure shall be based on the upper bound when
pressure decreases the load-carrying capability of the
structure.
el Limit pressure shall be based on the lower bound when
pressure increases the load-carrying capability of the
structure.
3. Combined Loads and Pressures
Pressure vessels (including main propellant tanks) shall be
capable of withstanding the following combinations of loads
and pressures without rupture or collapse:
a. Ultimate load and ultimate pressure when the pressure is
destabilizing
b. Ultimate load and limit pressure when the pressure is
stabilizing
c. Ultimate pressure alone
3.1.5 Desisn Factors
Design factors shall be used to account for structural analysis,
environmental, and material uncertainties which are not amenable to rational
approaches.
Factors of Safety
Table 3-1 shows the yield and ultimate factors of safety to be used
in Phase B studies for various structural components.
Proof Factors
Table 3-1 shows the proof factors to be used in Phase B studies.
In addition to the above factors, when adequate fracture touchness
data and sufficient knowledge of operating conditions are available to
determine the required proof pressure from fracture mechanics principles,
the required proof pressure will be determined from these data and used.
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The methods and requirements are provided in the NASA design criteria
monograph "Fracture Control of _tallic Pressure Vessels," NASA SP8040.
Service Life Factors and Environments
Table 3-2 shows factors to be used in relation to fatigue, flaw growth,
and creep during Phase B studies.
Booster main propellant tanks, pressure vessels, and cabin structures
shall be designed to preclude the occurrence of both functional failure
(i.e., leakage of fluids and gasses) and structural failure (i.e., rupture).
Flaw growth analyses for both types of phenomena shall be performed con-
sidering the complexity of structural details, environments, and loadings
for each particular design. The factor 1.5 for flaw growth calculations
during Phase B studies was selected on the basis of (i) the observation
that flaw growth is a better behaved phenomenon than flaw initiation (i.e.,
fatigue) for which a life factor of 4 is traditionally used; and (2) the
desire to maintain a realistic structural design approach with minimum
weight impact. This life factor for flaw growth must be re-examined when
sufficient flaw growth data for Space Shuttle materials become available.
Due to present uncertainties on (i) the behavior of materials under
sustained and cyclic creep conditions, (2) temperature predictions due to
lack of substantiating flight data, and (3) potential temperature overshoots
due to presently undefined perturbations of nominal trajectories, a rather
conservative approach was used in establishing life factors for creep
evaluation during Phase B studies. These factors were a factor of four on
design service life and, in addition, a factor of two on accumulated creep
strain.
The design environments given in Table 3-3 are to be used for safe-
life calculations.
Margins of Safety
The margin of safety shall be positive and shall be determined at
ultimate allowable levels and at yield levels, when appropriate, at the
temperatures expected for all critical conditions.
For minimum-weight design, the margin of safety should be as small
as practicable.
3.1.6 Service Life
The combined effects of fatigue, thermal stress, and creep on general
structure shall be evaluated.
Load spectra shall be defined to represent analytically the cumulative
static_ dynamic, and environmental loads and deflections anticipated for
all major structural components during the service life of the vehicle.
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Table 3-1. Design Factors of Safety
Component Yield Ultimate Proof Applied On
I. i0 1.40
Main propellant tanks
Personnel compartments,
windows, doors, hatches
Airframe structure
{i. i0
1.00
i. i0
1.50
1.00
1.10i i0
Pressure vessels
Pressurized lines
fittings
Thermal stresses
1.00
, 1.00
1.40
--m
1.50
2.00
1.40
1.50
2.00
2.50
1.00
1.25
B
1.50
B
1.50
1.50
Maximum relief valve
pressure only
Loads (+ limit pressure)
Proof pressures
Loads (+ limit pressure)
Maximum operating
pressure only
Proof pressure
Boost + entry loads
Aircraft mode loads
Maximum operating
pressure
Maximum operating
pressure
Thermal forces +
flight loads
Thermal forces alone
Proof factor TBD based on Fracture Mechanics Analysis
Table 3-2. Service Life Factors
ITEM FA CTOR APPLIED ON
Fatigue initiation
Flaw growth to leak
Flaw growth to failure
Creep
4.0
1.5
1.5
4.0
and
2.0
Design service life
Design service life
Design service life
Design service life
Accumulated creep strain
NOTE: Design service life = 100 missions and 10 years of operation.
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.
2.
where
Flaw growth shall not exceed the growth required to increase the
maximum undetectable initial flaw to a size where the stress intensity
under limit-stress levels exceeds the threshold stress-intensity values.
The effects of short-time load excursions which result in stress intensities
above the threshold (e.g., due to maneuver loads, vibratory loads, or gust
loads) shall be accounted for in the fatigue-life predictions.
Safe-Life
Safe-life design concepts shall be applied to all structure vital to
the integrity of the vehicle or the safety of personnel. The safe-life
shall be determined using the factors given in Table 3-2.
The determination of structural safe-life shall take into consideration
the effects of the following factors in combination with the expected
operating environments:
Material properties and failure mechanisms
Load spectra
Cyclic-loads effects
Sustained-loads effects
Cumulative combined damage
Fail-Safe
Where practicable, fail-safe design concepts shall be applied. For
all fail-safe structure, the failure of a single principal structural
component shall not degrade the strength or stiffness of the structure
below that necessary to carry limit load. All fail-safe structure shall
be accessible for periodic inspection.
3.1.7 Desisn Thickness
The structural design thickness, td, for each metallic structural
member other than mechanically or chemically milled pressure vessels shall
be the minimum thickness obtained by either of the following calculations:
td = mean thickness based on equal plus and minus tolerances
td = N times the minimum thickness
N = i. i0 for strength design
N = 1.05 for stability design
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The mean and minimum design thicknesses, as used above, shall include
allowances for cumulative material damage or loss resulting from repeated
exposure to the design environment. The design thickness for mechanically
or chemically milled pressure vessels shall be the minimum thickness (i.e.,
mean minus the lower tolerance).
3.2 DESIGN LOADS
Design conditions listed in 3.1.3 were evaluated by GDC to determine
critical conditions and resulting external loads on booster primary structure.
These limit design loadings are summarized in the following sections; data
are abstracted from Reference 4. A summary of characteristics for critical
design conditions is given in Table 3-4.
3.2.1 Aerodynamic Surfaces
A summary of design loadings at the root of aerodynamic surfaces is
given in Table 3-5. The spanwise distribution of bending moment is given
in Figures 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3 for the wing, canard, and vertical stabilizer,
respectively.
3.2.2 Body Loads
Body Shell Loads
Internal loads consisting of axial and shear loads and bending and
torsion moments were determined along the body length for 25 different
load conditions by GDC as part of their Phase B study effort. The results
of this analysis are documented in Reference 4. These data have been
reviewed and ten loading conditions identified as being of potential interest
for the present study. The resulting distributed longitudinal loading (Nx)
on the body shell at the top and bottom centerlines is plotted versus body
station in Figures 3-4 and 3-5. These loadings are based on limit external
loads and limit nominal compartment ullage pressures. The identifying
numbers for design conditions are the same as employed in Reference 4.
The body bending moment, axial force, and compartment pressure for
these selected design conditions and three body stations of potential
interest for the present study are summarized in Table 3-6.
Orbiter Attachment Loads
Design limit loads for the connection between booster and orbiter
vehicles are summarized in Table 3-7.
Thrust Loads
The variation of total booster main engine thrust over the boost
period is plotted in Figure 3-6.
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Table 3-3. Safe-life Design Environments
COMPONENT
LO 2 Tank
LH 2 Tank
Inte rtank A dapte r
TPS, Wing, Canard
Empenage, Thrust
Structure, and Orbiter
Attachments
/
I
DESIGN ENVIRONMENT
LO 2 @ -320°F or GO 2 @ 70°F
Air at 70°F
Air at 70°F
3 1/2% salt solution with alternate
drying
Table 3-4. Summary of Design Conditions
Condition
Two-week standby
One-day hold
One-hour to launch
Liftoff
LO 2 mass
LH 2 mass
Orbiter & other
Haximum dynamic
pressure
aq
Sq
Haximum thrust
Booster burnout
Booster recovery
Subsonic gust
Subsonic maneuver
Landing
Axial Load
Factor
(g)
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.31 ±0.15
1.31 I0.25
1.31 ±0.21
1.71
1.71
3.0 ±0.30
3.0 ±0.30
Lateral
Load
Factor
(g)
TBD
T BD
TBD
+0.62,
-0.20
±0.15
TBD
TBD
4.0
2.05
2.50
2.0
_+.35
Wind Speed at
60 Feet or
<xq (6q)
72.1 knots
48 knots
34.4 knots
±2800 deg-psf
±2400 deg-psf
_+480 deg-psf
±i00 deg-psf
Remarks
Unfueled,
unpressurized
Fueled,
pressurized
Fueled,
unpressurized
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Table 3-5. Design Loads for Aerodynamic Surfaces
Surface
Wing
Canard
Vertical
Stabilizer
NOTE:
De sign
Condit ion
Max _-q
Entry
2.5g Man.
Subsonic
gust
2.5g Man.
Max _-q
Subsonic
side gust
Subsonic
rudder kick
Max B-q
Shear
(ib x 103)
646.7
650.6
518.9
508.5
HN
2.90
2.92
2.33
2.28
64.0 .287
43.9 .197
272 1.22
204 .915
187 .839
Bending
Moment
(in-lbxl06 )
Torque
l_-m (in-lbxl06) _-m
173.9 1.98 25.7 .293
163.1 1.86 30.0 .342
150.3 1.71 77.1 .880
146.3 1.67 74.5 .850
4.76 .0544 1.55 .0177
3.66 .0_18 -1.26 -.0144
63.0 .719 77.0 .879
50.9 .580 45.3 .516
43.2 .492 61.0 .695
(i) All loads are limit
(2) Loads are at root of aerodynamic surface
(3) Loads are per panel
3-12
SD72-SH-O046
#jil_ Space DivisionNorth American Rockwell
× • •
I
" SD72-S}I-0046
_ Space DivisionNorth American Rockwell
3-1h
SD72-SH-O046
'. .............. .L .......
#_ Space DivisionNorth American Rockwell
2"
- "'7 ". " "
..... .f -.-
I
,iJ
O0
W
r,.)
r_
....... 7 "
1
I
[
r
i i
L.. . _4 ............ 4 .......
;
0
r
._ t .........
.O
°r-i
4J
E
O
,00
,0J,-
4-_
Y,
T_,
e_
t_ ---
o0
i
3-15
!
SD72-SH-0046
SPACE DIVISION
NOItTH AMEItlCAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
1_1214 LAKEWOOO BOULEVARD • OOWNLry. CALIFOMNIA 90241
Figure 3-4.
Rodv Load4nos - Tom O_
o,T,. a_9-71
t -1-
o ., , _ ..r , , "-_././ , ,
Load Conditions ______, '2_
6 Liftoff
-1 -7 q= = 2800
8 qci = -2800
10 Max 1_hrust
12
13
23
--4 m
-2
I
o0
3
-3
,-4
el
42
o
4_t"
-5
0
ea
-6
Subsonic Gust
2-g Tmt_
÷2.5g Maneuver
24 -1.0gManeuver
FORM MZII-N-a
Note:
-7
- I
I000
3-Z6
PAQE NO. OF
,,tpo_.o. SD72-Slt- 0046
,,oozL NO. B-9U
Burnout 7
!
Loadin_s are
based on nominal
ullage pressures.
-i
-8
-9
I
2000
I
3OO0
Body Station (inches)
PMIPAM[O mY: RT_[_ T
CMI[CKI[ID Iy:
OAT,, 8--9--71
SPACE DIVISION
NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
12214 LAKLWOOO BOULEVARD. OOWNLry, CALIFORNIA 90241
Figure 3-5.
Body Loadin_s - Bottom q_
FORM MIII-N.2
3-17
PA6E NO. OF
.,,ORT.o SD72-SH=0046
,oo,L ,o. B-9U
4--
3--
2--
O
,-4
M
.m
r.4
v
z
I 0
.4
o
_i _- 23
m
= 24
._
.l,J
O
1.1
.r..l
_ -3 --
O
--/4 _
-6 --
Load Conditions -- I} .- ,
\6 Liftoff
7 q_ = 2800
Jl
8 q_ .. -2800
Max Thrust
Burnout - IO _ ?.
Entry (Recovery) _ __
Subsonic Gust / - 12/_
-IZ/ L_
16 2-g Taxi
+2.5g Maneuver o 7 &_% _'__  neuv ri/X
/\
--
T 6
/
Note: Loadlngs are base( on
nominal ullage pressures.
i0
ii
12
13
I I
i000 2000
Body Station (inches)
7
3000 7_
I
4000
_ Space DivisionNo h Amerk_ Rockwell
c_
o0
o,
H
03 £J 0
o
,i.J
° ,.-.4
_ ,-4
_ N
[--i _ ,-.4
o
_J
.r4
o
oO
0_o ,.-4 o4 o4 co oo £-4
&J_Jo •
o u_ o o
e
,0
O O O O O O O O O O
°O O O O O O _ oO oO
• O O O O O O _r_ oO ,--4
• j
_._ e_l I I I I I I u'_ c_ o0
I
o_ ._ C_l ,--4
• o o 0o o _1 o'_
_r_ I I I I I I I I
• ,,,I" o c_ u_ _ _ _'_ -.1- o _o
I I I I
u_
O
-,-4
o
o
H
I
o
o
o4
I
II
I
o
_J
,,.4
o
.H
I
¢xl
>
_)
+
_J
>
m
o
I
O _-I o4 _ _D o'_ -.1"
.H
I
u_
o
_4 u
o
o .H :_
-_ 0 OO
O0 ,"4
0
o o o
,,..4 _
3-18
SD72-SH-0046
_,_lv_ Space DivisionNorth American Rockwell
Table 3-7. Booster/Orbiter Connection Loads
i
BOOSTER B-9U
BOOST PHASE
\
SEPARATION SYSTEM
LIMIT LOADS
+Fz MX
CONDITION WIND
TWO-WEEK GROUND WINDS, HEAD
UNFUELED, WITH TOWER TAIL
SUPPORT SIDE
ONE-DAY GROUND WINDS, HEAD
FUELED, WITH TOWER TAIL
SUPPORT SIDE
ONE-HOUR GROUND WINDS, HEAD
FUELED, UNSUPPORTED TAIL
SIDE
DYNAMIC LIFTOFF PLUS HEAD
ONE-HOUR GROUND WINDS TAIL
SIDE
MAX a_-q aZ-q = 2800 HEAD
e_-q =-2800 TAIL
NO WIND
MAX _-q +2400 SIDE
3g MAX
THRUST
BOOSTER
BURNOUT
N x =3.3 Ny= 0 N z =-0.35
N x 3.3 Ny=+0.1N z -0.25
Nx=3.3 Nr=0 Nz=-0.46
Nx=3.3 N,=+0_ .I N z=-0.36
Fx Fy Fz Ay A z M x
(KIPS) (KIPS) (KIPS) (KIPS) (KIPSI (X 1061N-LB)
268 0 56.9 0 -33.0 0
268 0 -119.0 0 149.0 0
268 +_98.5 28.8 +30.2 34.9 TI7.1
859 0 95.2 0 62.7 0
859 0 -0.1 0 161.0 0
859 +53.3 80.0 +16.3 99.5 _9.28
859 0 89.5 0 76.5 0
859 0 30.0 0 138.0 0
859 +_33.3 80.0 +_10.2 99.5 ¥5.80
1296 0 119.0 0 134.0 0
1295 0 82.2 0 182.0 0
12961!20.5 12_.0 +2.92 150.0 _4.14
1798 0 224.8 0 234.8 0
1804 0 83.0 0 950.3 0
1808 0 137.4 0 625.6 0
1802 +81.2 128.8 +_166.8 653.7 T72.3
2849 0 135.2 0 424.5 0
2849 +55.4 179.3! +30.7 394.5 ?7.6
2841 0 62.9 0 459.0 0
2841 +55.4 118.3 +30.7 428.0 ¥7.6
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3.2.3 Pro_ellant Tank Pressures
The ullage pressure schedule over the complete mission is plotted in
Figures 3-7 and 3-8 for the LOX and LH 2 tanks respectively. Also indicated
on these curves is the variation of total pressure (ullage plus head) at the
bottom of the tanks.
The resulting design pressure profiles over the length of the tanks are
plotted in Figures 3-9 and 3-10.
3.3 SERVICE LOAD SPECTRA
Service load spectra for major structural elements of the B-gu booster
have been determined by GDC in support of other contracted studies. Data
sumnmrized in this section is taken from References 5, 6, and 7. The data
is presented in the form of curves giving number of exceedances versus load
magnitude for key loading _arameters. The number of exceedances are based
on a total of i00 operational missions. Ferry missions are not included in
these curves, but their effect can be approximated by doubling the number of
exceedances indicated for cruise, landing, and taxi flight phases.
3.3.1. Wing Load Spectra
Load spectra for the wing are given in Figure 3-11 in terms of mean and
alternating bending moment at the wing root. The bending moments are
expressed as a percentage of maximum design bending moment. The ascent
phase has been divided into segments, and a series of curves are plotted
which give exceedances of alternating bending moment for various values of
mean bending moment. Wing bending moment for the entry phase is assumed to
increase from zero to a positive maximum; the load magnitude shown for this
flight phase refers to the maximum value of this one-sided bending moment
di stribution.
3.3.2 Vertical Stabilizer Load Spectra
Load spectra for the vertical stabilizer are given in Figure 3-12. The
data is presented in the same form as for the wing; the ascent phase is
divided into segments and a series of curves are plotted which give exceedance
of alternating bending moment at the root of the vertical stabilizer. The
alternating bending moment is again expressed as a percentage of maximum
design value. The mean bending moment is zero for all flight conditions.
3.3.3 Bod_ Load Spectra
Service load spectra are given in Figure 3-13 for fuselage station 2600;
this station is in the region of maximum bending moment on the body. The
data is plotted as exceedance of alternating bending moment at Sta. 2600 in
conjunction with a prescribed mean bending moment. Two types of loading
variation are represented on this figure. The bending moment for maximum
thrust and entry conditions increases from zero to a positive or negative
peak; this peak value is defined by the load exceedance curves. Transient
bending moments due to atmospheric disturbances will alternate about some
3-21
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mean value which is the result of steady-state aerodynamic and thrust forces.
Major aerodynamic transients will occur in the maximum c< -_ regime during
ascent, so a mean bending moment applicable to this condition is used for
the ascent flight phase. The effect of axial load and tank ullage pressure
must also be considered, of course.
Service load spectra are given in Figure 3-14 for the orbiter aft
attachment. The exceedance of alternating loads in the normal and lateral
directions are given, expressed as a percentage of maximum design values.
The exceedance of main engine thrust variation for one flight is given
in Figure 3-15.
3.& STRL_TURAL TEMPERATURES
Detailed thermal analysis has not been performed in the Phase B study
on all structural elements of present interest. However, typical transient
temperature histories on the wing and vertical stabilizer are illustrated in
Figures 3-16 and 3-17, respectively. The wing lower surface has a thermal
protection system (TPS) over the primary structure. Primary structure of
the wing upper surface and the vertical stabilizer main box is exposed to
direct aerodynamic heating. The vertical stabilizer is also subjected to
heating from plume impingement of the orbiter main engines during the
separation phase.
A summary of the estimated range of temperature on each of the selected
structural elements for the major mission phases is given in Table 3-8.
These estimates are based on the specific data and general trends indicated
in Figures 3-16 and 3-17, and consideration of the following factors:
i.
The TPS is designed to protect the primary structure by
limiting the maximum temperatures to approximately 300F
for aluminum sub-structure and 65OF for titanium sub-
structure.
. Primary structure covered by TPS will experience thermal
lag compared to outer surface temperatures. Peak tempera-
tures will occur at a later time and decay more slowly
than for the outer surface.
.
_e
Primary structure involving thick sections, such as wing
spar caps and orbiter aft attachment bulkhead, will have
significant heat sink capability. Peak temperatures on
these members will be much less than for thin skins, and
the peak temperature will decay more slowly.
Internal insulation is employed in the T/_2 tank; the
resulting minimum temperature expected on the structural
wall is approximately -20OF.
5. The crew compartment will be environmentally controlled
for crew habitability.
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Table 3-8 Estimated Range of Structural Temperatures
Structural
Element
_^ Tank
Cy_. Shell
LOX Tank
Cyl. Shell
LOX Tank
Aft. Bulkhead
Wing Spars
Vert. Stab.
Main Box
Skins (Root)
Intertank
Adapter
Cyl. Shell
Orbiter Aft
Attach Buklhead
Crew
Compartment
Cyl. Shell
Flight Phase
Ascent
-200F to
-IOOF
-297F to
OF
-29TF
OF to
I30F
OF to
I30F
-250F to
130F
-200F to
OF
60F to
IOOF
Entry
IOOF to
300F
IOOF to
30OF
-29TF to
IOOF
200F to
300F
300F to
480F
200F to
300F
OF to
200F
_&
Cruise
IOOF to
300F
IOOF to
300F
IOOF to
200F
200F to
300F
IOOF
300F
200F to
300F
IOOF to
2OOF
Landin_
Taxi
IOOF to
30OF
IOOF to
300F
IOOF to
200F
IOOF to
300F
OF to
I30F
200F to
300F
IOOF to
200F
Ferry
-65F to
130F
j_
-65F to
I30F
60F to
IOOF
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]_.0 SELECTED STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS
4. i SELECTION SUMMARY
To provide an efficient and effective basis to conduct the study, it is
necessary to select discrete structural elements and associated critical
sections for detailed strength, fatigue, and fracture mechanics investiga-
tions. The elements should be selected to provide a representative sample
covering the range of materials, operating environments, design approach,
and failure modes expected for the shuttle booster structure. In general,
they should also represent structural areas which are a significant portion
of the structural weight, so that the influence of different criteria and
approaches on vehicle weight and performance will be determined on a
realistic basis.
A matrix of candidate structural elements of the B-9U booster is
presented in Table h-1. This table also summarizes the type of structural
configuration, selected material, operating stress and temperature environ-
ment, weight of similar structure, and proof test and inspection considera-
tions as determined in the Space Shuttle Phase B Study. Review and evalua-
tion of this matrix led to the following selection;reasons for selection are
discussed below.
The following structural elements are of primary interest and are
selected as the principal basis for detailed investigations:
i. LH 2 tank cylindrical shell-mid region (Sta. 2600)
2. LOX tank cylindrical shell-forward region
3. LOX tank cylindrical shell-aft region
4. LOX tank aft bulkhead
5. Wing spars (lower surface )-root region
6. Vertical stabilizer main box-root region
7. Crew compartment cylindrical shell
The following structural elements are of secondary interest and will be
investigated to an extent appropriate to date availability and study scope.
i. Orbiter aft support bulkhead
2. Intertank adapter cylindrical shell.
4.2 SELECTION RATIONALE
The main propellant tanks of the booster are obviously primary elements
for investigation because of their susceptability to fracture, the cata-
strophic consequences of failure, and the large amount of structural weight
involved. Because of the low density of liguid hydrogen, the pressure
gradient from forward to aft end of the LH 2 tank is relatively small. There-
fore, a single section at Sta. 2600 has been selected for analysis. This
is in the region of the maximum body bending moment and should therefore
4-1
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provide a good basis to evaluate the influence of flight loads on fatigue and
fracture characteristics of the tank. The evaluation of behavior under hoop
stresses due to internal pressure determined at this station should be
representative of the entire LH 2 tank. A large pressure gradient exists
over the length of the LOX tank, so sections at both the forward and aft
ends of the cylindrical shell are selected for analysis. The aft bulkhead
of the LOX tank is subjected to a maximum design pressure, so it is selected
for evaluation as an example of pressure vessel membrane structure. The
general results and trends determine d for this member should also be
applicable to the other propellant tank bulkheads.
The wing spars are selected as the most appropriate elements of the
wing structural assembly for investigation. They represent a significant
portion of the structural weight and are loaded by axial tension and
compression stresses. In-service accessibility and inspection limitations
exist because of attachment of cover skins and thermal protection system;
the effects of these limitations should be investigated. Spars on the wing
upper and lower surfaces are of similar configuration; however, the lower
surface operates at higher tensile stress levels, so it is selected for
analysis.
The main box of the vertical stabilizer is also selected for analysis
because of the different nature of the aerodynamic loading and because it
is of different structural configuration from the wing. Integral-stiffened
skin planks resist the spanwise bending loads rather than concentrated spar
members.
Although the crew compartment represents only a relatively small
portion of the structural weight, it is selected for evaluation in this
study because of special problems related to crew safety. The current design
approach applied to almost all aircraft pressurized fuselage structure
provides a high fail-safe capability such that a skin crack can extend
completely between frame members without causing catastrophic rupture.
However, this concept may not be practical for space shuttle, considering
the loss of cabin atmosphere that will occur before the crew can descend
to a safe attitude or don pressure suits. Therefore, it is considered
desirable to evaluate the crew compartment cylindrical shell, with special
attention to crew safety provisions.
The orbiter aft support bulkhead is of interest as an example of a
heavy forged member subjected to repeated load cycles. The same type of
structure is also found at the orbiter forward attachment and at wing
support frames. However, the basic design and stress analysis data is less
well developed for these members than for the other structural elements
considered. Also, the total weight involved is a relatively small per-
centage of the vehicle structural weight, so that fracture mechanics and
fatigue design considerations applied to these members should not have a
major impact on the total vehicle weigh t and performance.
The intertank adapter is also of interest as an example of unpressurized
fuselage structure. However, because of thrust and inertia ioadinge during
boost, the c_ression design stresses are much higher than the maximum
tension stresses encountered. Therefore, it is unlikely that fracture
considerations would cause a significant change in the design approach or
the structural weight of this assembly.
4-2
SD72-SH=O046
1Struclural Type of
ElenL, nt Structure
I_'_] LH 2 .ank Integral
2219-TB7 Total
Weight of
Similar
Material Structure
23,B00 k_
i aluminum
i alloy (52,b00 ibl
i plate
I
4100 kg
i aluminum
iMloy (9100 Ib)
_8: Orbi_pr 1200 kg
s u pp,_ rt [ ft, r ging
bulkhead ] {2700 lb)
I
(afti [
(_ Vertical _-spar ho×, 2000 kg
stabilizer mte_r al titanium
rnair_ box stilfcned (annealed} (4S_lO lb)
II_ skin planks [
I
@ I_tertan_ Int g I 7875l era 3400 kg
adapter, ;stiffened i aluminum
cytmder I skin riveted alloy C?6O0 Ib)
shell to frame_ [ plate
¢> I
Percent (II
Vehicle I Limit
Structural] Stres_
Weight J{ten_ionl
23,0 310 _/m _
(45 kstl
3,7 270 _/m 2
(39 ksi)
(SO k$i)
Potential
Failure Criticality
Modes Level
Leakage [ Def,, r r edcritical
R uptur e Ii_medi ate
catastrophic
Le_]age To be
determined
upture [Immediate
!catastr_phic
, I
i cy .... po,;nti.1
Candidate or
Design i Type of Temperature Initial
Approach Loading Flaws
_B a× a ens on 143 k f _OO F) Parent meta
Safe life tdiscrete s:>ectral moderaie
, -- I _--
Safe life Bi _xi;d tension 91 k 1-297 F)! Parenl met,d,
(discrete spectral i moder lit.
plus [ to %_ elds,
 °dg e"d'ngi I(randol_ spectra! 422 K k30o _ } higk
' I
1
345 MN/m
(SO ksi)
(90 ksi) ____
_40 M9/_ 2
(6_ ksil
(l_ ksi]
I
1
NOTES
( 1 _Total weight of structural _ystern excluding T_S, landing, docking) = (247, 000 lb:,
(2_Total weight of 1.0 2 and LH 2 tank bulkheads
(3)Estimated, based on skin temperature and heat-_ink capacity of _ubstructure
(4)Validity c,f proc_f le_t to verify no leakage during service fife i_ questionable
{5:L_tcrior surface t_f /.H_ tank bulkheads not accessible because of foam insulatmn
Recontn_ended selection cod(
Prh_ary elements for study
_>Secondary elements b_r study
Pl ouf
T,r st
F easible
Ye_ (41
I
!
_T _I _i _i _ _
i Potential
I for ; P_oof
Type uf i Temperature initial I Test
+ Loading I Cycles ]_ laws F ea_ible
Blaxial tension 143 k (-200 F Parent metal, Ye_ (4)
(discrete spectra) nlode r ale
, plus to Welds, high i
ihody bending 4 k ]00 [:)
I{randon% spectral 22 r
tdiscrete spe( trail i n_ederate
phls to , %% eli!s,
body bendin)/ II high
irandozn spectral 422 k (30U
I i ! .....Biaxial tension [ql k (-297 Parent nmtll, Yes (4/
(Oiscr ete spectr 1: to I,_
: V ] _s
I [3_g k (200 F) h_h '
B "i I tens 299 k bO F) [ , ,. "fe_
lax t . i
(dis_ rete spectr _ to [
;;IL k tin0 F)
Xxld tt'n_lon" 273 k (0 F) Lo_ No
< ,,nip,-{, _ _ L,,I, to {3
j_F,1NO<,Ill Spt'cI r,_
t22 _ {3uo I:11
1
! :
dor!l Sl'e_tra: 36t, k (200 F)
\xlal tensiml.' _275 k (t) [1 I Moderate Vel'/
,; t)IIIDFI. SS_o n r diffic_l[t
ti {ra_tdolsl 5p_'ct r _l) to
522 N (480 [)i
Axial tensiun iii k(-250 [] ktodvrale _,'_c_,nlpre s sbJr, i
{randottt spectral [ to :
422 K [30D []
Meet h,,, _ode:
_t_nts h:r study
nlents h_r study
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Table q-l, Matrix of Candidate Structural Elements and Characteristics -
B-9U Booster
Accessibility Applicable NDE Methods
Operational
Service Detail Assembly Post-Proof Operational
Fabrication and
Proof Test
Completely
accessible
Co mpletely
accessible
Completely
accessible
Completely
accessible
Interior surface
not accessible
Exterior surface
accessible by
removal of TPS
Interior surface
accessibleIS)
Exterior surface
accessible by
removal of TPS
[ntt, r lot surface
accessible
Access to exterior
surface is very
dithcult
I_nlit e_ acces_
_te r_,r s_r fa_ _
Lin_it ed access
thr ough inspec-
tiol_ panels,
ABES cavities
r
C:omph.t ely
accessible
Exterior surface
accessibh-, limit e(_
access to interior
Cr, rnpleteiy
accessible
l,imit ed access
through mspectinn
panels. ABES
cav,t,cs
Visual, penetrant
both sidest
U ltr_sonic {raw
mater_al)
Same as_
Visual, X-ray,
lenetrantiweldsl
lame _s
i
J
Visual, penet r ant
Visual, pene- Visual, pene-
trant, _dtrasonic trant. (local(raw materiaD web/plate weld
regions)
I
-!-/[
Accessible by Visual, Visual,
rem_val of TI'S penetrant penetrant
Exterior surface IVlsu_! Visual, a_ded
accessible, linfiled penetr'ant by fiber optics
access to interior
surfaev
Limited access to Visual, Visual
interior surface, ]trot i ultrasonic nt
exterior surface Ir aw imater ial)
acct ssible by re-
nloval of TPS
Visual, X-ray (wcldsb
penetrant (welds and
local parent metall
Acoustic emission
(during proof)
Same as Q_
Same as i_
Visual, pressure
decay, leak check
Visual, leak
detection, pressure
decay, penetrant
and X-ray (local
areas)
Same as
Same as
Visual, pressure
decay, leak check
Visual, aided by
fiber optics
Visual, penetr_nt
Visual, aided by
fiber optics
I
I
Visual. penetr&nt Visual, penetrant
4-3, 4-4 SD72-SH41046
?Ja _
#_ Space DivisionNorth American Rockwell
5.0 FATIGUE AND FRACTURE PROPERTIES
Summarized in this section are fatigue and fracture properties of
materials that have been selected or are alternate candidates of interest
for the chosen structural elements. Properties have been established from
wide-spread literature survey, supplemented by in-house data derived from
test programs conducted under other contracts.
5.1 FATIGUE PROPERTIES
5.I.I 2219 Aluminum AIIo_
S-N curves for 2219-aluminum alloy are plotted in Figure 5-1. A family
of curves are plotted for various values of stress ratio (maximum stress in
cycle divided by minimum stress in cycle). The data (solid curves) are for
a theoretical stress concentration factor (Kt) of 4.4, which is considered
to be representative or slightly conservative for average design practice as
applied to structural assemblies and joints of the propellant tanks. Data
are also given (dashed curves) for a Kt of 3.0. The S-N curves are expressed
in terms of percent of material ultimate tensile strength, and are considered
to be applicable to both the -T851 and -T878 tempers of the alloy. The
curves are based on room temperature data, but may be applied over the
temperature range of -300 F to +300 F with only small error.
The curves are based primarily on the data of Reference 8; however,
other sources, such as Reference 9, have been examined to compare and validate
the data.
5.1.2 6AI-4V Titanium Alloy
S-N curves for 6A1-4V titanium alloy are plotted in Figure 5-2
(K t = 3.0) and Figure 5.3 (K t = 4.5). Again, a family of curves is plotted
for various values of stress ratio, and the allowable maximum stress is
expressed as a percentage of material ultimate tensile strength. The curves
are based on room temperature test data for the annealed material and will
be slightly conservative if applied to elevated temperature up to +650 F.
Using the allowable stress values determined from these curves with annealed
material properties for material in the solution treated and aged (STA)
temper should also be conservative.
The S-N curves are based on the data presented in Reference 8 for titanium
which was subjected to a diffusion bond thermal cycle. This is equivalent to
a mill anneal temper insofar as strength and fatigue properties are concerned.
Data on material in this condition were obtained by extensive testing at the
NR Los Angeles Division. Data from other sources, such as References 10 and
11, were also reviewed to verify the validity of the S-N curves.
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The S-N curves for Kt = 4.5 are considered to be representative of
average design practice applied to joints and attachments; those for Kt = 3.0
representative of design practice where rather extensive care is taken to
minimize stress concentrations and to employ other methods to retard fatigue
crack initiation. An interesting comparison is presented in the modified
Goodman diagram of Figure 3-4. Superimposed on the constant life curves for
Kt = 3.0 and Kt = 4.5 are discrete points representing the results of fatigue
tests on struc£ural joints. Spotwelded joint data is taken from Reference 11,
riveted joint data from Reference 12. It can be seen that the spotwelded
joint and the Hi-Shear rivet joint were approximately comparable to a Kt = 4.5
in the higher cycle range; the riveted joint using Taper-Lok fasteners
exhibited better fatigue life than notched specimens with Kt = 3,0. It also
can be seen that the allowable stress determined from notch6d specimens
becomes progressively mote conservative compared to joint tests as the fatigue
life is reduced below 10 _ cycles.
5.2 FRACTURE PROPERTIES
5.2.1 Fracture Toughness
The plane-strain fracture toughness (K I ) is the most common of the
fracture properties of interest for c engineering materials. It
represents the resistance to fracture of a material containing cracks or
crack-like defects and subjected to a monotonic tension loading. Ideally, it
may be taken as a basic material property which is not affected by the detail
design configuration. However, a number of different types of test specimens
and test techniques have been used by various investigators to attempt to
measure this property. Unfortunately, the results from those various
approaches are not necessarily compatible and caution must be exercised in
evaluating and interpreting the data. The compact tension (CT) and notch-
bend (NB) type of test specimens have been standardized by ASTM committee for
plane-strain fracture toughness testing in an attempt to provide a more
uniform basis for comparison of data from various sources. However, there
are a number of rules or tests that must be satisfied for each set of test
data to qualify the validity of plane-strain fracture toughness results.
One of the more significant rules involves the required minimum thickness of
the test specimen to insure that plane-strain conditions exist. Some
investigators prefer the surface flawed, or part-through-crack (PTC) type of
specimen because it more closely simulates the type of defect and loading
conditions encountered on actual structures in service, llowever, no ASTM
standards have been established for this type of specimen.
A survey has been made of fracture toughness data for materials of
interest from a number of sources; the results are summarized in Tables 5-1
and 5-2 for Ti-6A1-4V and 2219 aluminum alloys, respectively. The type and
thickness of test specimen and the relative orientation of test loading and
direction of crack extension is listed, as well as the range and average values
of apparent fracture toughness. The nomenclature for test specimen orien-
tation is illustrated in Figure 5-5.
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A considerable amount of fracture toughness test data for Ti-6AI-4V
alloy in the annealed condition has been obtained by NR/Los Angeles Division
on current production programs. This data is plotted versus specimen thickness
in Figures 5-6 and 5-7. An estimated lower bound curve also,is indicated, which
defines an effective fracture toughness (Kc) of 87.6 _tN/(m) /2 (80 ksi i¢_-_)for
thicknesses up to 0.51 cm (0.20 in.), decreasing to a value of 66 _£4/(m)3/2
(60 ksi i_n) for thicknesses of 1.9 cm (0.75 in.) and greater. This value
for KI also appears to be in reasonable agreement with data from other sources
indicated in Table 5-1. A fracture toughness (Kic) of 38.4 N_4/(m)3/2 (35
ksi ¢Th_ is estimated as a design value for this alloy in the solution treated
and aged condition (STA) from other data presented in Table 5-1.
Design values for plane-strain fracture toughness (KI¢) of 2219 aluminum
parent metal and welds have been estimated from the data hsted in Table 5-2,
and are summarized below. The effective fracture toughness also is dependent
on material thickness, but this influence will be accounted for by use of
empirical test data currently being developed through in-house test programs.
2219-T87 Aluminum Alloy
Material Form and
Orientation
Base metal - long. (RW)
Base metal - trans. (WR)
Weld (2319 filler alloy)
70 F
MN/(m) 3/2
36
33
17.5
ksi icon.
33
30
16
K
E
-320 F
_/(m) 3/2 ksi i¢'_"n.
39.5
36
21
36
33
19
5.2.2 Crack Growth Rate-Cyclic Load
Crack growth under cyclic tension stresses is commonly characterized as
da/dN; i.e., the amount of crack extension (increase of half-length for a
through crack, increase in depth for a surface crack) per cycle of applied
loading. Host investigators agree that the crack growth rate is primarily
dependent on the stress intensity range during ti_e load cycle (AK = Kmin/Kmax)
and the associated maximum stress intensity achieved. In contrast to
conventional fatigue practice, a negative value of load ratio has no meaning,
because it is assumed that the crack will close under compression stresses and
these stresses will be transferred by bearing along the crack surfaces with no
further change in stress intensity at the tip of the crack. Therefore, a load
ratio of zero is the minimum value encountered in crack growth analysis.
Extensive testing to determine crack growth rates for Ti-6AI-4V has been
accomplished by NR/Los Angeles Division as part of current production programs.
Current data from this source is plotted in Figure 5-8. This data represents
production material lots with relatively low fracture toughness and crack
growth rates somewhat higher than average. Therefore, it is considered to
represent a reasonable design boundary for use in this study. The data points
represent tests on five specimens, three at a load ratio of 0.3 and two at a
load ratio of zero. An empirical equation has been proposed by R. Forman to
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Rolling /_
First symbol - direction of load
Second (third) symbol(s) - direction(s) of crack extension
Example s:
PTC Specimens CT Specimens
P
P
P
Figure 5-5 Orientation of Fracture Properties
Test Specimens
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provide a mathematical expression which approximates typical crack growth
rate characteristics for engineering materials. This equation is expressed
as :
n
da _ c (AK)
dN (I-R) Kc-AK
whe re :
da
dN - crack growth rate in./cycle
AK =
R
range of stress intensity in load cycle
(AK = Kmax - Kmin) - psi i/_n.
Kmin.
load ratio in cycle (R - k-_-a-_)
Kc = critical stress intensity for fracture - psi iv_-n-n.
c ) coefficients determined empirically to provide best fit
n ) to test data.
The Forman equation will generally provide a satisfactory approximation to
the upper transition of crack growth rate with AK, but will not account for
the lower transition which may occur at low values of AK. Therefore, in
some cases it may be desirable to define a second equation of the Forman type
to approximate crack growth characteristics in the region of low AK.
Coefficients for the Forman equation have been determined to approximate
the crack growth rate test data for Ti-6AI-4V (annealed) and are indicated on
Figure 5-8 along with the corresponding curves. A lower transition in the
slope of the crack growth curve appears to occur at a AK of approximately
I0 ksi i¢_n. Therefore, a second set of coefficients have been determined to
approximate the growth rate characteristics for AK less than I0 ksi i/i-n-]'.;
these are also indicated on Figure 5-8.
Crack growth rates for 2219-T87 aluminum alloy have been determined by
investigators using both PTC and CT specimens; these data are plotted in
Figures 5-9 and 5-10 respectively. A curve representing the Forman equation
with indicated coefficients is also plotted on each curve. _lese coefficients
were established by Forman in Ref. 20. It can be seen that correlation of
data between the two different investigators and types of specimens is
generally excellent. The empirical curve proposed by Forman provides a good
fit to the CT data for longitudinal specimens (RW orientation) over the
complete range of AK investigated, llowever, crack growth rates for CT
transverse specimens (WR orientation) appear to be somewhat greater in the
range of high AK; modified coefficients have been determined as indicated on
Figure 5-10 to provide a better fit to this data. Crack growth rates
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determined by Forman on PTC specimens at -320 F are plotted in Figure 5-11,
along with the empirical fit curve and corresponding coefficients recommended
by him.
Stress intensities calculated by Forman in reduction of crack growth rate
test data include a deep-flaw magnification factor, with resulting expression:
AK = l.l&_ /'_7"Q') Mk
The variation of _ with crack depth/thickness ratio and crack aspect ratio
used by Forman is plotted in Figure 5-12.
One limitation of the Forman type equation is the difficulty of
accurately representing the experimental data for crack growth in the low
stress intensity range. This can be partially overcome by the use of a dual
definition of Forman curves, as previously mentioned. However, it appears
that a threshold stress intensity will exist for most materials below which
no crack growth will occur. Even the use of two separate Forman type curves
to represent test data will not accommodate a threshold stress intensity
concept. A recent development at Space Division was the pursuit of a
generalized growth rate expression that accommodates both a lower threshold
and an upper limit of critical stress intensity. The equation developed to
achieve this goal is presented below.
da
-- = EXP
dN
in K - In _K
o
n - • arctar',h2
In _%K -
In E II-R) + In _K
c o
InK II-RI- ln..%K
c o t+ in C - EXP c 2 '
where material constants
n = Paris equation exponent
C = Paris equation coefficient
K c = stress intensity for fracture
K o = threshold stress intensity range for growth
and input variables
K = cyclic range of stress intensity (constant amplitude)
P
rain
R = load ratio
P
n]ax
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This equation may appear to be cumbersome to use for manual calculations,
however, once programmed for computer analysis it is simple to apply because
of the limited number of material constants and input variables that must be
specified. Initial evaluations of the capability of this expression to
provide a good fit to experimental data have been encouraging. A comparison
of fit to experimental growth rate data determined by SD on two aluminum
alloys is given in Figure 5-13.
This expression has been programmed for use in crack-growth analyses
on the llewlett-Packard biodel 9810 computer/plotter and was applied to the
propellant tank crack growth analyses presented in subsequent sections of
this report. The growth rate curves used in these analyses are presented
in Figure 5o14. Crack growth analyses for other structural components were
performed using the EFFGRO computer program (IBM 360) with Forman equation(s)
describing crack growth rates.
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Figure 5-8. Crack Growth Rate for Ti-6AI-4V Under Cyclic Leading
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5.2.3 Empirical Fracture Data - 2219-T87 Welds
Fracture and flaw growth tests were performed on 2219-T87 weld joint
specimens as part of the fracture mechanics experimental program conducted
by Space Division under Contract NAS7-200, Supplemental Agreement 2026, TA-20.
Crack growth rate data, determined from part-through crack specimens, are
reflected in the curve of Figure 5-14.
Weld specimens were also tested under monotonic load to failure. The
specimens were instrumented with crack opening displacement gauges and also
with a vacuum cup mounted on the back surface to detect and record crack
break-through. "rests were conducted on weld joints of 0.25 cm (0.10 in.),
0.51 cm (0.20 in.) and 0.89 cm (0.35 in.) thickness. Results of the static
load tests are summarized in Figure 5-15; data for the individual weld thick-
nesses are plotted separately. The data are plotted as gross section stress
versus normalized initial flaw depth (ai/Q). The stress at which break-
through occurred is indicated by open symbols, the stress at fracture by
solid symbols. Pre-flawing was controlled to produce aspect ratios of
initial flaws approximating a/2c = 0.1 and 0.4; these are indicated by circle
and square symbols, respectively. It can be seen that for all specimens of
0.25 cm (0.1 in.) thickness, crack break-through occurred prior to fracture;
in most cases the stress at fracture was considerably greater than the
stress at break-through. The majority of specimens of 0.51 cm (0.2 in.)
thickness also exhibited break-through prior to fracture, but only a few of
the 0.89 cm (0.35 in.) thick specimens showed this characteristic. Mechanical
properties tests on representative weld specimens showed a typical yield
strength for the weld of about 138 _lN/m 2 (20 ksi). It can be seen that the
break-through or fracture phenomena of interest occurred at gross section
stresses considerably above the weld yield strength in almost all cases.
Therefore, fracture behavior is not expected to follow trends predictable by
elastic fracture mechanics theory, and empirical description of crack growth
and fracture characteristics is required.
The above data have been reduced to an apparent fracture toughness for
either fracture or break-through by using the standard solution for stress
intensity at the tip of a part-through crack with a deep flaw magnification
factor determined from Figure 5-12. These results are plotted in Figure 5-16
as a function of flaw depth to thickness ratio (ai/t). It can be seen that,
although considerable scatter is present, the deep flaw magnification factor
appears to normalize the data reasonably well with respect to flaw depth/
thickness ratio. It can also be seen that the break-through phenomenon is
not confined to only those specimens in which initial flaw depth approaches
the thickness, but is distributed over a range of ai/t from 0.5 to 0.95.
Estimated lower and upper bounds of apparent fracture toughness when break-
through occurs (or fracture for the 0.89 cm thick specimens) are indicated
by dashed lines on these plots. The group of data points for ai/2c = 0.4 in
Figure 5-16b which fall below the estimated lower bound are excluded because
they represent relatively small values of ai/Q in which the fracture stress
approaches the ultimate strength of an unflawed weld. This constraint results
in artificially low values for apparent fracture toughness. These estimated
5-23
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lower and upper bounds are used to construct the plot of Figure 5-17, which
approximates the range of apparent fracture toughness as a function of weld
thickness. This range is used in subsequent studies of critical flaw sizes
and proof test requirements for the propellant tanks.
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6.0 FATIGUE LIFE _NALYSIS
Summarized in this section are detailed fatigue damage analyses for the
selected structural elements and the resulting safe-life predictions.
Variations to the basic structural configuration and/or design stress levels
defined for the selected structural elements in the Phase B studies are also
investigated where appropriate.
6.1 ANALYSIS METHODS AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The linear cumulative damage theory (Miner's Law) is used as the basic
analysis approach to predict fatigue damage due to the cyclic loading spectra
and the resulting safe-life for a given structural element. The loading
spectra presented in Section 3 of this report form the basis for this analysis.
Random load spectra, such as bending moment on wing, vertical stabilizer, and
fuselage are divided into regular increments of number of load exceedances.
The difference between successive exceedances at each increment is the
number of load occurrences within that increment. An average value of loading
within that increment is used to represent all load cycles that occur over
that increment. For structural elements with a more discrete loading spectra,
such as propellant tank pressures, the load spectra are defined directly. The
maximum and minimum stresses associated with load cycles for a given increment
are determined from the Phase _ definition of limit design stresses (modified
where appropriate) and are used with the applicable S-N curves from Section 5
to determine the allowa01e number of cycles for these stress conditions. The
ratio of number of applied load cycles to allowable load cycles is the fatigue
damage for that increment of the loading spectra. The fatigue damage increments
are then summed to find the total damage incurred by a given structural element
for each major mission phase and for the entire mission profile. The safe-
life is predicted by dividing the nominal calculated fatigue life by a factor
of four. The above procedure can be represented by the following equations:
D= _ rl
N
where :
D = Fatigue damage for i00 missions
n = Number of applied load cycles for specified stress conditions
over lO0 missions
N = Number of load cycles to cause fatigue failure under specified
stress conditions
Ls= Safe-life in terms of number of missions
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The results of the fatigue life analyses are summarized in Table 6-1.
Fatigue damage is listed for each major mission phase and for the total
mission profile, based on i00 mission exposure. The resulting predicted
safe-life is also summarized. It can be seen that the predicted safe-lives
for the vertical stabilizer and the intertanks adapter shell structure are
very large (greater than 1000 missions) because of the low tension stresses
under design conditions. Fatigue damage on the vertical stabilizer due to
thermal stresses cycles is of the same order of magnitude as the damage due
to airload cycles during the ascent phase.
Modest fatigue damage is indicated for the fuselage shell at Sta. 2600,
the orbiter aft attachment support frame, and the crew compartment. The
corresponding predicted safe-lives range from hSo missions to 960 missions.
A relatively conservative theoretical stress concentration factor (K t = 4.4)
is assumed in these calculations. Therefore, normal good design practice
should be adequate to provide satisfactory fatigue life for these structural
components. Fatigue damage for the fuselage shell at Sta. 2600 is compared
for two analytical models: (1) longitudinal membrane loading in the
cyclindrical shell due to 0ending moment, axial load, and internal pressure,
and (2) membrane loading plus secondary bending stresses due to the
discontinuity effects of fuselage ring frames restraining the free expansion
of the skin-stringer shell under internal pressure loading, it can be seen
that these secondary stresses may have a significant influence on fatigue
damage; the predicted safe life is reduced from 960 missions to 520 missions
for the example case.
Safe-life predicted for the LOX tank aft bulkhead is 185 missions.
This represents a relatively small margin over the required service life of
100 missions and indicates that close attention to detail design of propellant
tanks is desiraole to assure satisfactory fatigue life. Development tests to
determine fatigue life cnaracteristics of typical welded and mechanical joints
will be of particular importance.
Fatigue damage predicted for the wing spar cap in the root region is
extremely hign; a safe-life of only 6 missions is indicated for an assumed
theoretical stress concentration factor of 4.4. The predicted safe-life is
increased to 20 missions if S-N curves based on K t = 3.0 are used in the
damage analysis. This indicates that refined design practices to minimize
fatigue effects will not be adequate by themselves to provide satisfactory
fatigue life because of the severity of the loading spectra and the high
tension stresses in the wing spars under limit design conditions of
600 MN/m 2 (88 ksi). It was determined by iteration that a reduction in
limit design tension stress to approximately 450 _/m 2 (65 ksi) is necessary
to provide adequate fatigue life, assuming Kt = 3.0. This modification is
also summarized in Ta0el 6-1; a predicted safe-life of 135 missions is indicated.
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6.2 FATIGUE _ZALYSIS - _4ING
6.2.1 Structural Configuration and Loading
Basic structural geometry, internal loadings and member sizing for
major structural elements of the wing are given in Reference 22. Review
of these data indicates that the wing spar caps on the lower wing surface
in the root region are the most highly stressed tension members. Spar No. 4
at Span Sta. 0 is the most highly loaded member and this section is taken as
the reference for the fatigue damage analysis. A sketch of the spar cap and
adjacent geometry at this section is given in Figure 6-1.
(5.7 in.) .... _r
7
(5.7 in. )
I
I
I
I
_---I -_ -
2.5 cm __ | 5.9 cm
(I.0 in. ) -_ (2.3 in)'_- /
Corrugated Skin __J
Corrugated
JJ Shear Web
_Spar Cap
./
2.0 am
"_-- (.8o in.)
Figure 6-1. Wing Spar Cap Geometry
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The spar cap area is sized on the basis of tension stress in the max q_
ultimate design condition; a 5 percent allowance is made for area lost due to
fastener noles. Tne critical design condition is a room temperature case so
that the gross section stress may be expressed as:
Oul t = 0.95 Ftu
ali m = °ult =
= 850 _N/m2 (123 ksi)
570 _{/m 2 (88 ksi)
6.2.2 Damage Analysis_
Detailed calculations of fatigue damage are presented in Table 6-2. The
amplitude of alternating stress cycles and mean stress are based on the limit
design stress defined above and the wing load spectra given in Figure 3-11.
Allowable number of load cycles for given stress conditions are determined
from S-N curves based on Kt = 4.5, presented in Figure 5-3. The calculated
fatigue damage due to cruise/landing and taxi mission phases is doubled to
approximate the effect of ferry missions over the operational life. It can
be seen that the total damage factor for i00 missions is significantly greater
than unity (D = 4.26); the corresponding safe-life is 6 missions. Atmospheric
tur0ulence during the ascent and cruise/landing mission phases contributes
the major portion of the damage; fatigue damage due to ground-air-ground
(GAG) cycles is insignificant.
Because the safe-life predicted above is much less than the design require-
ment of 100 missions, a supplementary damage analysis was performed using S-N
curves based on a lower tneoretical stress concentration factor (Kt = 3.0)
and given in Figure 5.2. It is considered that this corresponds, in an
approximate manner, to employing extensive measures in design and fabrication
to reduce effects detrimental to fatigue performance. These measures may
include such things as generous fillet radii, tapered Joints, interference
fit fasteners, shot peening, coining, etc. Detailed calculations for this
condition are presented in Table 6-3. It can be seen that significant improve-
ment is indicated witn a total damage factor of 1.23, however the corresponding
safe-life of 20 missions is still far below the design requirements.
A final evaluation was performed to determine the reduction in limit
design stress level required to meet design requirements for fatigue life.
By iteration, it was determined that a limit tension stress of approximately
450 MN/m 2 (65 ksi) will satisfy the design requirement of 100 mission life,
based on K t = 3.0. Damage calculations for this case are presented in
Table 6-4. A total damage factor of 0.186 is indicated, with corresponding
safe-life of 135 missions.
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6.3 FATIGUE ANALYSIS - VERTICAL STABILIZER
6.3.1 Structural Configuration and Loading
T_e vertical sta0ilizer main box is a 3-spar structure with integral
stiffened cover skins of 6AL-4V titanium alloy. In contrast to the wing,
in which spanwise bending is carried by concentrated spar caps, spanwise
bending loads on _he vertical stabilizer are resisted primarily by the
distributed cover skins. The assembly is designed as a neat-sink structure,
without an external thermal protection system, and therefore is subjected to
higher temperatures and temperature gradients than the wing spar caps.
Maximum stresses in the cover skins occur at the canted rib near the root;
this section is selected for fatigue analysis as indicated in Figure 6-2.
The cover skin structural geometry and limit design stress requires
considerable redefinition from the data presented in Reference 22 because of
subsequent changes in design loads. The cover skin geometry developed in
Reference 22 is shown in Figure 6-3(a). This was based on a critical
limit root bending moment for the surface of 8.9x106 Nm (79x106 in-lb)
imposed by the max qs condition during the ascent phase. Subsequent final
loads analyses showed a 19rge reduction in max qS loads to a limit root
bending moment of 4.88x10°Nm (43.2x106 in-lb); the subsonic side gust
condition became critical with a limit root moment of 7.1xlO6Nm (63.0x106 in-lb).
Time did not permit incorporation of these load changes into the structural
sizing reported in Reference 22 as part of the Phase B study effort. Therefore,
an approximate re-optimization of skin and integral stiffener dimensions has
been performed in this study to reflect the revised design loads. Stability
under spanwise compression loading is the critical design requirement; the
skin thickness and rib spacing were taken the same as defined in Reference 22
and stiffener spacing, depth and thickness were varied to achieve simultaneous
skin panel and wide column buckling at ultimate design load. The resulting
cover skin configuration is illustrated in Figure 6-3(b).
The spanwise loading at the selected section due to current design loads
is determined by applying the ratio of design bending moments and applicable
ultimate factors of safety to the data reported in Reference 22. This results
in an ultimate loading of 0.85 _/m (4900 lb-in); with corresponding limit
design stresses of 180 _/m 2 (26 ksi) for the subsonic side gust condition and
124 _/m 2 (18 Ksi) for the max qS condition, using the revised cover skin
section indicated in Figure 6-3(b).
6.3.2 Damase Analysis
Detailed calculations of fatigue damage on the selected section are
presented in Taole 6-5. Allowable load cycles are determined from S-N
curves based on Kt = 4.5, presented in Figure 5-3. The amplitude of applied
stress cycles is based on the vertical stabilizer load spectra presented in
Figure 3-12; however, some interpretation is required in the application of
these load spectra because of the change in design loads. The load spectra
are based on the original set of design loads, in which max qB was the
critical design condition. The curves for ascent phase are used directly
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with an associated limit design stress of 124 MN/m 2 (18 ksi). Cruise/landing
phase now contains the critical design condition and it is assumed that limit
load will be experienced once during 100 missions. The amplitude of this
curve is increased by a factor of 2.17 to conform with this assumption, and
is used with a limit design stress of 180 _/m 2 (26 ksi) appropriate for the
subsonic gust condition. The amplitude of the exceedance curve for the entry
phase is increased by the ratio of the original to the revised root bending
moments for the max q6 condition (k = 1.83) and is used with the current
limit design stress for the max q6 condition.
Significant temperature gradients exist between the skin and integral
stiffener elements, so an evaluation of the effect of thermal stresses on
the fatigue damage is included in the analysis. Skin and stiffener temperature
profiles are illustrated in Figure 3-17, These temperatures are based on the
analysis of the original cover skin section shown in Figure 6-2(a) and will be
slightly conservative for the current configuration because the smaller
thickness and mass of the integral stiffener will reduce the temperature
gradient between skin and stiffener. It can be seen that two distinct
thermal pulses occur during the mission; the first is due to impingement of
the orbiter main engine plumes during separation, and the second is due to
entry heating. As a conservative simplification, these will be treated as
two discrete stress cycles with the thermal stress assumed to return to zero
between the two pulses. Elastic behavior will prevail during conditions of
interest, so that the thermal stresses may be determined from the elementary
equations :
or=. -El [al AT1 - a2 AT2]
1 + (EA)I/(EA) 2
o2_= E2 IsI ATI-
where:
E =
A =
AT =
thermal stress
elastic modulus
cross-section area
coefficient of thermal expansion
temperature change from room temperature
subscripts:
1 = skin
2 = integral stiffener
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Tne values of tne above parameters, and resulting thermal stresses, are
summarized below for the two thermal pulses:
PULSE i PULSE 2
T1 = 460K (370 F) T 1 =
AT 1 = 167C (300 F) AT 2 =
T2 = 310K (100 F) T2 =
AT 2 = 17C (30 F) AT 2 =
a I = i0.2xlO-69m/cm-deg C al =
(5.68x10-°in/in-deg F)
a2 = 9.1xlO-6c_/cm-deg C _2 =
(5.05xlO-Oin/in-deg F)
E1 = 1.03xl05MN/m 2 (14.gxlO 6 psi) E1 =
E2 = 1.12xl05MN/m 2 (16.2xl06 psi) E2 =
A1 = 1.55cm 2 (0.240 in. 2) A1 =
A2 = .865cm 2 (0.134 in. 2) A2 =
= -58.5MN/m2 (-8.5 ksi) _i =1
= 107 _/m 2 (15.6 ksi) a 2 =2
516K (470 F)
222C (400 F)
390K (245 F)
97C (175 F)
I0.4xl0-6cm/cm-deg C
(5.80xlO-bin/in-deg F)
9" 7xl0-6c_/cm-deg C
5.40xi0- in/in-deg F)
.994x105MN/m 2 (14.4xlO6psi)
i. 07xi05_/m 2 (15.5xlO6psi )
1.55cm 2 (0.240 in. 2)
.865cm 2 (0.134 in. 2)
-51 FK_/m2 (-7.4 ksi)
91.5NI_/m2 (13.3 ksi)
It can be seen from Table 6-1 that the fatigue damage at the selected
section is small, with corresponding predicted safe-life of 2270 missions.
Tnis is the result of the low tension design stresses associated with this
configuration in which stability under compression loading is the overriding
design requirement. Almost all of the fatigue damage is incurred during the
cruise/landing mission phase. As for the wing, the indicated damage for this
phase is doubled to account for ferry missions over the operational life.
Tne damage due to thermal stress, while not significant compared to the
total, is about half the damage due to airload cycles during ascent and
entry mission phases.
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6.4 FATIGUE ANALYSIS - INTERTANK ADAPTER
6.4.1 Structural Confif_ration and Loading
The intertank adapter is a cylindrical shell structure with integral
stiffened 2219-T87 aluminum skins and internal ring frames. Maximum
longitudinal tension loading in the cylindrical shell occurs on the bottom
centerline near Body Sta. 2180. The limit design compression loading of
6.1 x lO 5 N/m (3500 lb/in) is considerably greater than limit design tension
loading of 5.05 x 105 N/m (2900 lb/in) for this region (see Figure 3-5) so
that the skin stringer shell will be critical for compression buckling mode
of failure. It is assumed that the shell is designed to an allowable
ultimate compression stress of 276 MN/m 2 (40 ksi); the resulting effective
shell thickness is 0.31cm(0.122 in).
Conditions producing tension loading on the adapter lower surface and
the resulting longitudinal tension stresses are summarized below:
Load
Condi ti on
Longitudinal Loading (Nx)
(N/m) (ib/in)
Longitudinal Stress (_ x )
(NN/m2) (ksi)
(ii) Burnout 5.05 x l05 2900 164 23.8
(12) Entry 1.22 x l05 700 39 5.6
(13) Subsonic 2.1 x 104 120 6.9 1.0
Gust
(16) 2-g Taxi 3.5 x i04 200 ll 1.6
6.4.2 Dama$e AnalFsis
It is apparent that only the burnout case produces stress levels high
enough to cause potential fatigue damage. Therefore, the loading spectra
can be simplified to the basic GAG c_cle which varies from -5.05x10 p N/m
(-2900 lb/in) at lift off to 5.05x10 N/m (2900 lb/in) at burnout. The
structure is essentially at room temperature for these significant fatigue
stresses. For these conditions:
R = -I.0
Cmax/Ftu = 23.8 = 0.38
62.0
N = 4300 cycles (Figure 5-1)
D = __i00 = .0232
4300
Ls = i00 =
4(.0232)
1080 missions (Safe-life)
6-27
SD72-SH-0046
_J_ Space DivisionNorth Amencan Rockwell
6.5 FATIGb-E ANALYSIS - FUSELAGE STA. 2600
6.5.1 Structural Configuration and Loadin_
Fuselage Sta. 2600 is in the LH 2 tank adjacent to the orbiter aft
attachment. This section represents the region of maximum body bending
during the ascent flignt phase. The LH 2 tank is an integral stiffened
cylindrical shell of 2219-T87 aluminum alloy. Ring frames are spaced at
approximately 1.73 m (68 in.) to provide shell stability or to accept major
external loads. Maximum tension stresses occur on the bottom center-line;
therefore this region will be critical for fatigue life evaluation. Tne
shell properties in tnis region are obtained from Reference 5 as follows:
ts = 0.310 cm (0.122 in.)
= 0.445 cm (0.175 in.)
(skin thickness)
(effective thickness of skin and
integral stringers)
Longitudinal loading in the I_2 tank shell is produced by external
bending moments and axial loads and by internal tank pressures. Longitudinal
stresses due to applied moment are determined from the equation:
= __iL_
_XM _R2_
and due to external axial load by the expression:
eXA = FX
2_ R_
where:
M = applied bending moment
R = shell radius = 5.05m (198 in.)
= effective shell thickness
FX = applied external axial load
The tank ullage pressure (pu)produces an average longitudinal tensile
stress equal to:
Xp 2_-
However, because of Poisson effects associated with hoop stresses in the tank
skin due to internal pressure, the actual longitudinal tension stress in the
skin will be higher than in the integral stringers to maintain strain compati-
bility. The following equations for longitudinal stresses are derived on the
basis of maintaining equal longitudinal strains between the skin and the
integral stringers:
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_Xstr = (1-2p)
2_
°Xsk = puR_-=--[i+2_( __ -i)]
2t ts
(integral stringer stress)
(skin stress)
6.5.2 Damage Anal_sis - Memorane Loading
Exceedance of alternating bending moment and associated values of mean
bending moment are defined in Figure 3-13 for ascent, entry, cruise/landing
and taxi mission phases. The effective GAG cycle to maximum thrust on every
mission is also indicated. It is also necessary to define axial loads and
tank pressures associated with these mission phases to determine the net
mean and alternating stresses in the tank shell. The majority of significant
alternating moment cycles during the ascent phase will occur near the max qa
condition, so axial load and tank pressures associated with this design
condition are used for the ascent phase. Axial loads and tank pressures for
all mission phases are summarized below:
Condition
Ascent (max qa )
Ascent (burnout)
Entry
Cruise/Landing
Taxi
Axial Load
(_) (ib)
Ullage Pressure
(MN/m 2) (psi)
-22.5 -5.05 x 106
-1.51 -3.40 x 106
-.55 -1.24 x lO 5
-.39 -8.8 x 104
0 0
.125 18.2
.143 20.8
.ll9 17.2
.062 9.0
.021 3.0
Stress spectra for the various mission phases are derived from the
loading spectra presented in Figure 3-13 and the previously defined equations
to convert loading to stress. Detailed stress spectra and corresponding
fatigue damage calculations are presented in Table 6-6. The burnout(maximum
thrust) condition is treated as an effective ground-air-ground (GAG) cycle,
with total tension stress increasing from zero at prelaunch to a maximum at
burnout once per mission. Tension stresses listed in the table refer to the
skin element, because of Poisson's effect on tank pressure stresses , the
net skin stress is higher than the integral stringer stress. Allowable
number of load cycles for given stress conditions are obtained from the S-N
curves of Figure 5-i.
It can be seen from the results of Table 6-6 that the calculated fatigue
damage is moderate, with corresponding predicted safe-life of 960 missions.
Almost all of the damage is due to the effective GAG cycles of maximum stress
at burnout; the damage due to airload fluctuations during ascent and entry
is relatively small. The assumed theoretical stress concentration factor of
Kt = 4.4 that is the basis for the S-N curves used in the damage analysis is
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probably conservative for the type of structure and welded Joints associated
with the skin element.
6.5.3 Dama$e Anal[sis - Membrane Plus Discontinuity Loading
The preceding fatigue damage analysis is based on an idealized structural
model in which the tank is assumed to remain a pure cylinder and only
elementary membrane loadings exist in the tank shell structure. In the actual
structure, significant secondary stresses may be induced because of the
restraint of the fuselage ring frames preventing free radial deflection of the
skin/stringer shell under tank pressure or external axial loads. Therefore,
it is considered desirable to perform a supplementary analysis which considers
these effects and provides a comparison with the basic solution to evaluate
the significance of such discontinuity stresses on the fatigue life of the
tank shell.
Analysis of the secondary bending stresses due to the interaction of
fuselage ring frames and the skin/stringer shell is accomplished by the use
of "Shell of Revolution" computer program which was developed for and
extensively applied to the analysis of the Saturn S-II stage. The idealized
structural shell and a typical skin/stringer section are indicated in Figure
6-h. The influence of both a typical stability frame and a major load-
carrying frame, sucn as the orbiter attach support frame at Sta. 2666, on
secondary bending stresses i_ skin and stringers is considered. A tank
ullage pressure of .lh3 _/m (20.8 psig) is taken for the analysis, and three
values of external longitudinal loading intensity are considered. The
distribution of secondary bending moment on the skin/stringer beam element
per unit shell width is plotted in Figure 6-5. The resulting secondary
bending stresses are stunmarized in Table 6-7.
It can be seen that discontinuity effects adjacent to a major load-carrying
frame are much greater than for a stability frame. Because the stringers are
external to tne tanK, the flange element of stringer is loaded in compression
by the secondary bending moment at the frame station. This will not aggravate
the fatigue damage and tnerefore tne skin element, _hicn is loaded in tension
by secondary bending, will 0e more critical. Secondary bending stresses on
the ski_ vary from about 3h i,_/m2(5 ksi) for N_ = .49 ;_;/m(2800 lb/in) to
55 _/m_(8 ksi) for _x = -.bl I_/mQ-3500 lb/in_ Tnese secondary bending
effects are incorporated in the fatigue damage calculations summarized in
Table 6-8. The secondary bending stresses for a given mission phase are
approximated by interpolation between tne results sumzarized in Table 6-7
for the values of tank pressure and external longitudinal loading applicable
to each mission phase. The secondary bending stress is included as an
increase in tne mean stress for each applicable mission phase.
The secondary bending moment midway between frames produces tension on
the stringer flange element and compression on the skin. However, the second-
ary bending stress on flange at this location is less than the difference in
stress between skin and stringer due to Poisson's effect on skin hoop stresses.
Therefore, the skin remains as the critical element for fatigue life analysis.
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Figure 6-4. LH2 Tank Shell Model for Discontinuity Analysis
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The total fatigue da_aage indicated from Table 6-8 is still moderate, but
a significant increase is noted over the basic case. The predicted safe-life
is 520 missions as compared with 960 missions for the solution considering
only membrane stresses. This illustrates that discontinuity effects and
associated secondary stresses must be carefully considered in the design
development and fatigue evaluation of actual vehicle structure.
6.6 FATIGUE ANALYSIS - ORBITER AFT ATTACH SUPPORT FRAJ_E
6.6.1 Structural Configuration and Loadins
The orbiter aft attach support structure is a major fuselage ring frame
of 2219 aluminum alloy. The frame extends from the LH2 tank wall to the
external mold line defined by the contour of the thermal protection system.
The inboard cap of the frame is an integral part of the I_{2 tank wall. A
sketch showing the idealized structural geometry and identification of
individual members used by GDC in the Phase B study analysis is given in
Figure 6-6.
5
2
?
lO
12
2O
16
18
13
19
Figure 6-6. Orbiter Aft Attach Support Frame
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From Reference 7, the critical member in the idealized frame configura-
tion is indicated as bar #6 (inboard cap). This member is designed by
tension load in the inboard cap, whereas the other members generally have
larger compression design loads than tension, with consequent reduction in
the operating tension stresses. The frame experiences internal bending
moment, shear and axial loads due to the external normal and lateral loads
applied at the orbiter aft attachment. Unit stress solutions for bar #6
are given in Reference 7 as follows:
A = i000 kips, o6 = 24.7 ksi
z
Ay = i000 kips, _6 = 68.0 ksi
Because the frame is an integral part of the LH 2 tank, it is also loaded
in hoop tension due to the radial deflection tendency of the tank shell under
internal pressure and longitudinal compression loading. The discontinuity
solution described in Section 6.5.3 also provides the net radial deflection
at frame locations, from which the effective hoop stress in the frame is
calculated. The frame cross-section area assumed in the discontinuity
analysis is 26 cm2 (4.0 in.2); this value is a reasonable overall average
for this frame and also for the local section which includes bar #6. The
frame hoop stresses calculated from the discontinuity solution for a tank
ullage pressure of 0.143 I_/in. 2 (20.8 psig) are:
Case
1
2
3
External
Longitudinal
Loading (Nx)
0
2800 lb/in.
-3500 ib/in.
Frame Hoop Stress
(_,_/m 2 ) (ksi)
12 4 18.0
106 15.4
145 21.i
In this case, the reference values of longitudinal loading are related to
the external axial load, without regard to external bending moment, because
the influence on frame hoop stress is associated with Poisson's effect on
the hoop strains in the tank skin.
Critical design loads on the frame occur in the max qa and max q6
conditions ; limit design values and corresponding limit stresses in bar #6
are :
max__Z_R_
A = 4.21 _ (950 kips)
z
A = 0
Y
_6 = 163 MN/m 2 (23.6 ksi)
max q_
A = 2.90 _ (654 kips)
z
A = 0.74 _ (167 kips)
Y
_6 = 190 MN/m 2 (27.5 ksi)
For this flight con<_itiou, t:_c l:L_i'c c.esi_ axial loading and tank pressure
are :
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F = 22.2 MN (-5.05 x 106 lb)
x
N = -0.705 MN/m (-4050 ib/in.)x
Pu = 0.136 _@/m 2 (19.7 psig)
By interpolation of discontinuity solution values, the resulting hoop stress
in the frame is determined to be
ghoop = 138 MN/m 2 (20 ksi) (limit)
The total tension stress in bar #6 for the max q8 conditon is then:
o = 327 _/m2 (47.5 ksi) (limit)
6to t
= 457 MN/m 2 (66.5 ksi) (ultimate)
This total ultimate stress is somewhat greater than the ultimate tensile
strength of the material, if room temperature properties are assumed.
Therefore, it is assumed that the area of bar #6 is increased so that the
ultimate applied stress does not exceed 0.95 Ft for 2219-T87 aluminum alloy
at room temperature. This allows a 5 percent _ocal reduction in net section
area due to fastener holes. It is further assumed that the local increase
in area of bar #6 will not significantly change the frsme hoop stress due to
internal pressure. The stress coefficients for unit normal and lateral frame
loads are then ratioed down to maintain acceptable stresses from this
loading source, as follows:
k 0._5(62.0) - 1.b,(20)
= 1._27.5) - = 0.805
The stress coefficients for bar #6 due to unit normal and lateral external
loads applied to the frame then become:
Az = i000 kips, o 6 = 20 ksi
Ay = i000 kips, 06 = 55 ksi
6.6.2 Damage Analysis
Fatigue damage calculations are summarized in Table 6-9. The loading
spectra is derived from the exceedance curves of Fig. 3-14 and the !ir_t
design loads for max qa and max qB conditions listed in the preceding section.
These are converted to stress spectra for bar #6 by applying the unit load/
stress coefficients defined above. The influence of tank pressure and axial
load on the mean stress is included in the same manner as described in the
preceding section. Because the major cyclic loads will occur in the
vicinity of max qa flight time, the axial load and nominal tank ullage
pressure of ./25 _/in (18.2 psig) associated with this condition are used
to determine this contribution to the mean stress. This increment is found
to be 127 _@_/in2 (18.5 ksi).
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In addition, the frame stress resulting from the combination of tank
ullage pressure and the mean normal load at orbiter attach is treated as an
effective GAG cycle, with the stress building from zero to the maximum
value once per mission.
The total fatigue dmnage indicated in Table 6-9 is moderate, with a
corresponding predicted safe life of 480 missions. This indicates that no
fatigue pro01ems should be expected for this type of structural element on
the shuttle vehicle if normal good design practices are followed. It should
be noted that the major share of fatigue damage (approximately 90 percent) is
due to the effective GAG cycle of stress due to tank pressure and mean normal
load at the orbiter attachment. The remainder of the damage is primarily due
to alternating lateral loads at the orbiter attachment.
6.7 FATIGUE ANALYSIS - L0X TANK AFr BUI/</IEAD
6.7.1 Structural ConfiGuration and Loading
_e LOX tank aft bulkhead is a membrane dome of ellipsoidal contour
having an aspect ratio of /2. The dome is a welded assembly employing
formed gore sections of 2219-T87 aluminum alloy. The gore skin thickness is
tapered from the maximum value at the apex of the dome to maintain approxi-
mately constant stresses in the meridian direction over the bulkhead surface.
Weld lands are assumed to be twice the thickness of the basic skin. The
basic skin in the region of the bulkhead apex is selected as the element for
fatigue life analysis.
The maximum limit pressure of 0.30 MN/in 2 (43.5 psig) at the apex of
the bulkhead occurs 100 sec. after liftoff with longitudinal load factor of
2.05 g. This limit design pressure assumes a pressure regulator malfunction,
so that tank ullage pressure is at the top of the relief valve range. The
total pressure for this flight ccndition with nominal tank ullage pressure
is 0.286 Z_/in 2 (41.5 psig).
Total pressure at the apex of the bulkhead during prelaunch (tank fully
fueled) is 0.183 MN/in 2 (26.5 psig).
6.7.2 Da_nage Analysis
The primary fatigue load spectrum on the bulkhead is essentially a GAG
cycle with the pressure increasing from zero at prelaunch, prior to fueling,
to a maximum value during boost once per mission. However, the influence of
engine thrust oscillations and corresponding inertia head pressures; ground
checkout fueling and pressurizations; and pressure regulator malfunctions
also will be evaluated. Two basic bulkhead configurations will be considered,
one based on ultimate strength design requirements and the other based on the
proof factor established oy GDC during the Phase 3 study.
Ultimate Strength Design
Skin thickness at bulkhead apex is assumed to be sized so that applied
stress under ultimate design pressure loading is equal to the uniaxial
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ultimate tensile strength of the material. Then fatigue stress spectrum may
be obtained as :
Boost:
O
_x
Ft u = (1,-"_)( Pnom)= (1,_)(4].,5_=Plim! 43,5) 0,68
°min = 0
R = 0
N = 550 cycles (Fig. 5-1, KT = 4.4)
i00
AD = _ = 0.182
55O
Ground checkout :
Assume three ground fueling and pressurization cycles per operational
mission
"i
Ftu 43.5) 0. 435
°rain = 0
R = 0
N = 7600 cycles (Fig. 5-1)
AD = 300
7600 = 0.040
Thrust Excurs ion :
The maximum thrust excursion indicated in Fig. 3-15 is ± 3.2 percent of
steady state value. At the time of maximum pressure on bulkhead the LOX head
is approximately 7.65 m (300 in. ) and the corresponding inertia head pressure
is 0.175 MN/in 2 (25.3 psig). The oscillating pressure is then:
Ap = ± .032(25.3) = -+0.81 psi
p max = 41.5 + 0.81 = 42.31 psi
p rain = 41.5 - 0.81 = 40.69 psi
R =  0.69 0.96
42.31 =
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ultimate tensile strength of the material. Then fatigue stress spectrum may
be obtained as :
Boost:
max
Ftu (1,----_)( Pnom /= ( 1 ){hl,5 _== Plim! I--_ [43.5) 0.68
ore-in = 0
R = 0
N = 550 cycles (Fig. 5-1, KT = h.h)
I00
AD = -- = 0.182
550
Ground checkout :
Assume three ground fueling and pressurization cycles per operational
mission
Etu 43.5) o.435
°rain = 0
R = 0
N = 7600 cycles (Fig. 5-1)
300 = 0 .oho
AD = 7600
Thrust Excursion :
The maximum thrust excursion indicated in Fig. 3-15 is ± 3.2 percent of
steady state value. At the time of maximum pressure on bulkhead the LOX head
is approximately 7.65 m (300 in. ) and the corresponding inertia head pressure
is 0.175 MN/in 2 (25.3 psig). The oscillating pressure is then:
Ap = ± .032(25.3) = ± 0.81 psi
p max = hl.5 + 0.81 = h2.31 psi
p min = 41.5 - 0.81 = 40.69 psi
R = 40.69 0.96
42.31 =
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°max
= 0.69
Ftu
N = 106 cycles
Assuming i00 occurrences per flight of this magnitude transient, which is
very conservative:
AD = 100 (i00) = .010
10 6
Total damage is then:
D = 0.182 + 0.040 + 0.010 = 0.232
and corresponding safe life is:
L = i00 = 108 missions
s 4( .232 )
If a pressure regulator malfunction is assumed to occur on 10 percent of the
flights, which is probably highly conservative, the fatigue damage due to
boost pressure cycles becomes:
Nominal Pressure: (90 percent of flights)
AO -- 9O____= 0.163
55O
Limit Pressure: (i0 percent of flights)
°max i
Ftu i. 4
0.715
omi n = O
R = 0
N = 350 cycles
i0
AD2 = 35---O= 0.029
AD = 0.163 + 0.029 = 0.192
D = 0.192 + 0.040 + 0.010 = 0.242
i00
L - = 103 missions
s 4(.242)
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Proof Test Design
A proof factor for the lower LOX tank of 1.23 was determined by GDC
during the Phase B Study; this was based on the assumption that the proof
test would be performed with liquid nitrogen and was derived by application
of plane-strain fracture mechanics theory and test data. This value m_v not
agree with proof factors that will be subsequently determined in this study
using empirical data from current fracture mechanics test programs ; however,
it will be used for the present to illustrate the potential effect of proof
test requirements on fatigue life. This proof factor required an increase
in bulkhead skin thickness in the apex region from 0.292 cm (0.115 in.) to
0.318 cm (0.125 in.) to avoid exceeding material yield stress under proof
test conditions. Therefore, the stress spectra for this configuration is
determined by applying the inverse ratio of the appropriate skin thicknesses
to the preceding values.
Boost:
°max O. 115
= (0.68) = 0.92 (o.68) = 0.625
Ftu 0.125
(2 . = 0
mln
R = 0
N =
AD =
1050 cycles ( Fig. 5-i)
i00
= 0.0955
1050
Ground che ok out :
gmax
= 0.92 (0.435) = 0.400
Ftu
o_i n = 0
R = 0
N = i0,i00 (Fig. 5-1)
300
AD = = 0.0297
i0, iO0
Thrust Excursion:
AD = 0.010
Total Damage :
D = 0.0955 + 0.0297 + 0.010 = 0.135
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i00
L =
s 4 (.135")
= 185 missions
Discussion of Results
The S-N curves used in this analysis, based on K_ = 4.4, are probably
conservative for the type of structure and weld joint Zdetails of the
bulkhead, particularly in the high stress-low cycle range of interest.
However, the very marginal safe fatigue life indicated by these analyses
shows that close attention to detail design and adequate fatigue life
development and qualification tests will be of vital importance to assure
satisfactory fatigue performance of the reusable propellant tanks for space
shuttle. It also can be seen that fatigue damage due to ground checkout
tanking and pressurization and due to thrust excursions is relatively
minor. Reductions in operating stress due to proof test requirements may
provide significant improvement in fatigue life.
6.8 FATIGUE _ALYSiS - CREW COMPARTMENT
6.8.1 Structural Configuration and Loading
The structural configuration of the crew compartment was not defined to
the depth of detail in the Phase B Study as for other structural elements
presently considered; therefore, it is necessary to make several assumptions.
The mid-portion of the crew corapartment is idealized as a pressurized, semi-
monocoque cylindrical shell of 3.05 m (120 in.) diameter, constructed of
2219-T87 aluminum alloy. Minimum skin thickness is assumed to be 0.076 cm
(0.030 in.). The crew compartment is mounted from the nose TPS shell
structure and does not experience primary body loads. The major loading
source is due to compartment internal pressure with a maximtua value of
0.103 MN/m 2 (15 psia).
Z% (15.o)(6o)
t = 0.030 = 30,000 psi
(206 l,_{/m2 )
6.8.2 Da_aage Analysis
The stress spectrum for operational missions is a simple 6A6 cycle from
zero to maximum pressure differential once per mission.
O
max 30
= 0.48
Ftu
Omi n = 0
R = 0
N
AD
5,000 cycles (Fig. 5-1, KT = 4.4)
i00
= 0.020
5OOO
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It is also necessary to consider the fatigue damage that may be incurred
during ferry missions. It is conservatively assumed that one complete
transcontinental ferry mission is performed for each operational mission, as
a worst case situation. The typical transcontinental route involves l0
flight segments; an ascent from sea level to maximum cruise altitude of 6.1 km
(20,000 ft) is assknned for each segment. Ambient pressure at that
altitude is .046 MN/m_ (6.7 psia) so the maximum pressure differential is:
Ap = 15.0 - 6.7 = 8.3 psi
8.3(60) = 16,600 psi
max =
.O3O
°max 16.6
Ftu 62.0
0.27
omi n = 0
R = 0
N = 60,000 cycles (Fig. 5-1)
lO<lO0) = 0.017
AD - 60,000
Total damage :
D = 0.020 + 0.017 = 0.037
i00
Ls - 4(.037)
= 675 missions
These results indicate that no fatigue problems should be expected for the
crew compartment, even with very extensive ferry mission utilization.
6-47
SD72-SH-0046
#_ Space DivisionNorth Amencan Rockwell
6.9 FATIGUE ANALYSIS - WING - ALTERNATE MATERIAL
6.9.1 Structural Configuration and Loadin6
The use of 2219-T87 aluminum alloy for wing spar caps will be evaluated
from fatigue and fracture mechanics considerations to determine relative merits
compared to the primary selection of 6A1-4V titanium alloy. The general
configuration and shape of the aluminum spar caps is assumed to be similar
to the titanium members, however the section dimensions and thickness are
increased to provide additional area consistent with the reduced allowable
stresses for the aluminum material. The basic loading spectra are the same
as employed for fatigue analysis of the titanium structure. The stress
levels for individual load cycles are reduced in proportion to the limit
operating stresses of aluminum versus titanium material. A maximum structural
temperature of 370 K (200 F) is assumed for the aluminum spar caps during
entry and subsequent cruise flight. A corresponding limit operating stress
of 275 MN/m 2 (40 ksi) is approximated for the max qa design condition.
6.9.2 Damage Anal2sis -
Detailed calculations of fatigue damage for the reference limit stress
of 275 MN/m 2 (40 ksi) are presented in Table 6-10. Damage analysis is based
on S-N curves with a theoretical stress concentration factor of 3.0 to be
consistent with the final approach selected for the basic wing configuration
with titanium alloy. A total damage factor of 0.66 is calculated; this
corresponds to a safe-life of 38 missions with a scatter factor of h.o
included. This is not satisfactory, so the limit operating stress must be
reduced to achieve adequate fatigue life--a limit stress of approximately
240 MN/m 2 (35 ksi) was determined by iteration. Fatigue damage analysis
for this reduced limit stress is summarized in Table 6-11. A total damage
factor of 0.238 is calculated for this case_ this corresponds to a safe-life
of 105 missions. A comparison of structural weight between aluminum and
titanium material for the wing spar caps is performed in a subsequent section
of this report dealing with safe-life analyses assuming an initial crack-like
flaw to be present in the structure.
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7.0 SAFE-LIFE A_ALYSIS
Su_m_arized in this section are analyses that investigate the characteris-
tics of crack growth in the selected structural elements to the point where
critical dimensions are reached. In contrast to the preceding fatigue life
analyses, in which an originally sound structure is assumed and the amount of
service exposure to initiate a fatigue crack is determined, the safe-life
analyses of this section assume a pre-existing flaw in the structure prior to
the start of operational service. The crack growth under the applicable
repeated load spectra is evaluated, and the safe-life in terms of number of
missions is dete_ained as the interval until tae initial defect grows to a
size that could cause failure under limit design conditions. The size of
initial defect is arbitrarily selected; usually with regard to nondestructive
evalhation (NDE) capabilities appropriate for the type of defect, material,
and structural configuration. In some cases, the initial defect size is
taken so that a parmaetric investigation of missions to failure (critical size)
versus initial flaw size may be performed. The resulting influence of various
initial defect sizes and various safe-life safety factors on the weight of a
structure designed to achieve a safe-life of i00 missions is evaluated for
appropriate structural elements.
7.1 ANALYSIS _THODS
7.1.1 Stress Intensity and Critical Flaw Size
Fracture mechanics theory uses the basic parameter of stress intensity as
the key index to determine crack instability and crack growth behaviour. Stress
intensity is a function of both the applied general stress level and the size,
character, and location of the crack or crack-like defect. Stress intensity
solutions and design curves are summarized in Reference 23 for a large number
of practical cases. For convenience, the stress intensity equations for
elementary cases considered in this study are summarized in Fig. 7-1.
_he critical crack size that will cause abrupt instability under a pre-
scribed stress level on the general section, or the critical stress for a
given crack size, can be determined from the stress intensity equations by
setting the applied stress intensity equal to the critical value. This
critical value is customarily taken as the plane-strain fracture toughness (KI )
if the structural member in question is relatively thick, iIigher values c
for critical stress intensity, approaching the plane-stress fracture toughness
(Kc)' may be justified for thin members. A discussion of fracture toughness
trends, and values recommended for use in this study, is given in Section 5.
Where empirical data are available from current in-house testing on fracture
of 2219 aluminum alloy containing through or part-through cracks, these data
are used directly to establish critical flaw sizes or critical stress levels.
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Crack Type
Through
Crack
L
i
Edge
Crack
Part -Through
Crack
I
Corner
Crack
Crack from
Fastener
Hole
Stress Intensity
KI = _ ;k
KI = 1.12 _ X
Kimax = i.i MK o-_
Q = f(a/2c, _/_y)
(See Figure i, Reference 2&)
ME = f(a/2c, a/t)
(See Figure 5-12)
[See Reference 23, page 44
for f(c/r)]
= Finite width correction factor; significant if crack length
> 0.2 plate width. (See Reference 23, pages 51-55 for specific
values.)
Figure 7-i. Elementary Stress Intensity Solutions
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In the apPlication of the theoretical stress intensity equations to
practical structures, it is generally necessary to make corrections for
plasticity effects. In the case of a part-through crack, this plasticity
correction is an inherent part of the design curves for the shape factor
(1) given in Figure 1 of Reference 24. For the cases of through cracks of
various configurations, plasticity effects are commonly accounted for by
adding an increment to the actual crack length equal to the radius of the
plastic zone at the tip of the crack. This plastic zone radius can be
approximated by the expressions:
_ 1 (KI 12 (plane-stress)
rp 2_ \dy/
r - (plane-strain)
p 6w _y!
7.1.2 Crack Growth Ana_sis
Crack growth under random spectra loading is accomplished by use of the
EFFGR0 computer program. This computer program was developed by NR's
Los Angeles Division to expedite fracture mechanics analyses in support of
the B-1 design effort. Crack growth analyses are accomplished by systemati-
cally increasing crack size in 0.1 percent increments, and finding the number
of load cycles, or portion of the spectrum loading, required to grow through
that increment. This approach eliminates the iterative procedures required
by earlier crack growth analysis programs and greatly increases computing
efficiency. Forman coefficients are input data for crack growth rates used to
calculate total growth. The program accommodates a dual description of these
coefficients so that crack growth rates at low stress intensity ranges may
be approximated more accurately. Through crack, part-through crack, corner
crack, and crack from fastener hole are configurations accommodated. The
program provides the option to include retardation effects if desired;
analysis of these effects is based on residual stress intensity theory (Ref. 26).
The program continues crack growth analysis until instability is calculated
or until a specified number of load blocks are consumed. Spectral load data
are input as repeated blocks of the defined discrete load steps. Options to
permit randomization of the load steps are being developed. Output data
provide crack size, growth rate, and stress intensity for each load step of
each block. The points at which transition from a part-through to a through
crack and crack instability occur are defined. A sample printout of the
computer solution is given in the Appendix.
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The same general procedure is employed in manual calculations of crack
growth under simple loading spectra, such as propellant tank pressures, where
it is desired to introduce empirical descriptions of crack behaviour that
are not amenable to the computer program input options.
7.1.3 Retardation Effects
A number of investigators have observed that the application of an over-
load will significantly reduce the crack growth rate under subsequent load
cycles at a lower stress intensity, compared to the basic case of constant
amplitude cyclic loading at the same stress intensity. This effect is
generally attributed to the influence of a larger plastic zone and more severe
local yielding at the crack tip due to the overload. A theory postulated by
Elber, Reference 25, considers that the crack will close at a tensile stress
greater than zero because of large residual tension strains imposed on the
ligaments adjacent to the crack tip by the overload. This effectively
reduces the range of stress intensity experienced at the crack tip during
subsequent load cycles with corresponding reduction in the crack growth rate.
A somewhat similar theoretical concept has been pursued at NR's
Los Angeles division to develop crack growth retardation analysis techniques
for B-1 fracture mechanics evaluations (Reference 26). Semi-empirical
equations have been derived and incorporated as an analysis option in the
EFFGRO computer program. A residual tensile stress intensity is assumed to
exist at the crack tip (with no load on the structure) due to the large
plastic deformations and residual tensile strains imposed on ligaments
adjacent to the crack tip by overloads. The surrounding elastic material
attempts to close the crack as loading is removed, but complete crack closure
is presented by the residual tensile strains of these ligaments. The ligaments
immediately adjacent to the crack tip are therefore loaded in residual
compression and the adjacent material, still within the plastic zone region,
is loaded in residual tension. This residual tension serves to reduce the
range of stress intensity experienced at the crack tip during cyclic loading.
As the crack tip grows through the region of residual compression stress, and
begins to sever ligaments that are loaded in residual tension, the magnitude
of retardation effects will decay because of decreasing restraint of the
deformed material around the crack tip. The semi-empirical equations to
predict retardation effects are summarized as follows:
AKEF F = 1.33 (AK - KRE S)
whe re :
KRE S = Residual stress intensity at crack tip subsequent to overload.
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Ki.t_X = Applied stress intensity at crack tip due to overload
AK = Range of stress intensity, from minimum to maximum value over
load cycle
_FF = Effective range of stress intensity over the load cycle
considering the effect of residual stress intensity
aol = Crack size after application of overload
a.
1
= Crack size after application of given load cycles subsequent to
ove rlo ad
Z,po I = Size of plastic zone at crack tip formed by overload
C = Applied Stress
ay = Yield Stress.
A comparison of predicted crack growth, using the retardation analysis methods
described above, and values measured on a B-1 development test is given in
Figure 7-2. This test simulated the random spectrum loading imposed on a
reference fuselage station. It can be seen that correlation between analysis
and test is quite good; predicted crack growth neglecting retardation effects
is highly conservative. Somewhat greater deviations between theory and test
have been observed in other comparisons of this type; however the analytical
prediction of retardation is generally conservative, i.e., it predicts a more
rapid growth than actually observed in test.
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7.2 SAFE-LIFE _U_ALYSIS - WING
7.2.1 Structural Configuration and Loading
The lower spar cap of spar #4 in the root region is selected as the
critical wing structural element for crack growth analysis. Sizing of this
element at Span Sta. 0 is given as 103 cm2 (15.8 in. 2) in Reference 22; the
corresponding cross-section dimensions also are given in this reference.
However, t_lis sizing was based on ultimate strength design requirements with
a corresponding limit operating stress of 605 I{{/m2 (88 ksi). Results of the
fatigue life analysis for this member indicate that it is necessary to reduce
the limit design stress to approximately 450 I_/m 2 (65 ksi) to achieve a
satisfactory fatigue life. Therefore, the section area is increased to
approximately 123 cm2 (19 in.2); this accounts for the desired reduction in
stress level and also for a reduction in wing design bending loads from the
values used in the sizing analysis presented in Reference 22. The general
hat-section shape and proportions defined in this reference have been main-
tained and the section size increased to provide the desired additional area.
A sketch of the resulting cross-section is given in Fig. 7-3. Adjacent
structure and the assumed types of initial cracks also are indicated on the
sketch.
A simplified stress spectrum for crack growth analysis is derived from
the fatigue stress spectra given in Table 6-4 and is summarized in Table 7-1.
This spectrum was established by combining cycles with si_milar maximum and
minimum stresses from the various phases of the fatigue spectra to improve
computational efficiency of the crack growth analysis. In contrast to the
fatigue analysis, a negative value of minimum stress is not meaningful for
crack growth analysis because it is assumed that the crack closes under
compression loading and the compression is carried by bearing along the
crack contact surfaces with no further change in stress intensity at the
crack tip. Therefore, a stress of zero is the minimum value considered in the
crack growth stress spectrum. The spectrum listed in Table 7-1 is based on
a limit design stress of 450 MN/m 2 (65 ksi); smaller values of limit design
stress are also considered in the parametric studies of wing spar crack
growth, the indicated stress spectrum is reduced by the appropriate ratio of
limit design stresses for these analyses.
7.2.2 Crack Growth Anal_sis
Crack growth for wing spar caps is evaluated in parametric form over a
range of limit design stresses from 450 t_/m 2 (65 ksi) to 275 MN/m 2 (40 ksi).
Critical flaw sizes, that would cause fracture under li_mit stress, have been
calculated for the types of initial defects considered in this section using
the appropriate equations from Fig. 7-i. A plot of these critical sizes is
given in Fig. 7-4.
Crack growth analyses have been made for the various types of assumed
initial defects using the EFFGRO computer program. The growth is expressed
as flaw dimension (depth or length) versus number of missions until critical
size is reached. Selection of initial flaw size is arbitrary, but in general
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Figure 7-3. Wing Spar Cap Cross Section
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Table 7-1. Wing Spar Cap Stress Spectrum
Load Maximum Stress Minimun Stress Number
Step _si) (ksi) of Cycles
1 13.6 0
2 18.8 0
3 25.9 0
4 37.2 0
5 49.9 0
6 62.8 0
7 32.3 20.4
8 36.1 19.4
9 40.0 12.8
i0 43.9 9.0
ii 46.0 6. o
12 lO. 3 0
13 18.2 0
14 26.8 0
15 46.7 0
16 61.6 0
17 28.5 17.1
18 34.7 12.2
19 41.0 5.9
20 h6.4 0
21 51.3 0
22 22.8 0
9000.0
9900.0
990.0
lO0.O
10.O
1.0
9OOO.O
900.0
90.0
9.0
i.o
9ooo.o
900.0
70.0
20.0
lO. 0
4000.0
18o0.0
180.0
18.o
2.0
20.0
Stress spectrum based on limit operating stress of 65.0 ksi.
This load block represents l0 operational missions.
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has been taken to represent a flaw that could not be reliably detected by NDE.
Results of these growth analyses are plotted in Figures 7-5 through 7-8.
The growth curves are primarily for the basic case in which retardation
effects are not considered; however, examples of crack growth in which
retardation due to occasional high stresses in the loading spectrum are
considered are also superimposed on these figures to facilitate comparison.
It can be seen that crack growth retardation is very significant for this
type of loading spectrum; the safe-life is increased by a factor of 5 or
greater for the examples considered here.
The crack growth to failure plots are used to construct curves showing
the number of safe-life missions as a function of initial flaw size ; this
form of data presentation is more convenient for subsequent analysis and
evaluation. Curves of this type are given in Figures 7-9 througjl 7-12 for
the types of flaws and the range of limit design stresses considered. These
curves are for the basic analysis case in which crack growth retardation
effects are not considered. These data can then be used to construct cross-
plots that define the allowable li_t design stress as a function of the
number of safe-life missions required. Plots of this type are presented in
Fig. 7-13 for i00, 150 and 200 safe-life missions, so that the effect of
applying a safety factor to t_e required service life can be readily evaluated.
Similar crack growth to failure analyses have been performed in which
retardation effects are considered. Allowable number of missions versus
initial flaw size have been derived from the crack growth curves and are
plotted in Figures 7-1h through 7-26. It can be seen that the calculated
retardation effect greatly increases the number of safe-life missions for a
given initial flaw size. ilowever, this indicated improvement should be
treated rather cautiously for two major reasons: (i) the early stage of
retardation theory and test development at this time, and (2) the simplified
loading spectrum assumes that high stress cycles will be encountered in the
initial missions, with the result that crack growth retardation is considered
to be effective over almost all of the service life. Therefore, it is
recommended that the data of Figures 7-14 through 7-16 be considered as an
upper bound of the potential improvement that may be gained by considering
crack growth retardation.
7.2.3 Design Implications
'lhe fatigue analysis of wing spar caps indicated that the limit design
stress should be reduced to approximately 450 i_/m 2 (65 ksi) to achieve a
satisfactory fatigue life. ilowever, the results of crack growth analyses
su_mmarized in the preceding section show that even this stress level may
result in critical initial flaw sizes that are too small to reliably detect
by present day NDE techniques. Therefore, it is desirable to determine the
actual weight penalty involved for various sizes of initial defects to help
establish design criteria and NDE development requirements.
Not all of the wing spar cap structure is designed to operate at the
same maximum stress level as the section selected for crack growth analysis.
This is due to other desii_ requirements, practical limitations on minimum
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area, etc. This situation is illustrated in Figure 7-17, wing spar cao iz:,
stress contours{ are plotted for upper and lower surfaces. These curves
represent the structural sizing and operating stress levels determined by
GDC during the Phase B Study, and reported in Reference 22. These data have
oeen used to determine the increase in wing spar cap weight that would result
from restricting the limit operating stress to various values over the range
of 275 _4_/m2 (40 ksi) to 450 _N/m2 (65 ksi). The weight increase was evalu-
ated by numerical integration of the increments to spar cap area required
for each stress level; the integration was based on average properties over
increments of length defined by sixteen stations over the semi-span. The
results of this evaluation are plotted in Figure 7-18. It is of interest to
note that decreasing the limit operating stress to 450 94_/m2 (65 ksi) to
satisfy fatigue life requirements causes a relatively small increase in wing
weight. A weight penalty of only about 450 kg. (i000 ib) is indicated from
Figure 7-18. This is about 1.5 percent of total wing weight.
The above data are used with the previously defined variation of critical
initial flaw size versus limit operating stress to define summary curves that
depict wing weight increase as a function of assumed initial flaw size and
the number of safe-life missions required. These summary curves are plotted
in Figures 7-19 and 7-20 for the types of cracks considered in this analysis.
The weigher trend curves of Figure 7-19 are for the basic analysis case in
wnica crack growth retardation is not considered. It can be seen that weight
increase is very sensitive to the size of initial flaw assumed to exist in
the structure, and that a very significant weight penalty is involved for
flaw sizes that might practically be considered as a lower limit of reliable
detection under present NDE capabilities. Similar curves are plotted in
Figure 7-19 for the case in which crack growth retardation is included in the
analysis. Comparison with the preceding curves illustrates that considera-
tion of retardation effects may provide appreciable benefit to minimize the
weight penalty associated with achieving safe life for a practical initial
flaw size criteria. However, caution should be exercised at this time in the
use of predicted crack growth retardation for Space Shuttle design and
development. The basic theories and analytical methods to predict this
phenomenon are in an early stage of development and only limited test veri-
fication has been achieved. Recent experimental results, obtained by
investigators at NR SD and elsewhere, have indicated that the beneficial
effects of retardation may be eliminated or greatly reduced if the structure
is periodically exposed to elevated temperatures at points interspersed
throughout the random load spectra. Therefore, unless comprehensive test
data become available regarding this interaction, it appears unlikely that
crack growth retardation predictions can be used with confidence for Space
Shuttle structure that is subjected to elevated temperatures from ascent
or entry heating.
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7.3 SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS - VERTICAL STABILIZER
7.3.1 Structural Configuration and Loading
The critical section on vertical stabilizer main box selected for crack
growth analysis is the same as that selected for fatigue analysis, and is
illustrated in Figure 6-3(b).
A simplified stress spectrum for crack growth analysis is derived from
the fatigue stress spectra given in Table 6-5. The procedure is similar
to that described for the wing crack growth analysis, and the results are
summarized in Table 7-2. Thermal stress cycles are not included in this
stress spectrum because the predominant thermal transients produce tension
on the integral stiffeners and compression on the skin. The skin is the
critical element for crack growth evaluation; analysis indicates that complete
fracture of an integral stiffener is not a critical situation.
7.3.2 Crack Growth Analysis
Because of the thin skin and relatively low operating stresses of the
stabilizer main box, a part-through crack cannot become critical before
growing through the thickness. Therefore, a through crack is the only type
of initial defect of practical interest for this structural element. A
critical crack size (half-length) of 7.5 cm (2.95 in.) is calculated for
this type of crack at a limit stress of 180 l_/m 2 (26 ksi). .This result is
based on a value for critical stress intensity of 87.6 _:_/m3/2 (80 ksi i/_-n.)
and a size of plastic zone based on plane stress theory.
Because of the relatively low operating stresses of the vertical
stabilizer skins, it is expected that flaw growth will be slow and readily
detectable before critical size is reached. To verify this premise, an
initial flaw size (half-length) of 1.27 cm (0.5 in.) is selected as the basis
for growth analysis. Flaw growth is calculated by computer program in the
same manner as described for the wing spar caps. Results are plotted in
Figure 7-21, crack growth retardation is not considered. The crack growth
curve is used to derive the plot of number of missions to reach critical
crack length as a function of initial crack size, presented in Figure 7-22.
7.3.3 Design Implications
From Figure 7-22 it is apparent that a relatively large initial crack
can be tolerated in the vertical stabilizer skins. If a design requirement
of 200 missions is assumed (a safety factor of 2 on safe-life), the corres-
ponding maximum tolerable initial crack length is I_.8 cm (1.9 in.). Retarda-
tion effects would further increase this allowable initial size. The skins
are accessible for direct visual inspection througjlout the service life
because no external TPS is employed on this structural assembly. Therefore,
it is considered that a crack of this size would not escape detection and
that no further design provisions are required to ensure safe life.
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Table 7-2. Vertical Stabilizer Stress Spectrum
Maximum Stress Minimum Stress
(ksi) (ksi)
Number
of Cycles
i 3.0 0 64700.0
2 5.0 0 3900.0
3 7.0 0 ii00.0
4 8.0 0 230.0
5 9.0 o 80.0
6 12.0 0 30.0
7 14.0 0 2.0
8 15.6 0 1.0
9 3.o 0 9ooo.o
i0 5.0 0 900.0
Ii 6.6 0 70.0
12 7.8 0 20.0
13 9.0 0 i0.0
14 5.0 0 18000.0
15 lO.O o 18oo.o
16 12.6 o 14o.o
17 15.0 0 4o. 0
18 17.5 o 14. o
19 19.8 o 4.o
20 26.0 0 2.0
load block represents i0 operational missions.This
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7.4 SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS - CREW COMPARTMENT
7.4.1 Structural Configuration and Loading
The structural configuration and loading employed in the fatigue
analysis (Section 6.8.1) is used directly in the crack growth evaluation.
The stress spectrum is derived from repeated compartment pressurization
cycles imposed during operational missions and a conservative estimate of
associated ferry missions. Beeause of the simplicity of the loading spectrum,
a mission-by-rmission stress spectrum is established for crack growth analysis.
This spectrum consists of alternate applications of one cycle of 207 r'_/m2
(30 ksi) stress due to the operational mission and i0 cycles of 115 !._/m2
(16.6 ksi) stress from the ferry mission.
7.4.2 Crack Growth Analy_s_is
Because the crew compartment skins are thin, a through crack is the
only type of defect of practical interest. A critical crack size (half
lengta) of 0.81 cm (0.32 in.) is calculated for the limit design stress of
207 i¢_/m2 (_0 ksi). Thr___rediction is based on a critical stress inteasi_y
of 36 f47/m3/2 (33 ksi _in.), which is probably somewhat conservative for the
thin skins involved. A plastic zone size based on plane-stress theory is
included in the prediction of critical size.
Crack growth characteristics are calculated for initial crack sizes
(half-length) of 0.38 cm (0.15 in.) and 0.64 cm (0.25 in.), results are
plotted in Figure 7-23. Growth both with and without retardation effects
is presented. It can be seen that the predicted retardation is relatively
much less than for the wing spar caps. This is due to the difference in the
stress spectra associated with each structural element; the spectrum for
crew compartment approaches a constant amplitude situation whereas the wing
spectrum is highly random.
7.4.3 Design Implications
From Figure 7-23 it can be seen that a maximum initial crack length of
approximately 1.27 cm (0.5 in.) can be tolerated within the safe-life
design requirements. A through crack of this size should be reliably
detected during fabrication and final inspection of the structure. IIowever,
a crack of this size caused by accidental damage during the service life
mi_it go undetected because of restricted accessibility due to external TPS,
internal equipment, etc. Therefore, a fail-safe design concept may be highly
desirable to protect against this eventuality.
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7.5 SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS - ORBITER AFT ATTACII SUPPORT FRAME
7.5.1 Structural Configuration and Loadin6
A general description of the frame and major loadings is given in the
discussion of fatigue analysis (Section 6.6.1). A detailed description of
the areas and design loads for frame cap segments is given in Reference 27.
A limit design tension load of .246 _ (53 kips) and corresponding area of
9.0 cm2 (1.4 in. 2) are listed for the critical tension element, bar #6.
However, this sizing did not account for the hoop tension st=c_ inJ c<_<
in the frame by tank internal pressure; a cap area of 15.5 cm2 (2.4 in. 2) is
found to be required when this effect is considered. The data of Reference
27 also shows that the required inboard cap area is much less over the lowez"
portion of the frame circumference. Therefore, it is concluded that i% is
not desirable to incorporate the required area for element #6 as an integral
part of the LH2 tank wall because it would be very difficult to taper it to
the smaller area required over much of the frame. An assumed frame cap
configuration that provides the required area and is practical to fabricate
is shown in Figure 7-2h. A simplified stress spectrum is derived from the
fatigue analysis stress spectra presented in Table 6-9, and is su_m_arized
in Table 7-3 below.
Table 7-3. Orbiter Aft Attach Frame Stress Spectr'_m
Load Max. Stress Min. Stress Number
Step (ksi) (ksi) of Cycles
i 31.5 29.5 16,000
2 31.9 29. i 2,700
3 32.3 28.7 900
4 32.8 28.2 270
5 33.6 27.4 90
6 34.7 26.3 27
7 36. i 24.9 i0
8 36.9 24. i 2
9 38.0 23.0 I
i0 34.5 0 i0
The load block described in Table 7-3 represents i0 flight missions
and corresponds to a limit design stress of 290 ?{_/m2 (42 ksi). Crack growth
is also investigated for assumed limit stresses of 240 I{[/m2 (35 ksi) and
207 }_{4/m2 (30 ksi). The stress spectrum for these cases is obtained by
applying the appropriate ratio cf limit stresses to the values given in
Table 7-3.
7.5.2 Crack Growth Analysis
The growth characteristics of a through crack in the flange of the frame
cap are evaluated for the limit stress values indicated above and a corres-
ponding assumption of initial flaw size. Growth with and without consideration
of retardation effects is calculated; results are plotted in Figure 7-25.
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These data are used to construct curves of number of safe-life missions
versus initial flaw size, presented in Figure 7-26.
7.5.3 Design Implications
Design loads in the frame cap elements must be expressed in terms of
envelopes of maximum tension and compression values resulting from the
several potentially critical conditions of external loading applied at the
orbiter attachment points. Therefore, a detailed analysis is necessary to
determine the effect of imposing safe crack growth limitations on structural
weight. The envelope of maximum tension and compression design loads for
each cap segment (bar) is given in Reference 27, and is listed in Table 7-4.
However, these loads are based on consideration of loads applied to the frame
at the orbiter attachment points only. Therefore, a revised envelope of
design loads is calculated which includes the effects of tank internal
pressure. A frame tensile axial load of 0.36 MN (80,000 ib) has been
determined from the discontinuity analysis (see Section 6.6.1) for a tank
internal pressure corresponding to the max q_ condition. This force is
divided between the inboard and outboard caps in proportion to their
respective cross section areas. Revised envelopes of design loads, including
this effect, are listed in Table 7-4. Reference areas of cap segments are
calculated on the basis of these revised loads and allowable limit stresses
as follows:
0.95 Ftu _ 42 ksi.
Tension: °all°w - 1.4
Compression: = FcY=36 ksi.
Callow 1.4
The 5 percent reduction in tensile ultimate strength is an allowance for
fastener holes or other local reductions in net section area. The change in
area of each cap segment to limit the maximum tension stress to 35 ksi and
30 ksi, respectively, and corresponding weight increases are summarized in
Table 7-4. The resulting frame weight increase as a function of maximum
tension stress is plotted in Figure 7-27. These data are used with the safe-
life curves of Figure 7-26 to develop curves of frame weight increase versus
initial flaw size presented in Figure 7-28.
It can be seen that the frame weight increase is relatively small for
significant increases in initial flaw size. For example, an initial through
crack of approximately 0.76 cm (0.3 in.) length can be tolerated in the caps
of a frame designed to static strength requirements. If this initial size
is increased to a length of 1.27 cm (0.5 in.) the weight increase is 24 kg
(53 ib) for i00 mission life and 31 kg (69 ib) for 200 mission life. This
is in the range of 4 percent of the frame basic structural weight. Therefore,
it is concluded that safe-life requirements are feasible and will not impose
a significant weight penalty on the design of the booster major frames.
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Figure 7-24. Frame Cap Configuration - Orbiter Aft Attach
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Table 7-4. Cap Areas and Weight Increases -
Orbiter Aft Attach Support Frame
Bar
11o.
i
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
io
ii
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2o
(i)
Original
Design Load
(kips)
Tens. Comp.
216 268
--- 167
157 269
62 129
--- 186
53 ---
--- 303
62 115
--- 79
18 132
24 4
--- 62
9 5
0 4
16 0
_--m 5
I0 ---
_m-- 4
___
(2)
Revised
(3)
Design Load
(kips)
Tens. Comp.
%
(in.2)
_tens = 35 ksi
AW
(lb)
AA
(in. 2 )
5.3
0
0
0
0
1.9
0
0
0
o
2.1
2.8
I.i
1.0
0.7
1.7
0.7
i.i
0.8
1.3
/kA
(in. 2 )
[Ttens = 30 ksi
Aw
(ib.)
1.3
O
0
O
0
0.3
0
0
0
0
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.i
0.3
0.i
0.2
0.i
0.2
266 218
30 137
211 215
88 i03
62 124
71 ---
58 245
84 93
3O 49
68 82
42 ---
62 ---
41 ---
49 ---
40 ---
56 ---
40 ---
50 ---
40 ---
44 ---
6.3
3.8
6.0
2.9
3.7
1.7
6.8
2.6
1.6
2.6
1.0
1.5
1.0
1.2
1.0
1.3
1.0
1.2
1.0
i.i
2 x Z hl.o
(i) Limit loads due to oroiter attach forces.
(2) Limit loads including effects of tank internal pressure.
(3) Reference cap areas based on allowa01e limit stresses:
Tension <T- allow = 42 ksi.
Compression _- allow = 36 ksi.
2.6
0
1.0
0
0
0.7
0
0.2
0
0
0.4
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.5
0.3
0.4
10.6
0
5.1
0
0
4.4
0
1.3
0
0
4.2
5.6
2.2
1.9
2.1
3.5
2.1
2.7
2.5
2.5
I01
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7.6 SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS - FUSELAGE STA. 2600
7.6.1 Structural Confisuration and Loadin5
A general description of the LH 2 tank shell and major loadings in the
region of fuselage Sta. 2600 is given in the discussion of fatigue analysis
(Section 6.5). Maximum limit design stress occurs at the burnout condition
with internal tank pressure of 0.154 MN/m 2 (22.3 psi), and is comprised of
the following elements:
Body axial load and
bending moment - llO MN/m 2 (16.0 ksi)
Membrane stress due
to tank pressure - iii MN/m 2 (16.1 ksi)
Discontinuity
bending stress 36 MN/m2 ( 5.2 ksi)
Total 257 MN/m 2 (37.3 ksi)
A simplified stress spectrum for crack growth analysis is derived from
the fatigue stress spectra given in Table 6-8. The procedure is similar to
that described for the wing crack growth analysis, and the results are
summarized in Table 7-5. This spectrum includes the effects of discontinuity
bending stresses and is based on nominal tank pressures.
Table 7-5. Fuselage Sta. 2600 Stress Spectrum
Load
Step
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
l0
ll
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Max. Stress
(ksi)
3.8
4.4
13.9
14.6
15.4
16.9
17.7
18.4
19.9
35.8
17.5
18.1
18.5
19.1
21.0
22.9
10.9
ii.3
11.7
Min. Stress
(ksi)
1.4
0.8
i0.5
9.8
9.0
7.5
6.2
6.0
4.5
0
16.5
16.5
16.5
16.5
16.5
17.1
7.3
6.9
6.5
Number
of C_cles
9990
ll
700O
2000
70O
270
2O
i0
3
I0
7000
2700
2OO
70
2O
i0
9990
I0
1
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The load block described in Table 7-5 represents i_ flight missions and
corresponds to the limit design stress of 257 MN/m _ (37 ksi). Load step l0
represents the effective GAG cycle in which the total tension stress
increases from zero at prelaunch to a maximum at burnout once per mission.
7.6.2 Crack Growth Analysis
A surface crack is the only type of initial defect of interest for the
propellant tanks; a through crack would presumably be detected by leak tests
prior to the mission. Therefore, a part-through crack with aspect ratio
(a/2c) of 0.10 is selected as the basic model for this study. Critical size
is based on transition to a through crack, rather than instability. For this
study, transition is assumed to occur when the remaining ligament thickness
is equal to the plastic zone size. Because of the relatively thin material,
the plastic zone size is assumed to be given by the plane stress equation:
rp ay/
Substituting the equation for stress intensity of a part-through crack, and
rearranging terms yields the expression:
rp = t-a = _ ay
which can be put in the form:
_a= 1
This equation is solved by iteration using limit applied stress and a deep
flaw magnification factor as given by Figure 5-12; a value of a/t = 0.668 at
crack break-through is determined. The critical crack depth is therefore:
acr = 0.668 (0.120) = 0.080 in.
Crack growth to critical size is calculated for several assumed initial flaw
depths, both with and without retardation effects included. Results are
plotted in Figure 7-29. These data are used to construct curves of number
of safe-life missions versus initial flaw size, presented in Figure 7-30.
7.6.3 Design Implications
It can be seen from Figures 7-29 and 7-30 that crack growth is relatively
small, even without retardation effects considered. For a safe life of 100
missions, an initial flaw depth of 0.19 cm (0.075 in.) can be tolerated;
for 200 missions the allowable initial size is reduced to 0.18 cm (0.070 in.).
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These initial flaw depths are in the order of 60 percent of the skin thick-
ness, with corresponding surface length of about 1.8 cm (0.70 in.). Flaws of
this character should be reliably detected by existing inspection practices
and NDE techniques. Therefore, it is concluded that no special design
provisions are required to assure safe life for the case of part-through
cracks oriented in the circumferential direction in propellant tank skins.
Examination of the detailed computer output of crack growth analysis
indicated that about 9h percent of the total growth was due to the effective
GAG cycles of load step i0. This shows that alternating load cycles due to
atmospheric turbulence and entry maneuvers have relatively small effect on
the total crack growth.
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7.7 SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS - PROPELLANT TANKS
7.7.1 Structural Confisuration and Loading
Crack growth and fracture analyses are presented in this section for
parent metal and weld Joint in the aft region of the LH2 tank cylinder and
for parent metal at the apex of the LO2 tank aft bulkhead. Propellant tanks
are of 2219-T87 aluminum alloy. The general structural configurations for
these tank elements are described in the appropriate portions of the fatigue
analysis (Sections 6.5.1 and 6.7.1). Crack orientation is assumed to be
normal to the maximum principal stress direction in these tank elements.
This principal stress is not significantly affected by loadings other than
tank internal pressure, so simple load spectra, derived from ground test and
flight pressurizations, are applicable for these elements. A baseline
reference thickness and corresponding stress level for parent metal is
established from ultimate strength design requirements and the ultimate
factor of safety of 1.4. Weld land thickness is assumed to be twice the
corresponding thickness of parent metal. The limit stresses, material thick-
nesses, and alternating stress spectra for the reference propellant tank
elements are given in Table 7-6. The limit tank pressures are established
by maximum relief valve settings; the alternating stresses in the service
load spectra are based on normal pressure regulator ranges.
Table 7-6. Propellant Tank Stress Spectra
Parameter
Design Temperature
Limit Design Stress (ksi)
Minimum Thickness (in.)
Ground Test
Pressure
Cycles
Flight
Pressure
Cycles
Omax (ksi)
Omin (ksi)
N(1)
c (ksi)
max
Omi n (ksi)
_(1)
LH 2 Tank Cylinder -
Aft Re$ion
Parent Metal Weld
7o F
44.4
0.112
33.8
0
3
41.6
0
I
70 F
22.2
0.228
16.9
0
3
20.8
0
i
LO 2 Tank
Aft Bulkhead
(Parent Metal)
-297 F
53.0
o.117
32.4
0
3
50.5
(1)Number of stress cycles per mission
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In addition to the limit stresses defined above, which are based on
static strength design requirements, arbitrary values of reduced limit
operating stresses are also investigated to evaluate parametric trends of
crack growth, critical flaw sizes, and proof test requirements as a function
of operating stress. The material thickness and spectral stress levels are
adjusted to correspond to these revised values of limit stress. The selected
limit stresses (parent metal) are 44.4 ksi, 40.0 ksi and 35.0 ksi for the
LH 2 tank; 53.0 ksi, 50.0 ksi and 45.0 ksi for the LO 2 tank.
7.7.2 Crack Growth Analysis
Because of the structural configuration and service application
involved, a part-through crack is the only type of initial defect of
practical interest. Crack growth characteristics are calculated, assuming
various arbitrary initial flaw sizes, to determine the number of missions
until fracture or break-through (leakage) occurs. Aspect ratios of both
a/2c = 0.1 and 0.4 are considered, so as to bound the practical range ofinterest.
Growth analyses are accomplished using a computer program recently
developed at NR SD for use on the Hewlitt-Packard Model 9810 computer/
plotter. This program accommodates the NR SD generalized growth rate
expression and also calculates the growth of a surface crack in both the
length and depth direction, thus accounting for the effect of changing
aspect ratio during crack propagation on the stress intensity and corres-
ponding growth rate. Basic growth rate data represented by Figure 5-14 are
used with deep flaw magnification factors corresponding to Figure 5-12 in
the crack growth analyses. Break-through is assumed to occur when the
crack depth is equal to the material thickness. Fracture is predicted when
the applied stress intensity is equal to the critical value (Kc) for the
appropriate case listed in Figure 5-14. Retardation effects are not
considered.
Excellent agreement has been obtained between theoretical predictions,
using the methods described above, and experimental data for cycles to
break-through on 2219-T87 aluminum specimens of representative thickness.
Examples of this predictive analysis for a range of initial aspect ratios
are given in the computer drawn plots of Figure 7-31. Crack growth to
breakthrough is plotted for three selected specimens and cross section
sketches of the corresponding initial and predicted final crack configura-
tions are indicated. A comparison of predicted cycles to breakthrough with
experimental results is given in Figure 7-32. Test data reflected in this
plot were generated by Lockheed under NASA MSC Contract NAS9-11722. The pre-
dictive analyses used as a starting point the actual initial flaw geometry of
the test specimens (determined by post-test examination of the fracture
surface).
Results of the crack growth analyses are summarized in the computer
drawn plots presented in Figures 7-33 through 7-41. These data are used to
construct curves of number of safe life missions versus initial flaw size,
presented in Figures 7-42 through 7-44.
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Figure 7-31. Predicted Two-Dimensional Growth for Part-Through Cracks
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t_t_te 7-33. Crack Growth to Failure - LH 2 Tank Parent Metal
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Figure 7-36. Crack Growth to Failure - LH 2 Tank Welds
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7.7.3 Design and Proof Test Implications
A review of the crack growth to failure curves (Figures 7-33 through
7-41) shows that leakage will be the critical failure mode (crack propagates
to break-through prior to fracture) in all cases for aspect ratio of
a/2c = 0.4. The same situation is true for most cases of aspect ratio
a/2c = O.1 investigated for the LH 2 tank. Initial cracks of this aspect
ratio (a/2c = O.1) in the LO 2 tank bulkhead generally result in a predicted
fracture failure mode for service lives up to about 200 missions and leak-
age for greater service usage. The difference between LH2 and L02 tank
failure mode characteristics is due to the relative increase of tensile
strength compared to fracture toughness for 2219-T87 aluminum at the
cryogenic design temperature of the L02 tank. However, as the service life
requirement is increased, and the corresponding allowable initial flaw
becomes smaller, a greater change in crack aspect ratio takes place during
growth to critical conditions and leakage rather than fracture becomes the
predicted failure mode. For most practical cases of interest, the aspect
ratio of initial part-through cracks will lie somewhere between a/2c = 0.1
and 0.4, and probably closer to the latter value. Therefore, it is con-
cluded that leakage rather than fracture is the most probable failure mode
for the major portion of the integral propellant tanks. This offers some
potential design advantages if a small amount of leakage can be tolerated
by incorporating suitable purge and vent provisions in the vehicle design
to eliminate potential hazards. Detection of such leakage should be
possible by either an onboard monitoring system or during pre-flight
checkout. This failure mode thus offers the potential advantage of facili-
tating detection of defects and accomplishing repair before catastrophic
failure occurs. However, as discussed below, this failure mode also
complicates the task of establishing proof test conditions that will verify
that fracture or leakage will not occur over the service life.
Data presented in Figures 7-42 through 7-44 are summarized in Table 7-7
to describe the characteristics of the most severe initial flaws that can
be tolerated in the propellant tank sections investigated in this study.
The data summary is for the basic case in which thicknesses and operating
stresses are based on ultimate strength design requirements. This reference
case represents the smallest values of allowable initial flaws. Service
life requirements of both lO0 and 200 missions and initial flaw aspect
ratios of a/2c = O.1 and 0.4 are considered. It can be seen from this
summary table that in all cases the initial flaw characteristics are such
that reliable detection by current state-of-the-art NDE techniques should
be possible. The minimum flaw depth is approximately 0.15 cm (0.06 in.);
the minimum flaw surface length about 0.5 cm (0.2 in.), and minimum flaw
depth/thickness ratio is 0.4. Therefore, it is concluded that safe-life
characteristics of propellant tanks designed to conventional ultimate
strength requirements (UFS = 1.4) are compatible with current NDE capa-
bilities for detection of initial flaws.
Proof testing of pressure vessels, including integral propellant tanks,
is standard practice to verify the as-fabricated strength of each article.
Proof testing of all booster stages of the Saturn V vehicle was accomplished;
a proof factor of 1.05 times limit design pressure constituted the minimum
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Table 7-7• Summary of Characteristics of Allowable
Initial Flaws in Propellant Tanks (1)
Component
LH2 Tank
Parent
Metal
LH2 Tank
Welds
LO2 Tank
Parent
Metal
Parameter
ai (cm)
(in.)
ci (cm)
(in.)
ai/t
ai (cm)
(in.)
ci (cm)
(in.)
ai/t
ai (cm)
(in.)
ci (cm)
(in.)
ai/t
Required Service Life
i00 Missions
a/2c = •i
.52
3.6
(1.4z)
a/2c = •4
.23
(.092)
•63
(.25)
•81
.54
(.213)
1.4
(.55)
.62 .93
.17 .26
(.067) (.106)
1.7 .66
(.67) (.26)
•57 .90
200 Missions
a/2c = .1 a/2c = .4
.42
3.1
(1.24)
.54
.15
(.o58)
1.5
(.58)
.49
.53
(.21)
.74
.51
(.200)
1.3
(.50)
.87
.25
(.098)
.61
(.24)
.84
(1)Propellant tank wall thicknesses and operating stresses based on
ultimate strength design requirements (UFS = 1.4).
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requirements for this program. The feasibility of establishing proof test
requirements on a fracture mechanics basis, so as to verify that fracture
or leakage due to growth of initial crack-like defects will not occur during
the service life, is of great interest to provide higher confidence in
structural integrity than can be gained by application of NDE only. This
feasibility will therefore be investigated, using the specific propellant
tank sections analyzed in this study as representative of the general tank
characteristics. A number of proof test approaches could be considered in
practical application to simulate the design pressure and temperature profiles
over the tank. For purposes of this study, the possible options will be
simplified to the following presumed approach:
i. The LH2 tank will be tested as a complete assembly at room
temperature, using pneumatic pressurization.
. The LO 2 tank will be tested in sub-assembly increments, per the
following sequence. Sub-assemblies will be in the vertical
attitude during cryogenic tests.
(a) Aft bulkhead - LN2 pressurization
(b) Aft bulkhead
+ aft cylinder section - LN 2 pressurization
(c) Complete tank - pneumatic pressurization
Proof test requirements predicated on fracture mechanics theory are
established so that flaws which are more severe than allowable limits will
be revealed by causing rupture or leakage during proof test. In practice,
some simplifying assumptions appear to be required to be able to apply
present fracture mechanics technology. For example, the proof stress
required to cause fracture with an initial flaw present can be approximated
from the basic equation:
K I = 1.1 o_) Mk
where the stress intensity (KI) is set equal to a critical value appropriate
for the material, thickness, and proof test environment, and the flaw size
(a) is the maximum allowable initial flaw determined from the crack growth
analyses. This approach has been used to determine required proof stresses
for each operating stress and flaw aspect ratio considered in the study at
service life requirements of 100, 150, and 200 missions. Results are
plotted (Figures 7-45 through 7-47) as curves of required proof stress
versus limit design stress for a given service life requirement. Proof
stresses for parent metal (Figures 7-45 and 7-46) are based on a lower bound
estimate of critical stress intensity (Kc) consistent with the value used
to predict flaw growth and fracture under service operation. Specific
values used in the analMsis are Kc = 4h MN/m 3/2 (40 ksi i_n.) at room tem-
perature and 48.5 MN/m 5y2 (h4 ksi i_n.) at 77 K (-320 F). The normalizing
parameter Q is determined for the appropriate initial flaw aspect ratio
(a/2c) with the assumption that proof stress is equal to the yield strength
of the material. This latter condition represents the upper bound of what
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may be considered an acceptable proof test stress. Therefore, the parent
metal yield strength appropriate for the proof test temperature is also
indicated on Figures 7-_5 and 7-46 and is taken as the maximum permissible
proof test stress. The curves of required proof test stress are extrapo-
lated to the point of intersection with this boundary. This intersection
defines the maximum allowable limit design stress that will be compatible
with practical proof test verification. The ratio of proof stress to limit
design stress is designated as the proof factor. However, it is important
to note that the proof factors determined in this manner represent the best
possible situation, or the minimum value of proof factor that may satisfy
the fracture mechanics requirements for proof test. The logic of using a
lower bound estimate of critical stress intensity to establish required
proof stress has some validity when the operational failure mode is fracture
and the corresponding critical flaw size is also determined on the basis
of lower bound fracture properties. However, when the critical operational
failure mode is leakage, then u_22er bounds of critical stress intensity
may be required to establish proof stresses that will provide high confidence
of screening initial flaws that could cause leakage during operational
service. A realistic definition of such an upper bound will require
extensive test data applicable to the specific material, thickness, and
flaw aspect ratios of interest. Available empirical data for 2219-T87
parent metal were insufficient to permit investigation of the effect of
an "upper bound" requirement on proof factors.
The same general approach is used to determine required proof stresses
for the reference LH2 tank weld Joint, except that in this case an upper
bound of apparent fracture toughness is used for those cases where leakage
is the predicted failure mode. This upper bound represents either crack
break-through or fracture (whichever occurs first) and is approximated from
the empirical test data presented in Figure 5-16. The variation of both
upper and lower bounds of apparent fracture toughness with weld Joint
thickness is estimated in Figure 5-17. The required proof stress is
plotted in Figure 7-47 as a function of limit design stress in the weld
Joint for service life requirements of 100, 150 and 200 missions. It is
necessary to define a maximum permissible proof stress on the weld Joint
to determine the allowable limit design stress and the corresponding proof
factor. Typical yield strength for the 2219 welds is in the order of
140 MN/m2 (20 ksi). It can be seen that if the proof stress is limited
to the weld yield strength, similar to the parent metal approach, proof test
verification does not appear to be practical. It can also be questioned
whether this limitation is even a desirable requirement. The localized
yielding that may occur in a weld Joint will not produce a measurable
change in tank dimensions. Also, yielding of the weld metal during proof
test may actually be beneficial by reducing and redistributing residual
weld stresses and by improving geometric alignment of the Joint. However,
the proof stress should obviously not be set at a level where a significant
risk of proof test failure is encountered due to scatter in weld strength
properties. The fracture strength data presented in Figure 5-15 show that
an ultimate strength greater than 234 MN/m 2 (3h ksi) should be obtained in
welds which do not have significant crack-like defects. Proof safety
factors of 1.2 and 1.3 are estimated as reasonable bounds of the safety
margin that should be provided in proof test. Allowable proof stresses,
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based on these safety factors and the weld joint ultimate strength defined
above, are also indicated on Figure 7-h7. Intersection of the required
proof Stress curves with these limiting values defines the allowable limit
design stresses and corresponding proof test factors for the weld Joints.
It can be seen that reasonable results are obtained for an initial flaw
aspect ratio ai/2c = O.1; however, proof test verification that no leakage
will occur in weld Joints for an assumed initial flaw of aspect ratio
ai/2c = 0.4 does not appear to be feasible. The investigation of proof
stress requirements for welds is more conservative than that performed for
parent metal, because upper bound rather than lower bound values were used
for critical stress intensity. However, the weld test data presented in
Figures 5-15 and 5-16 illustrate another factor that complicates the task
of defining proof test requirements on a rigorous fracture mechanics basis.
A significant amount of subcritical flaw growth under monotonic loading is
indicated for many of the specimens. This raises the possibility that
flaws may exist of a size such that break-through or fracture does not
occur but that significant subcritical growth during proof test increases
their dimensions to a point where propagation to leakage may result under
the subsequent service load spectra. This possible complication also
exists for the parent metal behavior.
A summary of proof factors derived from the curves of Figures 7-25
through 7-27 is presented in Table 7-8. Because of the simplifying
assumptions and uncertainties discussed above, these factors must be
considered as tentative, and possibly lower bound, values. Considerably
more research in this area, beyond the scope of the present study, will be
required to clarify procedures for and practical limitations of the appli-
cation of fracture mechanics principles to define proof test requirements.
This is particularly true for thin wall pressure vessels such as the B-9U
integral propellant tanks. It can be seen from the summary table that the
proof factors associated with flaw aspect ratio ai/2c = 0.h are very high--
in the range of 1.8 for the LO 2 tank and 2.2 for the LH 2 tank. Also,
there is very little difference in proof factor between service life
requirements of lO0 and 200 missions. This situation results because the
stress intensity at break-through for a flaw of this aspect ratio is much
less than the critical value to cause fracture. Therefore, the fracture
mechanics theory predicts a very high proof stress required to screen out
flaws of this character by producing fracture during proof test. Because
the permissible proof stress is limited to the material yield strength, the
net effect of the fracture mechanics rationale is to require a significant
decrease in operating stress and corresponding increase in tank wall thick-
ness such that a crack of depth approaching the thickness will be critical
under proof loading to yield stress level. In this regime, the crack
growth due to the service load spectra is very small compared with initial
assumed flaw dimensions, and little difference can be seen between lO0
mission and 200 mission service life requirements. Thus, it would appear
that establishing proof test requirements to ensure no leakage during
operational service will not be practical for flaws approaching a semi-
circular shape. However, the development of empirical data regarding
flaw growth to break-through under monotonic loading should be considered
to obtain a more realistic assessment of potential proof test capabilities.
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The approximate weight increase of the tanks necessary to achieve the
indicated proof factors (a/2c = 0.i) is also indicated in Table 7-8. This
increase is with respect to a baseline design predicated on conventional
ultimate strength requirements (UFS = 1.4). These weight increments also
account for the practical limitations of matching proof pressure and flight
design pressure profiles over the length of a tank. These weights should
be considered as only approximate indications, and probably lower limits,
of the performance penalty associated with proof test based on fracture
mechanics rationale. As previously discussed, the effects of simplifying
assumptions, uncertainties, and flaw aspect ratios greater than a/2c = 0.i
may all tend to increase the indicated weight values.
The weight increases calculated for tank bulkheads are obtained
directly from the relative limit design stresses associated with ultimate
strength design versus required proof factor. However, the weight increments
for tank cylindrical sections do not increase directly with proof factor
because, as the tank skin thickness is increased, some reduction can be
made in the weight of integral stringers required to provide shell stability
under compressive loading. The following approximate relationships, derived
from skin/stringer optimization curves presented in Reference 6, are used
in calculation of weight increase for tank cylindrical sections:
m
LH2 tank: At = 0.50 At s
i
LO 2 tank: At = 0.80 At e
where:
At = increment of effective tank wall thickness (skin + distributed
stringers)
At s = t s - tso
ts = tank skin thickness required to meet specified proof factor
tso = tank skin thickness to meet ultimate strength design require-
ments (UFS = 1.4)
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7.8 SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS - WING SPAR CAPS - ALTERNATE MATERIAL
A limited investigation of flaw growth and fracture characteristics of
2219-T87 aluminum alloy wing spar caps is summarized in this section.
Results of this investigation and the fatigue analyses of Section 6.9 are
used to compare relative merits of the aluminum alloy with the primary
selection of 6Al-hVtitanium alloy.
7.8.1 Structural Configuration and Loadin_
The general configuration and shape of the aluminum spar caps is assumed
to be similar to the titanium members, however the section dimensions and
thickness are increased to provide additional area consistent with the reduced
allowable stresses for the aluminum material. Limit design stress levels of
275, 240 and 207 MN/m2 (40, 35 and 30 ksi) are selected as the basis for
parametric analyses. Simplified service load spectra for crack growth
analyses are obtained by applying the appropriate ratio of limit design
stresses to the load spectrum of Table 7-1.
7.8.2 Crack Growth Analysis
A review of the crack growth analysis results for the titanium spar
caps indicates that a corner crack from a fastener hole is one of the more
critical types of initial defects. It is also a realistic type of defect
for the materials and design configuration of the spar caps, and is there-
fore selected as the basic analytical model for comparison between the
aluminum and titanium material options. Crack growth to critical size is
calculated for an assumed initial flaw depth of .13 cm (0.050 in.) and
an assumed aspect ratio of corner crack (a/c = 1.O). Results are snmmarized
in Figure 7-48 for the selected limit design stress levels. These data are
used to construct curves of number of safe-life missions versus initial flaw
size, presented in Figure 7-49.
7.8.3 Design Implications
It can be seen from Figure 7-49 that the allowable limit design stress
will be greater than 240 MN/m 2 (35 ksi) for all initial flaw sizes up to
0.63 cm (0.25 in.) and up to 200 safe-life missions. These limits should
cover the practical range of interest for both assumed initial flaw
dimensions based on NDE detection capabilities and a specified safety factor
to be applied to service life used in flaw growth analyses. A maximum limit
design stress of 240 MN/m 2 (35 ksi) was previously determined (Section 6.9)
to satisfy basic fatigue life requirements, which include a scatter factor
of 4.0 on required service life. Therefore, it is concluded that the basic
fatigue life requirement will govern the design of aluminum spar caps over
the practical range of interest. The basic structural weight of aluminum
spar caps was evaluated by numerical integration of spar cap areas over the
wing surface; the integration was based on average properties over increments
of length defined by sixteen stations over the semi-span. Spar caps on the
upper wing surface are critical under compression loading during the max qm
flight condition. Required areas were determined assuming the ultimate
allowable compression stress to be equal to the material yield strength of
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345 MN/m 2 (50 ksi). Spar caps on the lower wing surface are critical under
tension loading in the same flight condition, required areas were determined
on the basis of the fatigue limited ultimate allowable stress of 338 MN/m 2
(49 ksi). A basic structural weight of 8200 kg (18,100 lb) was calculated
in this manner for the 2219-T87 aluminum spar caps.
The use of aluminum spar caps will also impose more severe requirements
on the thermal protection system (TPS) because of the reduction in structural
temperature that can be tolerated. The basic TPS for the B-9U is sized to
limit the temperature of the titanium substructure to 590 K (600 F). A
temperature of approximately 420 K (300 F) is estimated as a maximum practical
limit for the aluminum structure. (A corresponding temperature of 370 K
(200 F) is estimated for critical spar sections in wing root region because
of heat-sink capacity.) Estimated weight increases required in the TPS to
achieve this reduced structural temperature are summarized in Table 7-9.
A total increase of 1810 kg (4000 lb) is estimated, which must be added to
the basic structural weight of aluminum spar caps to permit a valid comparison
between aluminum and titanium material.
Table 7-9. Estimated Weight Increase of TPS to Accommodate
Aluminum Wing Spar Caps
Description of Change
Increase thickness of Dynaflex insulation
(lower wing surface) from 1.4 cm (0.55 in.)
to 2.5 cm (1.0 in.).
Provide local insulation and insulating
spacers between upper wing skin and spar,
rib, and former caps.
Increase thickness of selected panels of
wing lower structural skin to accommodate
increased differential thermal strain.
TOTAL
Weight Increase
(kg ) (ib )
1280
195
335
1810
283O
_30
740
4OOO
A summary weight comparison between the aluminum and titanium alloys for
wing spar caps is given in Figure 7-50. The total wing spar cap weight for
Ti-6AI-hV alloy is plotted as a function of initial flaw size and number of
safe-life missions required in the crack growth analysis. These curves are
developed from the data of Figures 7-13 and 7-18. The weight of aluminum
7-79
SD72-SH-O046
#I_ Space DivisionNorth American Rockwell
spar caps plus the TPS weight increase are superimposed on the same plot. It
can be seen that the titanium structure is considerably lighter than the aluminum
over most of the range of practical interest. The titanium weight approaches
that of the aluminum if initial flaw size is taken in the order of 0.63 cm
(0.25 in.) and a factor of safety of 2.0 is applied to the crack growth
prediction.
103 ib 103 kg
26
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o 20
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*_ 18
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Figure 7-50. Summary Weight Comparison - Aluminum and Titanium Alloys for
Wing Spar Caps
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7.9 SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS - EXTERNAL TANK
A brief fracture mechanics evaluation is made of the external tank
associated with the current Space Shuttle configuration concept. This tank
supplies all of the propellant for the orbiter main engines during the ascent
phase. The tank is separated from the orbiter after burnout (in orbit) and
is expended with each mission. Because of this one-use application, there is
no significant flaw growth to consider prior to the final operational usage.
The fracture mechanics evaluation is therefore limited to prediction of
critical flaw sizes for various regions of the tank and determining the
corresponding proof test requirements. An overall evaluation is then made
of a practical proof test approach to determine what design penalties will
be imposed on the tank structure to accommodate proof test.
7.9.1 Structural Configuration and Loadin6
A view of the overall external tank configuration is given in Figure 7-51.
The total assembly is comprised of an L02 tank subassembly and an LH2 tank
subassembly, separated by a skirt. The L02 tank is located at the forward end
and is shaped to provide an aerodynamic conical nose contour. The tanks are
primarily monocoque shells of revolution, local stiffening is employed only
in regions of concentrated longitudinal loading introduced by the attachments
of the orbiter or the solid rocket motors. This configuration concept was
selected to achieve design simplicity and manufacturing economy. The cylin-
drical and conical walls of the tanks are 2219-T87 aluminum alloy; 2219-T81
aluminum alloy is used for the end bulkheads to allow stretch forming of the
gore panels. All pressure-carrying structural Joints between tank components
are fusion welded, using the DC-TIG process. A preliminary definition of tank
skin and weld land thicknesses, based on flight design requirements, is given
in Figure 7-51.
The preliminary structural analyses of the external tank indicate that
hoop stresses due to tank internal pressure will be the critical factor for
both static strength design and for consideration of failure due to crack-like
defects. Body loads due to aerodynamic, thrust, and inertia forces during
ascent are not expected to modify significantly the critical principal
stresses for most regions of the tank. Therefore, consideration of design
loadings can be simplified to the variation of total pressure over the length
of the tanks. These pressure profiles are plotted in Figures 7-52 and 7-53
for the L02 and LH 2 tanks, respectively. Three time points during the ascent
trajectory are considered to ensure bounding an envelope of maximum design
pressures.
7.9.2 Critical Flaw Sizes and Proof Test Requirements
Critical sizes for an assumed initial surface flaw are calculated for
several locations in both the L02 and LH 2 tanks. The fundamental equation
for a part-through crack (Figure 7-1) and a far surface magnification factor
determined from Figure 5-12 are used in these calculations. Assumed initial
flaw aspect ratios of a/2c = 0.1 and 0.h are investigated. Results of these
investigations are summarized in Table 7-10. The skin thickness, limit design
stress, and corresponding design temperature are listed for the selected
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points in each tank. The fracture toughness is dependent on temperature,
so the values of critical stress intensity (Kc) used in the analyses are
also indicated in the table. The resulting critical flaw sizes (depth) are
given for the two assumed aspect ratios; in cases where the crack breaks
through to leakage prior to fracture, the stress intensity at transition is
also given. This stress intensity is calculated for a through crack of
length 2c. It can be seen that for the extreme aspect ratio a/2c = O.1,
fracture as a part-through crack is predicted for almost all cases. In the
one case where break-through is predicted, the stress intensity for a through
crack of the original surface crack length is well above critical value, so
that break-through and fracture would occur simultaneously. For aspect
ratio a/2c = O.h break-through to leakage prior to fracture is predicted for
all cases. The stress intensities for a through crack of length equal to
thickness/O.h are all less than critical value; therefore, the crack would
remain stable and fracture would not occur without an increase in stress
level. These resualts indicate that current inspection techniques should be
adequate to provide high confidence in structural integrity. For the
assumed flaw of a/2c = O.1, the minimum flaw depth to thickness ratio is
about 0.65 and the surface length of critical flaws is in the range of
2.5 cm (1.O in.) to h.0 cm (1.6 in.). As the assumed initial flaw approaches
a semicircular shape, the surface length decreases, but the flaw would have
to be almost completely through the thickness of material such that the plastic
zone induced by loading could cause break-through to leakage. In addition to
the inspection capabilities for detection, this condition should be revealed
during proof test by flaw break-through and consequent leakage.
A preliminary evaluation of proof test requirements under various
possible proof test environments is performed using the relative fracture
properties of tank parent metal as the primary correction factor. Empirical
data obtained during the Saturn S-II program supported the adequacy of a
proof factor of 1.05 to verify structural integrity for a one-use article
such as the S-II stage or the Shuttle external tank assembly. Therefore, the
required proof stresses for the external tank components are determined by
multiplying the limit design stress by the proof factor of 1.05 and by the
ratio of critical stress intensity for the parent metal at proof test tem-
perature to that at flight design temperature. Proof test practical limitations
with regard to matching flight design pressure profiles are also investigated
to determine effects on tank design. Some regions of the tank cylindrical
shells are sized by monocoque stability requirements, so that some reserve
capability is present to accommodate proof pressures that exceed theoretical
requirements. On the other hand, the tank bulkheads are designed by the
flight pressure/temperature conditions and no reserve strength is inherently
provided by other design requirements. The maximum allowable proof stress
is assumed to be equal to the parent metal yield stress at proof test tempera-
ture. The specific proof test approaches investigated are summarized below:
LH 2 Tank
A pneumatic proof test of the entire tank at room temperature is
assumed. Required proof pressure is determined to be 0.292 MN/m 2
(_2.5 psi).
7-86
SD72-SH-O046
#_ Space DivisionNorth American Rockwell
LO 2 Tank
It is assumed that proof test of the LO 2 tank will be accomplished
by incremental tests as the assembly progresses. The aft bulkhead
will be tested as a separate component; a second proof test, to a
lower pressure appropriate for the aft cylinder region, will then
be performed after assembly of the complete tank. The tank is in
the vertical attitude during this test. Both a room temperature test
using water and a cryogenic test using LN 2 as the pressurizing medium
are investigated for this general proof test approach.
A summary of the results of the investigation of proof test requirements
is given in Table 7-11. The required proof stress and the actual proof
stresses resulting from the practical proof test approaches considered are
listed for each of the selected tank components. The wall thicknesses of
the components, as determined by either flight or proof test requirements,
are also listed. Values are underlined where the proof test approach
results in an increase in thickness above flight design requirements. It
can be seen that the room temperature proof test on the LH 2 tank requires a
small increase in thickness of the forward bulkhead and a significant thick-
ness increase for the aft bulkhead. The resulting weight increase is estimated
to be approximately 90 kg (200 lb). No increase in thickness is required on
the cylindrical walls of the LH 2 tank. The data of Table 7-11 also indicate
that a cryogenic proof test of the LO 2 tank will not result in any thickness
increase of tank components above the flight design requirements. A room
temperature hydrostatic proof test sequence requires increasing the thickness
of the aft bulkhead; a weight penalty of approximately h5 kg (lO0 lb) is
estimated for this approach.
The total tank weight penalty associated with room temperature proof
testing is not considered to be excessive, and program costs will be much
less than for cryogenic proof test. Therefore, the room temperature tests
are recommended as the preferred primary approach. However, this approach
will require careful laboratory evaluation of the fracture properties of both
parent metal and welds at room temperature and at the flight design tempera-
tures to assure that proper proof stress correction factors are determined.
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8.0 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS
"Fail-safe" structure involves a damage tolerant design philosophy
under which failure of a structural element can be temporarily tolerated by
providing sufficient residual strength or alternate load paths to avoid
catastrophic failure under subsequent exposure to a limited period of
service operation. Successful application of this design approach depends
on three major considerations:
(1)
(2)
The fail-safe structure must be accessible for regular and
effective in-service inspection so that a damaged condition
will be reliably detected.
The residual strength and stiffness after initial failure
must be adequate to provide an acceptably low probability of
catastrophic failure under subsequent normal service operation.
Limit load is most commonly taken as the required residual
strength level.
(3) The fatigue life of the remaining structure, after failure
of a single principal element, must be adequate to prevent
any significant additional damage from occurring prior to
the next regular inspection period.
Typical fail-safe designs involve multielement or redundant structural
arrangements with crack arrest provisions in the form of geometric boun-
daries oi stiffening elements. Many of the typical stiffened panels
employed n conventional aircraft wing and fuselage structure possess an
inherent fail-safe capability of significant magnitude. It is obviously
desirable to make use of such inherent fail-safe characteristics and
enhance them to the extent required to comply with the fail-safe design
requirements to obtain maximum efficiency in applying this design concept.
Analyses presented in this section investigate the inherent fail-safe
capabilities of selected structural elements and determine the structural
modifications or reinforcement, and the associated weight increase, to meet
a specified level of residual strength. In most cases this residual strength
level has been varied over the range from 1.0 to 1.2 times limit load, so
that a parametric evaluation can be made of design impact resulting from
various levels of residual strength requirement. The following structural
components are considered to be reasonable candidates for a fail-safe
design approach, and are investigated in this section:
• Wing spar caps
• Vertical stabilizer main box
• Crew compartment
• LH 2 tank cylinder sections
8-1
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8.1 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS - WING
8.1.i Structural Confisuration and Loading
The maximum tension loading on the wing upper surface (down bending)
is only about 70 percent of the tension loading on the lower surface (up
bending); therefore, only the wing lower surface is considered for evalua-
tion of fail-safe design concepts. Also, it can be seen from the iso-stress
contours of Figure 7-15 that operating stresses in the wing spar caps
decrease rapidly in the tip region. For this reason, the fail-safe investi-
gation is not extended beyond Wing Sta. 500. Because of the multispar
arrangement of the wing structure, it is apparent that a significant residual
strength would remain, even if one spar cap were completely fractured.
Therefore, the first fail-safe design approach that is investigated assumes
monolithic spar caps of the configuration described in Section 7.2, and that
any one spar cap may be fractured at any point along its span. It is
further assumed that spar cap areas have been increased as necessary to
reduce the limit operating stress to hh6 MN/m 2 (65 ksi.) so that a satis-
factory fatigue life is achieved. The critical loading condition for fail-
safe requirements is max qa, which produces maximum tension loading on the
wing lower surface. The distribution of spar cap loads for this condition,
assuming an undamaged structure, is taken from Reference 22. These loads
are summarized in Table 8-1.
An alternate fail-safe design approach is also investigated; this
alternate approach assumes that each spar cap is built up of a number of
separate elements that are Joined by mechanical fasteners. Complete
fracture of any one element is presumed; the remaining elements are
required to carry the total load in that spar cap. An example of this
design concept is illustrated in Figure 8-1.
8.1.2 Residual Strensth and Sizin5 Analysis - Monolithic Spar Cap
Basic fail-safe analyses of the B-gu wing structure were performed
by General Dynamics Convair and are documented in Reference 27. These
analyses utilized computer solution of finite element representation of
the redundant wing structure to evaluate the revised distribution of
internal loading associated with failure of various members. Failure of
spar cap, spar cap and spar web, and spar truss diagonal was considered
in these analyses. However, failures were presumed to be located at
selected discrete points over thesurface of the wing. For present
purposes, it is believed that attention can be concentrated on spar cap
failure, but it is desirable to include the generalization that such
failure can occur at any point along the span of the spar cap. Therefore,
the data in Reference 27 have been used to determine approximate "load
addition factors" to account for the effect of failure of one spar cap on
the resulting loads in the adjacent spar caps. These factors are summarized
below.
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1.9 cm --_
(o.75 in.)
15.2 cm
(6.0 in. )
[ J
]
_Attach Fasteners
16.5 cm
(6.5 in.)
(2) Spar Cap No. 4 - Wing Sta. 0 - A = 120 cm2 (18.5 in. 2)
0.89 cm --_
(0.35 in.)
__1
r
_.7 Cm
(1.85 in. )
ii. 4 cm
(4.5 in.)
(b) Spar Cap No. 4 - Wing Sta. 450 - A = 42 cm 2 (6.5 in. 2)
Figure 8-1 Wing Spar Cap - Multi-Element Fail-Safe Design Concept
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Spar Cap
1
2
3
5
Critical Failure Location
(Adjacent Spar)
Additional Load
(Percent of Original Load
in Failed Member)
3o%
6o%
65%
9O%
55%
These factors are used with the basic design limit loads summarized in
Table 8-1 to obtain the fail-safe design loads listed in Table 8-2. These
loads are based on limit applied wing bending moment and the assumption
that an adjacent spar cap has fractured at the most adverse location. The
spar cap area required to satisfy applicable design requirements are
determined as follows:
(i) For an intact structure, the spar cap areas must satisfy the
ultimate strength design requirement in conjunction with the
loads of Table 8-1 and a safety factor of 1.h appropriate for
the critical design condition and also satisfy the requirement
for satisfactory fatigue life. In this case, the fatigue life
requirement has been determined more critical and will establish
the baseline spar cap areas. These areas are calculated using
the loads of Table 8-1 and a limit operating stress of
hh6 MN/m 2 (65 ksi.), which has been previously determined as
the maximum limit operating stress that will provide satisfactory
fatigue life.
(2) For a damaged structure, assuming one spar cap completely
fractured, the remaining structure must withstand a specified
percentage of limit load. The allowable stress for this case
is taken as 0.95 Ftu to allow for local reductions in area
due to fastener holes, etc. The spar cap areas required to
meet this condition are therefore calculated using the loads
of Table 8-2 and an allowable stress of 875 MN/m 2 (123 ksi.);
required areas have been determined for a residual strength of
1.O, 1.1 and 1.2 times limit load.
The difference between baseline spar cap areas, based on fatigue life
requirements, and the areas needed to satisfy the varying levels of
fail-safe requirements is then used to determine the weight increase
associated with the fail-safe design by numerical integration over the
portion of the wing considered. A further allowance of 20 percent of the
indicated spar cap weight increase is made to account for increased weight
of cover skin and spar truss diagonals. This factor is estimated from the
results summarized in Reference 27. The resulting weight increases are:
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Table 8-1. Limit Design Loads for Wing Lower Surface
Spar Caps (Undamaged Structure) (Kips)
Wing Span
Station
0
6O
120
163
207
267
327
387
447
5O7
222
215
2O8
200
193
150
79
2'
393
386
372
365
336
293
271
228
157
71
Spar Cap Number
3 4
91o
88o
815
794
730
65o
565
465
38O
286
1260
1250
1210
1180
1150
lO6O
88o
636
422
25o
365
372
343
343
322
264
150
150
150
128
Table 8-2, Fail-Safe Design Loads (1) For Wing Lower
Surface Spar Caps (Kips)
Wing Span
Station
0
6o
120
163
207
267
327
387
447
5O7
340
331
320
310
293
238
160
2
938
914
862
840
776
683
611
5O8
385
243
par Cap Number
3 4
1166 1590
1130 1585
lO57 152o
lO32 149o
948 144o
840 1298
741 1015
613 771
482 557
332 365
lO60
1062
1008
993
955
849
635
5OO
382
266
(1)Based on limit applied bending moment
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Residual Strength
Level
(Percent Limit Load)
100
ii0
120
Wing Weight
Increase
(k_) (ib)
365 805
495 1090
710 1570
8.1.3 Residual Strength and Sizing Analysis - Multi-Element S_mar Cap
As an alternate fail-safe design approach, it appears practical to
build up the spar cap of three separate elements of approximately equal area
and also accommodate the desired spanwise taper in cap area. This design
concept is illustrated in Figure 8-1, which shows cross sections of spar
cap No. 4 at Wing Sta. 0 and 450. The section dimensions are based on a
maximum limit stress of 446 MN/m 2 (65 ksi.) to satisfy fatigue life
requirements. The section elements are arranged so that each is accessible
for visual inspection from inside the wing, so that extensive cracking or
fracture of any one element can be reliably detected.
The fail-safe design criteria requires that adequate residual strength
be available if one of the elements is assumed to be completely fractured.
This residual strength can be approximated assuming the spar cap load is
carried by a uniform tension stress distributed over the remaining cross
section area. This approximation is considered to be Justified because
bending stresses due to local eccentricities from failure of one element
will tend to be dissipated by restraint of Skin and web and by plastic
deformations as ultimate strength capability is approached. For the
example case, the gross stress on the remaining section is then 1.5 times
the original gross stress on the spar cap, so that at limit load:
Ogross = 1.5(446) = 670 MN/m 2 (97.5 ksi.)
The indicated fastener pattern, which is discussed below, reduces the net
section area by 12.5 percent, so that:
670
One t = .--_= 765 MN/m 2 (Iii ksi.)
The ultimate tension strength is 895 MN/m 2 (130 ksi.), so the inherent
fail-safe capability of this design approach can be determined as:
895
R = 7--_= 1.17 x limit load
This result shows that the basic spar cap of three section elements has an
inherent residual strength capability adequate to satisfy fail-safe design
requirements. Weight increase associated with this design concept will be
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due to the weight of additional fasteners to Join the individual elements
and possibly due to practical limitations on achieving an idealized taper
of spar cap area in the spanwise direction.
The fasteners selected for this design concept are 5/32 inch diameter
Hi-Shear rivets of A-286 steel with aluminum collars. A double row of
fasteners at hD spacing is used at each element Joint, as indicated in
Figure 8-1. This fastener pattern was selected to provide capability to
transfer the load from a failed element to the remaining elements over a
reasonable length. The estimated weight increase for this design concept
over the portion of the wing considered (lower surface to Wing Sta. 500) is:
Fasteners to assemble spar
cap alements
22o kg (485 Ib)
Allowance for "non-optimum"
taper (estimated as l0 percent
of change in area from root
to W.S. 500)
18o kg (400 ib)
Total estimated weight increase 4oo kg (885 ib)
8.1.4 Residual Fatigue Life
The fail-safe design approach must provide adequate fatigue life, in
addition to adequate residual static strength, after failure of a single
principal element so that structural integrity is maintained until the next
regularly scheduled major structural inspection. The element failure would
be detected at this time and repair or replacement accomplished to restore
full structural capabilities. In the case of the present study, no firm
major inspection periods have been established. Therefore, the residual
fatigue life (after failure of one spar cap) for wing spar caps using the
monolithic design approach are investigated for three arbitrary levels of
residual strength (1.O, 1.1 and 1.2 x limit load) and the required inspection
intervals determined for these cases. Calculations are carried out in Table
8-3; the fatigue load spectrum is the same as that used for the basic wing
fatigue evaluation (Table 6-3) except that some fatigue blocks that
contributed negligable damange have been eliminated. The reference limit
stress for the case where residual strength is equal to limit load is 850
_/m 2 (123 ksi). The cyclic stresses listed in Table 6-3 are increased by
the ratio of the relative limit operating stresses to obtain the fatigue
stress spectrum for the fail-safe condition. This approach may be somewhat
conservative because it inherently assumes that the fractured spar cap is
ineffective under compression as well as tension loading. A rather extensive
investigation of an actual hardware design, including some test evaluation,
would be required to determine compression load effectiveness more accurately.
The total fatigue damage calculated in Table 8-3 is based on lO0
operational missions, so that the nominal fatigue life (number of missions)
is determined by dividing lO0 by the accumulated damage. This nominal llfe
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is then divided by a scatter factor of 4.0 to obtain "safe" fatigue life,
which is indicated at the bottom of Table 8-3. These lives are 3, 8 and 14
missions for residual strength factors of 1.0, i.i, and 1.2, respectively.
The safe fatigue life for the multi-element spar cap design concept
can be approximated by interpolation of the above results. This concept
provides an inherent residual strength factor of 1.17, so that the corres-
ponding safe fatigue llfe is approximately 12 missions after failure of one
element in the spar cap assembly. It should be noted that this analytical
prediction may be unconservatlve, because it is based on the assumption of
a uniform tension stress over the remaining spar cap elements. It is
possible that bending stresses due to the local eccentricities resulting
from failure of one element may significantly reduce fatigue life, even
though these bending stresses may be alleviated by plastic deformation as
ultimate load capability is approached. Therefore, test evaluation of resi-
dual fatigue llfe should be obtained for this type of fail-safe concept in
an actual design application.
8.1.5 Design Evaluation
A comparison of the relative structural weight increase between the
safe-llfe and fail-safe design approaches is, of course, of primary interest.
However, the weight increase curves for the safe-life approach, summarized
in Section 7, are baselined to the original preliminary design sizing which
considered only static strength requirements. Therefore, a weight increment
of approximately 450 kg (i000 ib) must be added to the fail-safe weight
requirements determined in this section to put them on a common basis for
comparison. This weight increment accounts for the reduction in maximum
limit tension stress to 446 MN/m 2 (165 ksi) to provide adequate fatigue llfe.
With this adjustment, the weight increase for the fail-safe approach
employing multi-element spar caps is 850 kg (1885 Ibs) and for monolithic
spar caps would range from 815 kg (1805 Ibs) to 1160 kg (2570 Ibs), depending
on the level of residual strength required. Examination of Figure 7-18 shows
that these weights are in the same order as weight increases for the safe-life
approach based on a resonable estimate of maximum initial flaw size that may
exist in the structure. It would be necessary to precisely define the types
and sizes of initial flaws and service life to be used as design requirements
for the safe-llfe approach to permit a more specific comparison. However, it
can be concluded that fail-safe is a practical and viable alternate design
approach in terms of impact on structural weight. The fail-safe approach
should result in greater safety because of decreased dependance on inspection
reliability to detect small flaws, and is considered to be the preferred
design approach for this application. However, it should be noted that the
evaluation of residual fatigue llfe indicates a safe-life, after failure of
a major structural element, of only 3 to 14 missions, depending on the
fail-safe design concept and residual strength level provided. This is a
relatively high frequency for major structural inspections, and may be an
important factor in the selection of the most appropriate design approach.
Several aspects need to be considered in a comparison of the relative
merits between the two types of fail-safe design approaches investigated in
this study. The monolithic spar cap offers the advantages of lower
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manufacturing costs and fewer fastener holes which may serve as fatigue
crack initiation sites. The multl-element spar cap is significantly lighter
for the same level of residual strength; failure of one element would result
in much less severe perturbations of wing stiffness and general internal
loading distributions than for monolithic design; and the multl-element
design is much more amenable to test verification of residual strength
capability than the monolithic approach. This last point may be a very
significant factor in evaluation of the two design concepts; the practical
difficulties in testing a full-scale wing structure employing monolithic
spar caps to verify satisfactory residual strength and fatigue llfe of
remaining structure can be seen to be very formidable, particularly when
consideration is given to all the potentially critical locations in which
a failure may occur. On the other hand, this type of testing may be
accomplished quite readily using component specimens representative of the
multl-element spar cap designs. A specific evaluation of the relative test
costs, relative manufacturing costs, and level of confidence in fail-safe
integrity would be required to select the most appropriate design concept
for an actual hardware application.
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8.2 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS - VERTICAL STABILIZER
The preceding evaluation of safe-llfe characteristics of the cover
skins of the vertical stabilizer (Section 7.3) indicated a satisfactory
condition; an initial through crack of almost 2 inch length can exist without
growing to failure during the service life. This should be quite detectable
by ordinary inspection if the outer surface of the vertical stabilizer is not
covered by a thermal protection system. However, a fail-safe investigation
will also be conducted on this assembly to provide some insight as to the
inherent fail-safe characteristics of this type of distributed integral-
stiffened structure and to evaluate what improvement in fail-safe capability
may be readily accomplished.
8.2.1 Structural Configuration and Loading
The vertical stabilizer main box is a three-spar structure, with the
spanwise bending resisted primarily by integral stiffened cover skins of
Ti-6AI-4V. The typical skin-stringer configuration is illustrated in Figure
6-3b. The total cover skin assembly is fabricated from spanwise planks
machined to this integral stiffened configuration. Ten such planks are
Joined to cover the chord of the main box structure. The basic design concept
from the Phase B study employed fusion welding for the spanwise Joints between
planks. An alternate design, involving splice straps and mechanical fasteners,
will be investigated to evaluate crack arrest and residual strength
characteristics of this approach. The two Joint configurations are illustrated
in Figure 8-2.
Critical bending on the vertical stabilizer is due to lateral gust during
subsonic flight; a limit spanwlse bending stress of 180 MN/m 2 (26 ksi) results
for the selected design configuration in the critical root region (see
Figure 6-2). This applied stress may be either tension or compression, and
is assumed to be uniform over the chord of the reference section for the
purposes of this study.
8.2.2 Inherent Residual Strength
The welded spanwise Joints between skin planks of the basic design
configuration provide no crack arrest capability; therefore, the inherent
crack arrest and residual strength characteristics are dependent on the
integral stiffeners. An approximate solution for the stress intensity at
the tip of a crack through the skin thickness is obtained as the crack
approaches, and then extends through, the integral stiffeners.
The initial model for this study assumes a through crack, of length 2a,
originating midway between integral stiffeners, as indicated in sketch below.
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Figure 8-2 Vertical Stabilizer Skin Plank Joint Configurations
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If no stiffeners were
present, the stress
intensity would be
given by the elementary
equation:
KI = q-_/-$a (1)
I
viiiV
F
As the crack approaches an integral stiffener, the stress intensity is
reduced because of the restraint provided by the stiffener. The resulting
stress intensity can be expressed as:
where _ is a correction factor depending on crack size, proximity of crack
tip to stiffener, and the relative stiffness of that member. An approximate
solution may be obtained from Figure 46 of Reference 23, where for the
parameters indicated in the sketch below:
A = f(s, .f-2_ ) o-
S
.,1
4 Esk tsk 2 (3)
Ast r Est r (l+-z))(,_-'_))
tt I
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In this case:
S - 4 (0.080),_' = 0.72 A¢
(0.127)(i. 3)(2.7)
Kz - ,_(26.0) _/3.14a = 46.0 _ _ (ksi 4-_3
Stress intensity is calculated in the table below as the crack grows from
80 percent to i00 percent of the panel width.
2 a
b
o.7o
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
2 a
(in.)
2. iO
2.40
2.55
2.70
2.85
3.00
0.450
0.300
0.225
0.150
O.075
0
(in.)
2.550
2.7OO
2.775
2.850
2.925
3.000
0.177
o.iii
o.081
O.052
O.O26
0
S
1.85
1.95
2. O0
2.05
2.12
2.16
A
0.95
0.90
0.88
0.81
o.75
0.72
i.O2
1.O9
1.13
i.16
1.19
1.22
KI
(ksi4_F.)
44.5
45.0
45.5
43.1
41.1
40.5
As the crack grows through the first set of integral stiffeners, a stress
intensity magnification will be imposed. This is due to the effect of loading
in the severed stiffener, remote from the crack, to apply additional crack
opening forces. This is illustrated in the dlagrambelow.
• _ TA --
P_r_ I _Pstr IIi I'L_ II
, II
I t _ a Jl
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The increase in stress
intensity can be
approximated from the
basic crack loading model
sketched below, and the
expression:
I
= P / a + d (4)KI
2_TTa 4 a - d
,i
where:
P = Load per unit thickness
A correction factor of 1.25 is applied to the above expression to account
for the actual case of collnear and opposite forces; this correction provides
close agreement with the solution of C.C. Poe for a somewhat different
geometric configuration that is presented in Reference 28, and is based on
a more exact general analysis.
Equation (4) can be expanded to cover the present problem by
accounting for the symmetric stiffener forces near each end of the crack
and converting stiffener force to a stress function, with the result:
= + a - d (5)
2 tsk #_ra a - dl a + d
It is convenient to put this expression in a coefficient form such that:
K I = _' (T'#'fTa (6)
and
Kz = ( A, +l)[TJ_a (7)
whe re :
A !
i 1
I( 1= 1.2 Astra+d) + i .dl22TF a tsk a-_- d/ _a + d/
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in this case:
= 1.25 (0.127) [
2(3.1k)(o.o8o)a
o ,o
a a - dl
£
:+:i
I_
ks+d/
1
+ 5L_.%- 1
(9)
As the crack tip approacbms the next set of stiffeners, a reduction in stress
as indicated by
ent evaluation. After the crack progresses throughintensity will be caused by the restraint of these memberS,
EquatiOn 2 and subsequ _ _ _tress intensity can be determined using
the second set of stiffeners, _ _v the additional stress intensity from
the above procedures by superimposing
crack-opening forces associated with both sets of severed stiffeners The
resulting distribution of stress intensity as a function of crack length is
calculated in Tabl_ 8-4 using Equations 2, 3, 7 and 9 and a limit applied, in Figure 8- 3. Both
s intensity correction factor,stress of 180 MN/mn (26 ski). The results are plotted
-+ress intensity and the net stres m A critical stress intensity of
the =_ _,_ _e _lotted in this a_m_ " - .... d on this plot.
It can be seen that integral stiffeners are relatively ineffectiveck tip approaches the f rst
oviding fail-safe capability" As the cra ..... o0 _ercent by thereduced approxlma_e'Y
in pr _^ =+_ess intensity is he crack progresses through the
ener oL,= _stiff , ---bet However, as t ..... _.o_ sed because of
. raint of this m=m • signiflcanLxY _ ..... a stiffener. If
rest .... _== intensity is
stiffener, the ._u .... _ b_U +ly, the stress intensity will Jump to a value
crack-opening forces associated with the severed
additional _ "_0 MN/roD/ [iio Ksl_ _-.J" __ the assumed to progressthe stiffener is severed_ 2 .P_T_. _r_l-__ Tf crack the skin (suggested
Reference 28)..the stress intensity
in the order oI _ "e erimental work of . _ ,_ _/m3/2 (98 ksi 4-_.).through the stiffener element at the same rate as through
by the theoretical and xp .__..o n aDOUL _l "-'- is again
will increase more gradually to a v_st_ffener, the stress intensity
approaches _ " s member. However, _e minimum stress
As the crack tip the second
reduced because of the restralnt of thl _ .... 92 MN/m j" (84 ksl 4-_.)"
intensity achieved, adjacent to this s_ ..... , is _ so
This is slightly above the design value for allowable stress intensity,
that crack arrest at the second stiffener is not assured. Therefore, the
inherent fail-safe capability of the vertical stabilizer skin is limited to
a crack of 7.6 cm (3 in.) length, which will be arrested by the adjacent
integral stiffeners.
8.2.3 _ Stre_ th of planked Skins
The use of mechanically fastened spanwise Joints for wing skin planks
will be investigated as a possible improved fail-safe design concept. The
hord of the main box is comprised he critical root region. Thetotal c .... + q6 cm (22 in.) in t f ten skin planks, and the width
of each plank is auu_ _ is determined assuming that a crack extends
residual strength of the structure
completely across the width of one skin plank. Because the riveted splice
Joint provides a geometric discontinuity to accomplish crack arrest, it is
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An estimated 5 in. of adjacent panel is combined with splice member as an
effective coaming stringer, so that:
A2 _ 0.275 + 5 (0.122) = 0.89 in. 2
A 3 = ii (0.122) = 1.34 in. 2
2
A1 = h0 (0.122) = 4.88 in.
(at least two intact planks
assumed on either side of
fractured plank)
The distances to centrolds of areas
AI and AS are:
bcl 25 in.
bc2 = 5.5 in.
and the effective distance to lumped areas is approximately 0.65-distance
to centroids (empirical relationship developed in Reference 29) so that:
bI -- 0.65 (25) 14.3 in.
b2 "_ 0.65 (5.5) = 3.6 in.
The relative stiffners parameters and resulting stress distributions are
then given by:
= -- 4.88
i Ebl AI 14.3
i = O.0545
_ 2 = Gt I_ + A_I = 0"4 (0"080 Iol__9 + ll._l =2 Eb2 3.6
O.0165
/_2 = 0.128
= Gt_-
EhA2
0.4(0.080) = 0.00252
14.3 (0.89)
Gt/9 4 =
Eb2A2
0.4 (0.08o)
3.6 (0.89)
= O.0100
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in this case:
A' 1.25 (0. 27)
2(3.14)(0.080) a
!
\a+d/
O. 318
! &
a-d a+dl
(9)
As the crack tip approaches the next set of stiffeners, a reduction in stress
intensity will be caused by the restraint of these members, as indicated by
Equation 2 and subsequent evaluation. After the crack progresses through
the second set of stiffeners, the stress intensity can be determined using
the above procedures by superimposing the additional stress intensity from
crack-opening forces associated with both sets of severed stiffeners. The
resulting distribution of stress intensity as a function of crack length is
calculated in Tabl_ 8-4, using Equations 2, 3, 7 and 9 and a limit applied
stress of 180 MN/m _ (26 ski). The results are plotted in Figure 8-3. Both
the stress intensit77 and the net stress intensity correction factor,
_(l+ _').. are plotted in this diagram. A critical stress intensity of
6 MN mBZ2 "-87. / [_0 ksi_-_ is also superimposed on this plot.
It can be seen that integral stiffeners are relatively ineffective
in providing fail-safe capability. As the crack tip approaches the first
stiffener, the stress intensity is reduced approximately 30 percent by the
restraint of this member. However, as the crack progresses through the
stiffener, the stress intensity is significantly increased because of
additional crack-opening forces associated with the severed stiffener. If
the stiffener is severed abruptly, the stress intensity will Jump to a value
3/2in the order of 120 MN/m (llO ksi_i-n.). If the crack is assumed to progress
through the stiffener element at the same rate as through the skin (suggested
by the theoretical and experimental work of Reference 28)..the stress intensity
will increase more gradually to a value of about 107 MN/m 3/2 (98 ksiq-_.).
As the crack tip approaches the second stiffener, the stress intensity is again
reduced because of the restraint of this member. However,_e minimum stress
intensity achieved, adjacent to this stiffener, is 92 MN/m _/_ (84 ksi_f-_.).
This is slightly above the design value for allowable stress intensity, so
that crack arrest at the second stiffener is not assured. Therefore, the
inherent fail-safe capability of the vertical stabilizer skin is limited to
a crack of 7.6 cm (3 in.) length, which will be arrested by the adjacent
integral stiffeners.
8.2.3 Residual Strength of Planked Skins
The use of mechanically fastened spanwlse joints for wing skin planks
will be investigated as a possible improved fail-safe design concept. The
total chord of the main box is comprised of ten skin planks, and the width
of each plank is about 56 cm (22 in.) in the critical root region. The
residual strength of the structure is determined assuming that a crack extends
completely across the width of one skin plank. Because the riveted splice
Joint provides a geometric discontinuity to accomplish crack arrest, it is
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not necessary or appropriate to apply fracture mechanics theory to predict
residual strength. However, the failure of one skin plank will cause an
elastic concentration of loading in the adjacent planks, that must be
accounted for. This is basically a load redistribution or "shear lag"
problem, and an approximate solution is obtained employing the "three-stringer
method" for rectangular cutouts in stiffened panels that is presented in
Reference 29. The vertical stabilizer design provides ribs at 1.27 (50 in.)
spacing with intermediate stiffeners midway between the ribs. Therefore,
a crack completely across a skin plank creates an effective "cut-out" bay of
56 cm (22 In.) width and 63 cm (25 in.) length before redistribution of the
longitudinal loading can be accomplished by skin shear flows.
The idealized model of the structure
containing this equivalent cut-out, and
the analysis equations from Reference 29
are summarized below. (To avoid confusion
with stress intensity designation, the
coefficients K1, K 2 etc. defined in Ref.
29 are identified as_l,/_ 2 etc. in the
present text. )
(TI = _'-I i - R C° A2 c°Sh_l XIAI cosh/_ I d
"O-2 = _-I i + R C° c°sh'Zgl XIcosh/91 d
T
x
A1
@ bc_ A 3
O O--<>--
Idealized
where: O-= average stress in net section,
which has the area A I + A2
Co, R are stress redistribution
factors, dependant on relative
axial and shear stlffeness.
In this case:
A 1
bl _b2 1
o o
O t t A2 A3
_bstitute
t = 0.080 in.
= 0.122 in.
Asp = 0.275 in.
(skin thickness)
(equivalent thickness of skin
and stiffeners)
(area of splice strap)
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An estimated 5 in. of adjacent panel is combined with splice member as an
effective coaming stringer, so that:
A2 _ 0.275 + 5 (0.122) - 0.89 in.2
A 3 = 11 (0.122) = 1.34 in.2
A 1 -- 40 (0.122) = 4.88 in.2 (at least two intact planks
assumed on either side of
fractured plank)
The distances to centroids of areas
A I and A 3 are:
bc I 25 in.
bc 2 = 55 in
and the effective distance to lumped areas is approximately 0.65 - distance
to centroids (empirical relationship developed in Reference 29) so that:
b 1 _ 0.65 (25) = 14.3 in.
b 2 _ 0.65 (5.5) = 3.6 in.
The relative stiffners parameters and resulting stress distributions are
then given by :
/_ 1 Ebl A1 A2 14.3 4.88
_i = 0.0545
/_2 = -- --
Eb 2 A2 3.6 O. 89
/_2 = o.128
Gt = 0.4(0.080) = 0.00252
EblA2 14.3 (0.89)
Gt = 0.4 (0.080) = O.OlOO
Eb2A2 3.6 (0.89)
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_2 2 2
=/Sl#2 - W3#4 _ (.o0296)(.0165)- (.00252) (OlOO)
= 0.236 x 10 -4
= O.00486
co= #/4
2 --2
= (. 00252)(.0z00)
(.00296)(.00486) + .236x10 -4
= 0.665
R _ i = 1
1 + tanhAd i + tanh (.0545)(i2)
1_'2= _-[ 1 + (0"635)(0"665) coshC°Sh/l XI/I d
= 0.635
The maximum stress in the net section will occur at the edge of the cut-
out, where x = d, so that:
: :
m
However, _-is the average stress in the net section, and is related to the
gross stress by the ratio of original to remaining area after fracture of one
skin plank, so that:
= __l°C-o -- i ll _o
9
_2 = 1.n (1..2)(:To: 1.58tTo
max
For this case, with O-o equal to limit stress of 180 MN/m 2 (26 ksi):
O-2max = 1.58 (180) = 280 NN/m 2 (41 ksi)
For tension loading, the allowable stress is estimated at 0.90 FTu, to account
for local area reductions due to fastener holes, etc. This gives an allowable
stress of 810 MN/m 2 (117 ksi), and the corresponding residual strength factor
is:
F.S. = 810 = 2.9
28O
This shows a residual strength capability approximately three times limit
load under tension loading, so obviously the fail-safe capability is adequate
for this failure mode. However, if the cracked skin plank is assumed to be
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completely ineffective under compression loading as well as tension, then
the previously determined stress concentration factor is also applicable
to the adjacent skin planks under compression loading. Because the design
loads on the vertical stabilizer are completely reversible, the maximum
compression stress would also be 280 MN/m 2 (41 ksl). The allowable compres-
sion stress, as governed by panel buckling, is 270 MN/m 2 (39.4 ksl). There-
fore, the fail-safe factor of safety under compression loading would be:
F.S. = 270 - 0.96
280
This indicates that slightly less than limit load capability would be provided
if the cracked skin plank is completely ineffective under compression loading.
Therefore, it is considered desirable to undertake an approximate evaluation
of the compression load carrying capability of the cracked skin plank.
Compression loading can be transmitted by bearing pressure on the crack
surfaces unless severe mlsallgnment of the panels on each side of the crack
has occurred. However, the effective bending stiffness will be reduced or
eliminated at the crack section. Assume, as a worst case, that the crack
occurs midway between chordwlse stiffeners and that the bending stiffness
of skln-stringer panels is completely eliminated at this point. The structural
model on each side of the cracks can then be idealized as a simply supported
column with an overhanging free end of length equal to one half the support
spacing. This is indicated in the sketch below:
The critical load can be
determined by writing the
appropriate differential
equations for each section
of the model (between the
supports, and overhang
reglon), imposing the
requirement for compatible
slope at the common Junction,
and solving for coefficients
by imposing appropriate boundary
conditl on s.
P
J
P
j-_--
J
J
J
J
The resulting combined equation is:
tan k_ -_- k_
sin 1_
2
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whe re:
k = VrP/ ,z
= column length between supports
Pe = Euler critical load for simply supported column.
The above equation was solved by iteration to obtain the value of k_, and
an effective column end fixity coefficient of 0.64 was determined. However,
some misalignment or imperfect bearing may exist between the crack surfaces,
so the effective end fixity coefficient is arbitrarily reduced to 0.40 to
allow for these possible effects. The allowable compression stress across
the cracked skin plank then becomes:
_--cr= 0.40 (39.4) = 15.8 ksi.
The previously determined load redistribution factors are then applied to
the difference between the gross applied stress and the allowable stress of
the cracked plank. This results in the following expression for the maximum
stress in adjacent skin planks.
_-= 15.8 + 1.58 ( O-o - 15.8 )
= 1.58_o - 9.2
Equating this applied stress to the panel buckling allowable:
39.4 = 1.58 0- o - 9.2
_-O = 30.8 ksi. (allowable gross stress)
and the fail-safe factor of safety is:
F.S. = 0.8 = 1.18
This indicates that, based on the preceding assumptions, the residual strength
under compression loading is approximately 20 percent above limit load level.
Because of this relatively small margin, and the gross nature of some of the
required assumptions, test verification of the residual strength would be
highly desirable for an actual design application.
8.2.4 Design Evaluation
The preceding evaluation showed that the inherent fail-safe capability
of the basic design for vertical stabilizer cover skins is relatively low;
a through crack of 7.6 cm (3.0 in.) length is the maximum that will be
arrested by integral stiffeners. However, by replacing the welded spanwise
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Joints between skin planks with riveted splices, the fail-safe capability
can be greatly improved. With this configuration, a crack completely across
the width of a skin plank (crack length = 22 in.) will be arrested and the
residual strength of the remaining structure is greater than limit load for
both tension and compression loading. The maximum stress on the remaining
structure is approximately 280 MN/m2 (hl ksi) at limit load, so that the safe
fatigue life of the remaining structure should exceed one service lifetime
(i00 missions), by comparison to the wing spar fatigue analysis. Therefore,
it is of interest to determine the approximate weight increase associated
with the riveted splices. This weight increase is estimated on the basis of
the following assumptions :
i) Splice straps are 7.0 cm (2.75 in.) wide and taper in thickness
from 0.254 cm (0.i00 in.) at the root to 0.127 cm (0.050 in.) at
the tip.
2) A staggered double row of counter sunk head titanium fasteners
are used on each side of the splice. Fasteners are 3/16 in. diameter
and the pattern is equivalent to a single row at 5/8 inch spacing.
3) Nine full-span splices are provided on each surface of the vertical
stabilizer main box.
The average length of spanwise splices is 11.2 m (440 in. ), the resulting
calculated weight of splice straps is ll8 kg ( 260 lb). However, if these
splice members are accounted for as effective spanwise bending material in
the original design, the gauge of basic skin and stringers may be reduced
slightly. Therefore, it is estimated that 50 percent of the indicated splice
weight is an actual increase to the vertical stabilizer structure.
The total length of splices involves approximately 25,000 fasteners with
an estimated weight of 20 kg ( 40 ib). The total weight increase is the sum
of fastener weight and effective splice strap weight:
20 + 0.5 (118) = 79 kg (170 lb)
This represents 1.8 percent of the stabilizer main box structural weight.
For the specific case of the B-9U vertical stabilizer, it is probable
that the additional fail-safe capabilities of riveted splices between skin
planks is not required. A through crack of 7.6 cm (3.0 in.) length should
be readily detected by visual inspection during pre-flight checks. However,
if this type of structure were used in an application that was not readily
inspectable, the additional fail-safe capability could be highly desirable.
For example, if the outer surface were covered with a thermal protection
system, direct visual inspection would not be possible. Radiographic
inspection, shooting completely through the structure, should reliably detect
a crack 56 em (22 in.) long, but might not ensure detection of a crack only
7.6 cm (3 in.) long.
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8.3 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS - CREW COMP_
The safe-life analysis of crew compartment indicated that an initial
crack of approximately 1.27 cm (0. 5 in.) length through the compartment
skin can exist without growing to failure during the service life. An
initial flaw of these characteristics should be reliably detected during
fabrication and final inspection of the structure. However, a crack of this
size caused by accidental damage during the service life might go undetected
because of restricted accessibility due to external TPS, internal equipment,
etc. Therefore, because of the extreme importance of compartment structural
integrity to crew safety, an investigation of fail-safe design concepts is
also performed. Particular attention is given to the problem of maintaining
a cabin atmosphere adequate for crew survival in the event that a crack
propagates to significant size before being arrested by the fail-safe design
provisions.
8.3.1 Structural Configuration and Loading
For purposes of the fail-safe study, the crew compartment is idealized
as a cy]indrical shell of 3.05 m (]20 in.) diameter and 4.6 m (180 in.) length.
The skin is of 2219-T87 aluminum alloy with integral longitudinal stiffeners.
Minimum skin thickness is 0.076 cm (0.030 in.). The fail-safe design concept
to be investigated assumes the use of circumferential "tear straps" of
annealed 6AL-4V titanium alloy riveted to the aluminum shell. These straps
serve as crack arrest members to prevent longitudinal cracks in the basic
skin from extending beyond the straps. Titanium is selected for these
members because of its high strength and toughness and the satisfactory
performance demonstrated on Jet transport aircraft cabins. The strap
spacing is considered a variable in the study, and the stnlctural and cabin
pressure systems weight is evaluated as a function of strap spacing, consid-
ering both structural integrity and cabin atmosphere requirements.
The crew compartment is loaded primarily by internal pressure; maximum
differential pressure is 14.7 psi. The limit hoop stress in basic skin is
206 MN/m _ (30 ksi).
8.3.2 Residual Strength and Sizing Analysis
In keeping with common practice employed in the design of Jet transport
aircraft cabins, it is assumed that a longitudinal crack may initiate in the
skin at the point of attachment of a tear strap and proceed in both directions
from this origin. The adjacent tear straps must then be adequate to arrest
the crack and confine it to a two-bay length. The effectiveness of the tear
straps may be expressed as a stress intensity reduction factor applied to
the crack tip. Theoretical and experimental investigations have shown that
this reduction is dependent on the relative stiffness of the strap to the
basic skin and the spacing of rivets in the strap attachment pattern. Design
curves have been developed in Reference 30 and are reproduced in Figure 8-4.
In this figure, a family of stress intensity coefficient curves are plotted
over three bays of a stiffened panel for various values of relative stiffness
and rivet spacing. In the present case it is desired to confine the crack
half-length to one bay, so the stress intensity conditions in the vicinity
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of the first strap away from the crack origin are of primary interest. It
can be seen that the maximum reduction in crack tip stress intensity occurs
at a value of a/b _ 1.O5. The stress intensity coefficients at this
locatiom are cross-plotted as a function of relative stiffness parameter
_x) in Figure 8-5; this presents the data in a form more easily used for
determining strap sizing requirements. In determining these requirements,
it is assumed that the maximum stress intensity at crack tip will be
limited to 90 percent of the critical value to ensure crack arrest. For
thin sections o£ 2219-787 aluminum alloy sheet, a critical stress intensity
(Kc) of 71 MN/m 3/2 (65 ksi _-{-n.) is estimated from literature sources. The
governing relationship can then be written as:
KI = /% _-_a = 0.90 Kc
where:
_-- = 30 ksi (limit hoop stress in skin)
a = 1.05 b
K c
A
therefore :
0.90(65.0)
(point of max reduction in stress
intensity)
= 65 ksi 4-{-_.
- f Z )
b
= A (30.0) (i.o5)b
= 1.07
4T
(lO)
Rivets are assumed to be at 3/4 in. spacing, so the rivet parameter (P/b)
is defined for a given value of strap spacing, b. The data plotted in
Figure 8-5 is then used to determine the strap sizing required to achieve
a given value of _ , from the relationship:
i + Ask Esk
Ast Est
where:
Ask = btsk (cross-section area of skin over one bay length)
As t
Esk
Est
= cross-section area of reinforcing strap
= modulus of elasticity of skin material
= modulus of elasticity of strap mater_l
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In this case:
= i = i
1 + Ask (10.5)(106 )
Ast (16.0)(10 6)
i + 0.665 Ask
Ast
Ast = 0.665 [1..___] Ask (ii)
The increased structural weight due to the addition of crack arrest straps
is calculated from the following relationships:
Number of straps: n = 180 (use next higher integer)
b
Circumference: S = 3.14 (]20) = 375 in.
Wst = n (375) Ast (0.160) = 60 n Ast (12)
In addition to this weight, some allowance is made for the practical
requirements of attaching the straps to the basic shell. The basic skin
thickness (0.030 in.) would limit the effectiveness of the riveted attach-
ment because of high bearing stresses on the skin. Therefore, it is
assumed that an integral reinforcing land, i in. wide and 0.060 in. thick
is provided under each strap to improve the Joint allowable. These contribu-
tions to structural weight increase are estimated using the following
relationships:
Additional skin weight:
W sk = n
Fastener weight:
(375)(1)(.030)(0.10) = 1.13 n (13)
Additional weight per fastener = 0.0043 ib
Number of fasteners = 375 n = 500 n
0.75
W = (500 n)(.OOh3) = 2.15 n
f
The strap area required and the resulting increase in structural weight are
calculated for a range of strap spacings from 4 in. to 20 in., employing
Equations I0, Ii, ]2, 13 and 14; calculations are summarized in Table 8-5.
A plot of the resulting structural weight increase is given in Figure 8-6.
It can be seen that minimum structural weight occurs at a strap spacing of
about 20 cm (8 in.); however, the curve is relatively flat and spacing can
be increased to the range of 30 cm (12 in.) to 36 cm (14 in.) with only a
modest penalty.
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Table 8-5 Crack-Arrest Strap Sizing and Structural
Weight Increase - Crew Cempartment
Strap
Spacing
b
(in.)
4
8
l0
12
14
16
18
20
No
of
Straps
n
45
22
18
15
13
Ii
I0
9
(z)i (2) (3)._
1.07 P/b _ I-_ Ask
(in.2)
.535
.39o
• 340
• 31o
.286
.267
.250
•240
•19 .175 .212 .120
.094 .255 .342 .240
•075 .300 .430 .3oo
.062 .36o .563 .36o
.054 .420 .725 .420
.047 .475 .9o5 .480
.0_2 .540 1.17 .540
.038 .630 1.70 .600
Ast Wst Wsk
(in'2 ) (ib) (ib)
Wf Wto t
(lb) (lb)
•017 46 51 97 19h
.054 72 25 47 144
.086 93 20 39 152
•135 121 17 32 170
•203 158 15 28 201
.290 192 12 2& 228
.420 252 ll 22 285
.680 367 i0 20 397
(i) _ = Stress intensity reduction factor
(2) P/b = Rivet pitch/strap spacing
(3) _ = Skin/strap relative stiffness parameter
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The above evaluation considers only the requirement of maintaining
structural integrity, i.e., preventing complete rupture of the crew compart-
ment with a significant crack present in the skin. This requirement is
adequate for conventional aircraft, which can quickly descend to a safe
altitude if such an event occurs and significant cabin leakage results.
However, the B-9U booster is constrained to follow a programmed flight path,
so that the problem of loss of cabin atmosphere may be equally as important
as preventing rupture of the compartment. This aspect of fail-safe design
requirements is investigated in the following sections.
8.3.3 Cabin Atmosphere Leakage
Experimental data on a specific configuration is probably required to
accurately define a relationship between crack length and effective leakage
area; however, for purposes of this study approximate relationships will be
developed using analysis and experimentally derived crack-opening displacement.
Normalized compliance expressions for center-cracked panels have been
developed as part of NR/SD fracture mechanics test effort. For panels of
inflrlte width, the compliance equation can be simplified to:
=[
whe re:
COD = measured opening displacement at center of crack
P/A = applied tension stress
E = modulus of elasticity of panel material
G = gauge length over which displacement is measured
a = crack half-length
The actual opening of the crack faces is desired, so the gauge length
approaches zero for this case, and the above equation may be simplified to:
where :
= 2#
= maximum crack opening, at center of crack.
If the crack faces are assumed to follow a sine wave deflection pattern, the
incremental area may be integrated with the following result for total area
of the crack opening:
A = 0.645#
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However, the crack faces probably tend to remain relatively parallel over
the mid-region, so the following estimated expression is used for crack
opening area:
In this case:
O- - 30,000 psi
E - 10.5 x 10 6 psi
- b (crack length assumed equal to strap spacing)
so that the expression for total crack opening area, considering that the
reference model is equivalent to two cracks of length b emanating from a
tear strap, may be written as:
A o .. 2 (1.60)(30,000) b 2 = 0.0092 b 2 (in. 2) (15)
(10.5)(lO6)
The above expression is based on linear displacement of a flat panel under
the action of in-plane tensile stresses. Because the actual model is a
portion of a cylindrical shell, which is subject to normal pressure loading
in addition to hoop stresses, it is possible that out-of-plane deflections
may occur which increase the effective leakage area. Def_ ctions normal to
the shell have been approximated for the case of a relatively long crack
(_ = 20 in.) by applying beam theory to a typical panel of skin with
integral stiffeners. The additional component of deflection in the opening
mode was found to be negligibly small ( 6'--_- 0.002 in.) for integral stiff-
eners sized to carry the normal pressure loading by beam action over the
length of the crack. However, the pressure loading on segments of the skin
between the crack face and the first longitudinal stiffener may cause local
skin distortions which could increase the effective leakage area but which
cannot be accurately predicted by theoretical analysis. Therefore, an
uncertainty factor, which varies linearly from 1.O for small cracks
(_ 4 in.) to 1.5 for long cracks (_ 20 in.) is applied to the crack-
opening area given by Equation 15.
The following basic assumptions are made to establish the framework for
detailed investigation of the impact of cabin atmosphere leakage on fail-
safe design requirements:
(i) The crew compartment is initially pressurized with air to
standard sea level conditions. A pressurized volume of
1200 cu ft is assumed.
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(2) The minimum cabin pressure for crew survival and adequate
performance is 7 psi; this is a cabin altitude of approximately
20,000 ft. It is assumed that the crew will don oxygen masks
during this emergency period.
(3) The period of time between the point in the ascent trajectory at
which a cabin skin failure could reasonably occur, and the point
at which the booster has descended to an altitude of 20,000 ft
after entry is 600 sec. Cabin atmosphere leakage will be consid-
ered over this maximum time period.
(4) Ambient pressure external to the crew compartment is assumed to
be zero for the entire time period defined above.
(5) An emergency pressurization system will be employed as required
to maintain a minimum cabin pressure of 7 psia.
With the simplifying assumption that cabin leakage is always to vacuum
conditions over the period of interest, the flow through the crack opening
area will be sonic, and the pressure at the orifice is related to the
compartment pressure by the constant relationship:
Po = 0.528 Pc (16)
where:
Po = pressure in free stream at orifice
Pc = compartment pressure
The gas temperatures in the orifice stream and the compartment are
related by the adiabatic equation:
TL PolTo
0.286
= Tc (o.528) = 0.84 Tc
0.286
(17)
The sonic velocity at the orifice .is a function of free-stream temperature
and is given by the equation:
C o = k g R T (18)
where:
C o = sonic velocity at orifice - ft/sec
k = gas constant = 1.4 for air
g = gravitational acceleration - 32.2 ft/sec 2
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R - universal gas constant = 53.3
T = absolute temperature - deg Rankine
so for this case:
Co - (19)
The free-stream gas density at the orifice is obtained from the fundamental
relationship:
Po (20)W O = __
RTo
The normalized flow rate (mass flow per unit area) is then obtained as the
product of velocity and density:
a/A - Co Wo (21)
where:
G
A =
C O =
w 0 ,,
= mass flow - lb/sec
effective crack-opening orifice area - ft 2
flow velocity - ft/sec
flow density - lb/ft 3
However, as leakage occurs, the air remaining in the compartment will expand
by adiabatic processes, which changes the initial reservoir conditions used
to find the free-stream properties at the orifice. The key relationships are
expressed by:
Tc 2 Pc2
= Tcl _ c I I Pc2 I 0.286= Tc2 p c I
w = P c2
c2 (23)
RTc 2
(22)
The cabin atmosphere properties and resulting normalized mass flow rates
are calculated using Equations 16 through 23, for several values of cabin
pressure over the range of 14.7 psia to 7.0 psia, in Table 8-6. The time
required to depressurize from 14.7 psia to 7.0 psia can then be determined
in normalized form by numerical integration considering the change in cabin
atmosphere weight and the average normalized mass flow rate between each of
the pressure increments considered in Table 8-6. However, as the cabin
pressure decreases, the effective orifice area of the crack opening will also
decrease because of the reduced hoop stress. As indicated earlier in this
section, crack opening deflection is a linear function of applied stress, so
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this relationship can be used to correct for the change in orifice area at
each cabin pressure level.
equations:
This procedure can be represented by the
Ao G A_
Aj = Pi
A o 14.7
(24)
(25)
where:
Aw
G
= depressurization time (sec.)
= increment of change in cabin atmosphere weight (ib)
= normalized mass flow rate (lb/ft 2 - sec)
A i = effective orifice area for increment considered
Ao = original orifice area at full cabin pressure
These calculations are also conducted in Table 8-6; numerical integration
of Equation 24 yields a normalized depressu_Ization time (14.7 psla to 7.0
psia) of 1.52 ft2-sec. The actual time to depressurlze is obtained by
dividing this value by the original orifice area. This area is a function
of the strap spacing and is obtained from Equation 15 and the estimated
factor to account for local skin distortion. If the depressurlzatlon time
is greater than 600 sec, no pressure make-up system is required. If the
time is less than this value, the required weight of pressurization gas can
be obtained by multiplying the mass flow rate at 7.0 psia cabin pressure
by the time over which presurlzatlon must be provided. A total system
weight of 2.8 x weight of stored gas has been estimated from preliminary
analyses. This factor is based on a 2000 psi stored gas system using Ti-6Al-hV
receivers designed to a burst factor of 2.0. Depressurlzation times, weights
of make-up gas, and total pressurization system weights are calculated in
Table 8-7 for crack-arrest strap spacings of 4 in. to 20 in. The resulting
pressurization system weight (including weight of stored gas) and the total
of structural and system weight increase is plotted in Figure 8-6.
8.3.4 Design Evaluation
It can be seen from Figure 8-6 that a cabin pressure make-up system is
required for strap spacings greater than about 15 cm (6 in.), and the weight
of this system increases rapidly for strap spacings beyond 25 cm (lO in.) to
30 cm (19 in.). For a strap spacing of 25 cm (lO in.), a total weight
increase of 190 kg (260 lb) is calculated for the structural reinforcements
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Table 8-7 Depressurization Time and Pressure System
Weight - Crew Compartment Atmosphere Leakage
Strap
Spac ing
b
(in.)
4
6
7
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
(1)
k
0
1.O
1. o5
i.07
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.5
2
• 0092b
(in. 2)
.147
• 332
.450
• 590
• 920
1.33
A (2)
O
(in.2) I (ft 2)
•147 .00102
•350 .00242
.480 .00334
.650 .00450
1.12 .oo78
i.73 .0120
¢(3)
(sec)
1470
625
455
338
195
126
n¢
(see)
O
O
145
262
4O5
474
0(4)
(ib/sec)
.Ohl
.055
•096
•148
1.80
2.36
2.96
3.68
2.52
3.54
4.44
5.5o
•0175
•0246
.0308
•0382
87
62
5O
4O
513
538
55O
56O
.215
•302
.378
•470
w(5)
gas
(lb)
0
0
6
14.5
39
7O
Ii0
162
208
263
Wsys
(lb)
0
0
17
41
109
196
3O8
454
582
737
(i) Estimated factor for increased orifice area due to local skin distortions
(2) Orifice area under maximum cabin pressure
(3) Time to depressurize from 14.7 psia to 7.0 psia
(h) G = [+_" [_° ] A° = 25"8p = 7.0 [__]7.0 Ao = 12.3 AO
(5) Weight of make-up gas to maintain cabin pressure of 7.0 psia.
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and pressure make-up system. This indicates that fail-safe design concepts,
including consideration of cabin atmosphere leakage, are feasible for the
crew compartment, but the associated weight increase may be in the order of
15 percent of the basic structural weight for this assembly.
More detailed investigation would be required to determine, for an
actual design application, if strap spacing should be selected to eliminate
the need for a make-up pressurization system. The additional manufacturing
costs for the structure would have to be weighed against cost and reliability
considerations of the emergency pressurization system. In any event,
representative tests should be performed to more accurately determine effect-
ive orifice area as a function of crack length. The study has shown this
to be a very critical parameter, and it was necessary to make a number of
assumptions to approximate this relationship for the present evaluation.
Another factor of possible concern is that the riveted attachment of
the crack-arrest straps to the compartment skins introduces several thousand
potential leak sources. However, it is believed that good design practice,
perhaps supplemented by auxiliary sealing provisions, can maintain normal
compartment leakage within acceptable limits. For example, on several S-II
stages mechanical Joints were introduced in the LH 2 tank because of rework
or repair requirements. These Joints were covered by aluminum foll seals
bonded to the structure with a suitable cryogenic adhesive. Leakage during
tanking, static firing, and prelaunch was monitored. Leakage was within
acceptable limits, and negligible in most cases. Sealing against liquid
hydrogen leakage is obviously a much more difficult problem than that of
sealing a compartment against leakage of air at normal environmental
tempe ratu re s.
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8._ FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS - LR2 TANK
Application of fail-safe design approach to large, welded integral
propellant tanks, such as the B-gU liquid hydrogen tank, intuitively appears
to be impractical. A limited fail-safe capability may be possible by
developing a "leak-before-break" failure mode for initial surface flaws of
reasonable aspect ratio. The larger task of providing crack-arrest reinforce-
ment to contain a through crack of significant length without rupture would
appear to be prohibitively heavy. This intuitive appraisal has been verified
in analyses conducted by General Dynamics Convair and reported in Reference
31. The following section presents a brief summary of these results.
There is, however, one detail aspect of fail-safe design that is
believed to have practical significance for this type of application. This
concerns the design of circumferential weld lands on a pressure vessel so as
to preclude the propagation of a transverse crack in the weld nugget through
the adjacent parent metal. Detailed investigation of this subject is presented
in Section 8.4.2.
8.4.1 Cylindrical Shell
The analyses of Reference 31 investigated the use of graphite/epoxy
crack-arrest straps bonded to the aluminum skin of both L0X and LH 2 tanks
of the B-gu booster. A strap cross-section 2.5 cm (1.0 in.) thick × 7.6 cm
(3.0 in.)was assumed for the LH 2 tank. Strap spacings of 46 cm (18 in.) and
92 cm (36 in. ) were investigated. The straps were treated as integral
stiffeners and stress intensity reduction factors determined from appropriate
curves of Reference 23 were used in the analyses. Results showed that for
a strap spacing of 46 cm (18 in.), and assuming a through crack of that
length, the allowable hoop stress in the skin was only about llO MN/m 2 (16 ksi)
and the corresponding additional strap weight was approximately 7700 kg (17,000
lb). The additional skin _eight required to reduce the stress level from 300
MN/m 2 (44 ksi) to 110 MN/m z (16 ksi) would be approximately 16,000 kg (35,000
lb). Therefore, the total weight penalty would be in the order of 23,700 kg
(52,000 lb). This is obviously not a tolerable weight increase. Another
factor of practical concern is that the leakage of a cryogenic propellant
from a through crack of the size considered would probably be a disastrous
situation in itself.
8.4.2 Circumferential Weld Lands
Transverse cracks across a weld suggest, due to weld shrinkage strains,
are one of the most common forms of weld defect. Because of the high
incidence of this type of flaw it would be desirable to design the weld
Joint to prevent such a crack from propagating through the adjacent parent
metal of the weld land at limit stress. The feasibility and potential
weight penalty of this approach is investigated in this section.
For a cylindrical pressure vessel, the circumferential welds are most
highly stressed in a direction parallel to the weld and hence are the most
critical regions in which to consider the presence of transverse cracks.
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Weld lands with about twice the thickness of basic skin are typically
selected for aluminum alloy pressure vessels. For the present example of
the B-9U LH2 tank, the basic skin thickness is 0.305 cm (0.120 In.) and a
weld land thickness of 0.635 cm (0.250 in.) is assumed. The other properties
of the LH 2 tank shell are illustrated in Figure 6-4.
The fail-safe design of the weld Joint may involve adjustment of two
variables, (i) controlling the width of weld bead to limit the length of
transverse crack and (2) adjusting the width of the weld land to modify the
net hoop stress applied to the crack tip. Therefore, a parametric
investigation is conducted to define the net hoop stress as a function of
tank pressure and weld land width and to define critical stress as a
function of weld bead width. The transverse crack is assumed to be completely
through the thickness and across the width of the weld bead for purposes
of this study.
The circumferential weld land acts as a small ring frame in the tank
shell and tends to reduce the hoop stress below the general stress field
for the skin because of the additional area. The variation of net hoop
stress at the center of the weld land with weld land width is investigated
using the "Shell of Revolution" computer program. A range of weld land
widths from 7.6 cm (3.0 in.) to 25.4 cm (I0 in.) is considered. The weld
land is assumed to be located midway between typical stability frames
(see Figure 6-4). Applied loading and tank pressure used in the analysis
are :
p = .172 MN/m 2 (25.0 psig)
Nx = -.870 MN/m (-5000 ib/in.)
The compression axial load case is the most critical because of Polsson
effects which tend to increase the hoop stress in the weld land compared
to the skin. Results for the above loading condition and the previously
described shell geometry are summarized below:
Weld Land Width Hoop Stress
(cm) (in. ) (MN/m 2) (ksi)
7.6 3.0 262 38.0
12.7 5.o 249 36. i
17.8 7. o 237 34.4
25.4 I0.0 222 32.3
The limit design pressure varies from about 0.152 MN/m 2 ( 22 psig) to
0.172 MN/m 2 (25 psig) over the length of the LH 2 tank. The hoop stresses
at other pressures for a given weld land width are approximated from the
following equation, which provides allowance for Poisson effects:
= % - 8o l- 9o
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where:
Po = reference pressure used in analysis
_o = hoop stress determined in analysis for reference
conditions
[_ = hoop stress resulting from tank pressure Pi
This relationship is used to define the family of curves showing the
relationship between hoop stress and weld land width for various values of
tank pressure, plotted in Figure 8-7.
Critical stress for the transverse crack is determined from the basic
equation for stress intensity at the tip of a through crack:
KI = U"_J--_---a
where:
KI _ KIc = 32.6 MN/m 3/2 (30 ksi _-.)
a = 0.5 x weld bead width.
Critical hoop stress for a range of weld bead widths is also plotted in Figure
8-7. It can be seen that the critical stress, and the resulting required weld
land width, is quite sensitive to the width of the weld bead. For conventional
MIG or TIG welds in aluminum alloys, the weld bead width is typically about
1.5 x material thickness. A current NR/SD welding specification permits a
maximum weld bead width of 2.5 t for t = 0.20 in., reducing to 2.0 t for
t = 0.50 in.
Considering the maximum limit pressure of 0.172 MN/m 2 (25 psig) and a
minimum practical _eld land width of 7.6 cm (3.0 in. ), the applied hoop
stress is 262 MN/m (38 ksi) and a weld bead width of 1.07 cm (0.42 in.) is
fail-safe. This width is about 1.7 x thickness, so the nominal case
(bw _ 1.5 t) is satisfactory with minimum weld land width.
To further explore the potential impact of this fail-safe requirement
on tank weight and/or welding specification limits on bead width, a maximum
bead width of 1.27 cm (0.5 in.), which is twice the weld land thickness, is
assumed and the effect of various residual strength factors on weld land
weight are evaluated. It is assumed that the LH2 tank will be fabricated
from 15 cylindrical segments, so that 14 circumferential weld lands exist
over the length of the tank. Of this total, eight weld lands are subjected
to a tank pressure of 0.154 MN/m 2 (22.4 psig) and six are assumed to be
loaded by an average tank pressure of 0.165 MN/m 2 (24.0 psig). A minimum
practical weld land width of 7.6 cm (3.0 in.) is taken as the reference
from which to evaluate weight increase. A range of residual strength
factors from 1.O to 1.2 times limit load is investigated and.results are
summarized in Table 8-8.
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Table 8-8 LH2 Tank Circumferential Weld Land
Fail-Safe Requirements
Parameter
Critical Stress
(b w- 0.5 in.)
p = 24 psig
(6 welds)
p = 22.4 psig
(8 welds)
(ksi)
b L (in.)
L (lb)
b
L (in.)
1.O
35.0
3.0
0
Residual Strength Factor
1.05
33.4
6.80
710
4.7
420
I.lO
31.8
9.00
1120
1.15
30.4
10.9
1470
8.7
1410
1.20
29.2
]2.8
183o
10.4
1830A% (lb)
Total (ib ) 354 1120 2060 2880 3660
Weight
Increase % Cyl. Shell O.53 1.6 3.I 4.3 5.5
b w
bL
AwL
- width of weld bead
- width of weld land
- additional weight of weld lands due to increased width
8.4.3 Design Evaluation
It has been shown that it is completely impractical to apply the type
of fail-safe design approach commonly used for Jet transport aircraft fuselage
structure to a large, welded, integral propellant tank, such as the B-gu LH2
tank. However, it does appear feasible to incorporate limited fail-safe provi-
sions in the design of uelded Joints. Proper design can prevent unstable
propagation of a transverse crack in the weld nugget across the adjacent
parent metal of the weld land under limit loading conditions. This design
approach may involve adjusting the width of weld land, limiting the maximum
width of weld bead, or a combination of these factors. Because of the high
incidence of this type of defect in typical welded structures, it is
recommended that this fail-safe design approach be applied wherever
practicable.
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A review of the results summarized in Table 8-8, for the specific example
of LH 2 tank circumferential welds, indicates a small weight penalty for
residual strength equal to limit load. However, the weight penalty increases
greatly as residual strength factor is increased. This suggests that
representative tests should be conducted for an actual design application to
verify what factor, if any, is required for reliable performance. Also,
modest reductions in allowable weld bead width will significantly increase
allowable hoop stresses and decrease the indicated weight penalty. This
illustrates the importance of reviewing welding processes and welding
specifications to ensure that efficient, but realistic, requirements are
specified.
The example analyzed in this study is for a tank designed to conventional
ultimate strength requirements. If proof test requirements cause an increase
in tank skin gauge, with corresponding reduction in limit operating stress,
the task of meeting present fail-safe requirements may be considerably less
d ifficu lt.
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9.0 CRITERIA EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Presented in this section are candidate design criteria that are
formulated to meet the objective of assuring the structural integrity of
Space Shuttle vehicles over their service lives. These criteria include
consideration of basic fatigue life assurance and both fail-safe and safe-
life approaches in damage tolerant design. A discussion of the rationale
leading to the candidate criteria is given, and the effects of these
criteria on the reference vehicle are evaluated. The evaluation covers a
range of service life requirements from lO0 missions to 500 missions. The
recommended criteria selected on the basis of these evaluations are summarized
as an integrated package. A comparison is made of the relative merits between
fail-safe and safe-life design approaches for applicable structural elements.
Factors considered in the evaluation of candidate criteria include the
effect on structural weight, in-service inspection frequency, and the type of
NDE techniques required for both production line and in-service inspections.
To make a quantitative evaluation of the effects of candidate safe-life
criteria on structural weight, it is necessary to establish an initial flaw
size to serve as the starting point for the crack growth analyses. This
assumed flaw size is dependent on the specific NDE techniques applied during
production line or in-service inspections and their associated capabilities
for reliable detection of flaws of the type and location of interest. In
actual practice during a hardware program this will require very close
scrutiny of all pertinent aspects of inspection of a given structural com-
ponent to define specific flaw detection capabilities. These aspects will
include the type of NDE technique selected, the detail structural configura-
tion and material, surface condition of the part, the possible type and
location of defects, and the accessibility for inspection. In many cases
the actual flaw detection capability will have to be verified by representa-
tive tests. This depth of investigation is obviously beyond the scope of
the present study; however, it is necessary to define representative capa-
bilities for flaw detection to permit a realistic assessment of the effect of
safe-life criteria on the reference vehicle. Therefore, the first portion
of this section is concerned with a review of NDE techniques that are within
present state-of-the-art and are applicable to Space Shuttle structure. The
NDE techniques, equipment and facilities required, and limitations on
application are described. A preliminary selection of the most appropriate
techniques and inspection points for the reference structural elements is
discussed. Generalized flaw detection capabilities for the primary techniques
are summarized; this definition is based on a combination of literature survey,
prior SD experience, and results to date of verification tests being accom-
plished by NR LAD under the B-I program.
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9.1 NDE TECHNIQUES AND CAPABILITIES
Presented in the following sections are brief summaries describing the
types of currently available NDE methods applicable to Space Shuttle elements;
the facilities and supporting equipment required to apply these methods; and
a preliminary assessment of the flaw detection capabilities of the various
NDE techniques. This evaluation of detection capabilities is used as the
basis to evaluate the impact of safe-life design requirements on the selected
structural elements of the B-9U booster and to compare safe-life and fail-
safe design approaches.
9.1.1 Basic NDE Techniques and Associated Equipment and Facility Requirements
The basic types of NDE methods applicable to Space Shuttle structural
elements are described below. A summary of the equipment and facilities
required to apply these methods is given in Table 9-1. Additional considera-
tions for application of these methods to in-service inspection of Space
Shuttle are also summarized in this table.
Visual/Optical Inspection
Visual inspection, the most elementary method for detecting surface
cracks, relies on the illumination of the object and the examination of the
surface with the eye. To improve visual inspection, optical aids such as
mirrors, microscopes, and borescopes (fiber and rod optics) can be utilized
to provide magnification and direct viewing conditions.
Penetrant Inspection
As an extension of visual inspection, the liquid penetrant method is
capable of detecting smaller surface cracks beyond the scope of the visual
technique. The penetrant method depends on the ability of an applied low
viscosity, low surface tension liquid to penetrate the surface crack by
capillary action. Excess penetrant is removed and an absorbent material
developer is applied to enhance the indications. Penetrants containing
fluorescent dyes are generally viewed with black light to find surface cracks.
Ultrasonic Inspection
Ultrasonic methods use low energy, high frequency mechanical vibrations
(sound waves) which are produced by a transducer (piezoelectric element) and
transmitted into the part by a couplant material at the transducer part
interface. A change in acoustic properties is detectable due to cracks
(surface or internal) which reflect and/or scatter the sound energy. The
reflected waves generate a received signal which is amplified and displayed
on a cathode ray tube.
Eddy Current Inspection
The eddy current method involves a coil carrying a high frequency
alternating current, which is brought into the vicinity of an electrical
conductor and thereby induces eddy currents in the conductor. The magnetic
9-2
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Type of NDE
Technique
Optical
Fluorescent
Penetrant
Ultrasonic
Table 9-1. NDE Techniques and Associated Facility and
Facilities and Equipment Required
Portable Test Equipment:
Borescope, rod optics, flexible fiber optics,
cold light source, camera and viewing adapter.
Permanent Stationary Test Equipment:
Dip tanks; drain, rinse, developer, dryer and
black-light inspection stations. Large parts may
require spray booth facilities for penetrant and
developer application.
Portable Test Equipment:
Applicator kits, spray cans of penetrant and
developer, portable black-light source, pre-inspection
etching and neutralizing materials and applicators,
post-inspection cleaning and drying materials.
Permanent Stationary Test Equipment:
Immersion tank or couplant spray facility, bridge,
turntable, ultrasonic transducer and recorder.
Cleaning and drying facility.
Portable Test Equipment:
Portable ultrasonic transducers, couplant and
applicator, signal display and/or recorder, power and
instrumentation cables, post-inspection cleaning and
drying materials.
Eddy
Current
Radiographic
Portable Test Equipment:
Eddy current probe (test coils), signal display
and/or recorder, calibration test blocks.
Permanent Stationary Test Equipment:
Lead-lined room, dark room facilities, film processing
unit, X-ray unit (X-ray generator, 150 KV, 300 KV
tubes, headstand)
Portable Test Equipment:
150 KV X-ray tube, X-ray generator, headstand
150 KV rod anode tube, isotope and source guide.
Miscellaneous Support Equipment:
Collimators, cones, film casettes, positioning devices,
penetrameters, identification and orientation markers,
shielding materials, safety monitoring equipment (film
badges, dosimeters, etc.), high intensity film viewer.

EquipmentRequirements
_ Space DivisionNorth American Rockwell
Application to In-Service Inspection
_," , ill,., , .!,_
Applicability limited only by accessibility for
inspection. Permanent fiber optics installations may
be considered for local critical regions.
Most inspections will be performed in place (on board
vehicle) and will utilize portable test equipment.
Some inspections on removed components may be conducted
using permanent maintenance base facilities.
Adequate post-inspection cleaning and drying must be
accomplished. Limited access.and potential entrapment
of fluids in Joints may curtail usage.
Limited access may curtail usage. Fasteners must be
removed to detect cracks from edge of fastener holes
unless they extend beyond head of fastener.
In-place (on board vehicle) inspections will utilize
portable radiographic equipment. Because of high cost,
inspection time, and necessary safety precautions, such
inspections will probably be limited to selected local
areas.
Radiographic inspection of removed components may be
conducted using permanent maintenance base facilities.
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field generated by the flow of the eddy current will be interrupted or
changed by cracks. This change, which affects the induced currents and
magnetic field produced, is detectable. An indicating device (ammeter or
oscilloscope) across the test coil or probe is utilized to measure the
magnetic field variations. Instrument sensitivity to small cracks requires
frequent calibration to maximize response and minimize the effect of lift-off
or any variations between the probe and surface of the part.
Radiographic Inspection
The radiographic method is based on the ability of X-ray, gamma, beta
or neutron radiation sources to penetrate a material, with the intensity of
transmitted radiation proportional to the effective density of the material.
Internal cracks or voids are revealed because of the local change in effective
density they cause and consequent image they produce on the radiographic film.
The detectable size of defects is directly influenced BY material thickness.
Maximum sensitivity is obtained when the crack orientation (longest dimension)
is parallel to the direction of radiation.
Acoustic Emission
The acoustic emission method involves the observation of a sound pulse
or elastic wave generated in a solid material when the material deforms.
The audible and inaudible (ultrasonic) signals or acoustic signatures are
detected by high sensitivity sensors, amplified, and recorded. Although the
technique is not applicable to static detection of cracks, crack growth
during structural loading generally involves sufficient release of energy
to produce detectable signals. The primary application of this method would
be during proof test of items such as propellant tanks and pressure vessels.
Acoustic emissions would be monitored during the test to identify any
indications of crack propagation and to obtain approximate locations of
acoustic emission sources. This concept also has the potential for develop-
ment as a continuous monitoring system for selected structural regions during
operational service.
It is believed that considerably more development and application
experience is required before this type of system can be used as a primary
inspection method, replacing more conventional NDE techniques. Therefore,
it is not included in the baseline of NDE techniques and capabilities used
to establish specific safe-life design requirements. However, it is recom-
mended that strong consideration be given to the use of such a system as a
supplementary inspection approach during proof testing of Space Shuttle
pressure vessels.
9.1.2 Application of NDE Techniques to Reference Structural Elements
Summarized in the following sections are the results of a preliminary
assessment to determine which NDE techniques are most suitable for inspection
of each of the reference structural elements, considering the individual
characteristics of material, design configuration and associated fabrication
processes. The most appropriate in-process inspection points during the
fabrication and assembly phase are identified in general terms. Possible
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methods for periodic inspection of the structural members during operational
service are discussed and limitations or constraints on the application of
these methods are described.
Fabrication and Assembly
Ultrasonic inspection will be performed on raw material of thick product
form, such as extrusions for wing spar caps and plates for propellant tank
skin/stringer panels, to detect internal voids or cracks.
Visual and penetrant inspection will be used to detect surface cracks
on detail parts after significant machining or forming operations. Wing
spar caps, frame caps, and integral stiffened skin panels for the propellant
tanks will be inspected in this manner.
Fastener holes in critical regions of thick sections, such as wing spar
and fuselage frame caps, will be inspected after drilling. Visual and
penetrant inspection will be used for those parts which are "destacked"
and individually accessible after the drilling operation.
For Joints which must remain assembled after the drilling operations,
and penetrant entrapment or contamination becomes a problem, the eddy current
method will be used for inspection of the fastener holes.
A combination of visual, penetrant, and radiographic inspection will be
made of the fusion weld Joints in the propellant tank and crew compartment
assembly. Visual inspection is made immediately after welding and is
primarily to verify that the weld bead is properly centered on the Joint
and that lack of fusion does not exist. Penetrant and radiographic inspection
will be performed after the weld bead build-up is machined flush with the
surrounding parent metal of the weld Joint. Surface etching will precede
the penetrant inspection to remove any smeared metal that may obscure detection
of surface cracks. These operations are normally performed before the
assembly is removed from the weld tooling, so that any required weld repairs
may be readily accomplished. It is anticipated that penetrant and radio-
graphic inspection of welds will also be performed after proof test of the
crew compartment or propellant tank assemblies.
Post-assembly inspection of mechanical Joints will rely primarily on
visual/optical methods_ borescope and rod and fiber optics will be used in
close-out areas which limited access for visual inspection. Penetrant and
ultrasonic methods, using portable equipment, may be used on a limited basis
for selected areas.
Operational Service
During operational service, the application of nondestructive evaluation
methods will rely on the accessibility of the structural element. To
expose the critical location and surface of some of the reference structural
elements, some disassembly may be required and in other areas removal of the
thermal protective system will be necessary.
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In the wing area, limited access through inspection panels and engine
cavities restricts primary nondestructive evaluation to visual examination
of spar caps using rod and flexible fiber optics, with optical magnification
and cold light source. Any unusual deformation of spar cap structure,
fastener damage, and the existence of visible cracks in the spar caps, or
in the vicinity of fastener holes, will be ascertained. Ultrasonic or eddy
current methods may be used to evaluate or verify the structural condition
in a suspect region. Removal of fasteners is required for use of eddy
current methods to detect cracks which do not extend beyond the fastener
head.
These methods are of value for inspection of local critical or suspect
areas, but are probably too costly and time-consuming to be considered for
application to entire structural areas during periodic in-service inspection.
The preceding description is also applicable to inspection of major
fuselage frames, but it will generally be necessary to remove external TPS
panels to obtain access for application of NDE techniques. It is obviously
desirable to avoid imposing a requirement for frequent removal and replace-
ment of TPS panels; therefore, a safe-life equal to the entire service life
appears to be an appropriate design requirement for these members.
In-service inspection of the LH2 tank is difficult because of lack of
accessibility. The interior surface is covered with foam type insulation
and the exterior surface of cylindrical walls is shrouded by the TPS.
Therefore, in-service inspection will probably be limited to local regions
that are suspect problem areas. Local removal of internal insulation or
TPS panels is required for visual, penetrant, ultrasonic, or radiographic
inspection. The L02 tank is considerably more accessible because internal
insulation is not required. Penetrant and ultrasonic inspection can be
performed directly on the interior surface. Local removal of TPS panels
may be necessary for placement of film or radiation source to accomplish
radiographic inspection.
Limited access is available to the external and internal surfaces of
the crew compartment. In-service inspection will depend primarily on visual
methods, supplemented by periodic leak checks. Penetrant and ultrasonic
methods, using portable equipment, may be used to good advantage in local
areas. Access is generally available for radiographic inspection of welds,
but because of cost, inspection time, and necessary safety precautions,
this method would not be recommended for regular periodic inspection.
The critical flaw size in vertical stabilizer skins is sufficiently
large that visual inspection methods should be adequate. Limited inspection
of stabilizer root fittings and attachments is possible by rod and fiber
optics through access holes and inspection ports.
9.1.3 NDE Capabilities
The flaw detection capabilities of any given NDE technique are, at best,
difficult to define precisely. Capabilities and reliability may be influenced
by many detail factors such as material, surface finish, protective coatings,
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geometric complexity, etc. Detail considerations of this nature are
obviously beyond the scope of the present study; however, it is necessary
to establish some general bounds that will serve as a realistic basis to
evaluate the effect of candidate safe-life criteria on design configuration,
operating stresses, and associated structural weight. A review of currently
available literature regarding NDE capabilities (References 32, 33 and 3_)
and of the results to date of NR LAD qualification tests on NDE techniques
to be applied to the B-I program has been made. Results of this review are
reflected in the estimated curves of "design values" for reliable detection
of crack-like flaws summarized in Figure 9-1. Individual curves are given
for the NDE techniques of interest. The curves are applicable to the most
common case of a crack partially through the thickness of material, and
attempt to provide a reasonable estimate of interaction between crack length
and crack depth as it affects detectability. For example, if crack depth
increases, the minimum detectable length probably decreases. On the other
#I_ Space DivisionNorth American Rockwell
structure and equal to the entire aircraft service life for structure that
is not inspectable. A suitable safety factor to account for fatigue scatter
is applied.
Maintenance, refurbishment, and pre-flight checkout plans for Space
Shuttle are not presently developed to a level of detail that permits
defining a specific inspection interval for use as part of the fail-safe
design criteria. It is probable that this interval may be adjusted somewhat
to avoid undue structural weight penalties, but it is postulated that inspection
intervals more frequent than every i0 missions would be undesirable. The
primary factor to consider in setting fail-safe design requirements for
Space Shuttle is the level of residual strength required after failure of
a single principal element. The current Air Force approach requires that
the residual strength be equal to or more than limit load or maximum spectrum
load, whichever is greater. This approach is rational if very high confidence
is held that any given structure will exhibit at least the design strength
level, or if the basic design loads are considered to be rather conservative,
such that some allowance for strength variations is inherently provided.
However, if the premise is adopted that realistic limit loads will be defined
for Space Shuttle, then some factor of safety applied to limit load to define
the required residual strength level appears to be desirable. A number of
the potential critical design conditions for shuttle structure result from
planned operation of the vehicle within rather narrowly controlled limits.
Examples are thrust and inertia forces and tank pressures during ascent,
entry maneuvers, etc. Therefore, the probability of encountering flight
conditions that approach limit design cases is considerably higher for Space
Shuttle than for conventional aircraft.
Selection of a structural factor of safety is always somewhat arbitrary
and subject to individual Judgment--validation of the selection usually
depends on demonstration by satisfactory service experience. A basic factor
of safety of I.i is proposed to account for possible variation in strength
between vehicles due to material properties, workmanship and prior service
experience. However, it is also necessary to consider the potential
inaccuracies associated with the basic structural design and analysis. Fail-
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9.2 EVALUATION OF DESIGN CRITERIA
9.2.1 Fatigue Life Criteria
The current Air Force approach to ensure adequate fatigue life of
operational aircraft involves a scatter factor of h.0 to be used in analysis
and test if an average service load spectrum is employed. Typical or
"best-fit" S-N data are used in the fatigue analysis. The scatter factor
of h.0 is probably somewhat arbitrary and, at best, only an approximate
allowance for the variability in specimen and component fatigue test results.
However, it is beyond the scope of the present study to attempt a more
rigorous evaluation of fatigue life criteria. The Air Force approach has
become widely accepted and appears to provide generally satisfactory results.
Therefore, it is recommended that it be adopted as the basic fatigue life
criteria to be applied to all primary structure of the Space Shuttle.
The results of the fatigue analyses conducted in this study indicate
that the above fatigue life design criteria should not result in significant
weight increase to Space Shuttle structure. The wing spar caps are the only
structural elements of the reference group in which fatigue life requirements
dictated a reduction in operating stresses below the level established by
static strength design requirements. For the basic 100 mission service life
requirement used as a ground rule in this study, the increase in structural
weight was about hSO kg (1000 lb). This is only about 0.h percent of the
structural weight of the total vehicle. It should be noted that the current
Space Shuttle Phase C RFP indicates a 500 mission service life to be a
design objective. This will, of course, increase the significance of fatigue
considerations in the design and development of Space Shuttle structure.
Detailed fatigue analyses based on a 500 mission service life requirement
have not been performed in this study; however, an approximate evaluation
can be made by considering the characteristics of the S-N curves in the
stress and load ratio ranges where greatest damage is incurred. A reduction
in limit design stress to 360 MN/m 2 (52 ksi) is estimated in this manner to
satisfy a 500 mission fatigue life for the wing spar caps. The corresponding
weight increase is about 1800 kg (h000 lb), which represents 1.5 percent of
the dry weight of the reference vehicle. Of course, the actual impact of
the fatigue life requirements will be strongly influenced by the detail
structural configuration of the selected design. The wing design for the
B-9U reference vehicle involves concentrated spar caps which carry all of
the spanwise bending loads. The cover skins are corrugated in the chordwise
direction and are ineffective as bending material for spanwise loading.
The spar caps are heavy, compact sections with allowable ultimate static
strength approaching the material tensile ultimate or compressive yield
stresses. Therefore, an efficient static strength design requires relatively
high operating stresses in the spar caps. On the other hand, if the wing
structural box were designed with distributed, stiffened covers as the
primary elements to resist spanwise bending loads, the allowable static
stresses would generally be significantly reduced by plate and column buckling
considerations. Because of the inherent lower operating stresses for this
type of structure, the effect of fatigue life requirements on the design
would be significantly reduced. This is illustrated by the fatigue analysis
results for the B-9U vertical stabilizer, which represents the latter type of
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design configuration. The analysis predicts a safe fatigue life of approxi-
mately 2200 missions for the static strength design; it is apparent that a
500 mission service life requirement will not impose any significant weight
increase on the vertical stabilizer.
The fatigue analyses also indicate that the integral propellant tanks,
based on static strength design, would not have a 500 mission safe fatigue
life. However, the estimated effective stress concentration factor used in
these analyses is quite conservative for the general tank structure. The
500 mission service life requirement will necessitate closer attention to
detail design of Joints, attachments, and integral reinforcements in the
tank walls to ensure satisfactory fatigue life, but the resulting weight
increase should be relatively minor.
The preceding discussions lead to the conclusion that the B-9U reference
vehicle represents a conservative baseline from which to evaluate the effects
of fatigue life requirements on Space Shuttle structural design. It is
further concluded that the proposed safe fatigue life criteria can be
accommodated without unacceptable weight increase; weight increases of
approximately 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent of the vehicle total structural
weight are estimated for the 100 mission and 500 mission service life
requirements, respectively.
9.2.2 Fail-Safe Design Criteria
Recent experience with new operational aircraft has rather dramatically
illustrated that conventional fatigue design requirements and verification
test programs may not be adequate by themselves to prevent premature fracture
of aircraft primary structure. It is recognized that, despite fatigue life
assurance efforts, undetected flaws or damage can exist in primary structure
at some time during the life of the aircraft. The Air Force is currently
attempting to cope with this problem by requiring damage tolerant design
concepts to be applied in critical areas of the primary structure. The
damage tolerance concepts may be of either the "fail-safe" or "safe-life"
(slow crack growth) categories. Application of these design approaches,
in conjunction with an overall fracture control program which will provide
assurance of adequate material fracture properties, inspection techniques,
development and verification tests, and operational practices, is first
being implemented from the inception of an aircraft design on the B-1 program.
Historical experience shows that such design approaches and controls are
necessary precautions to assure the structural integrity of Space Shuttle
vehicles. Therefore, the question is not whether such approaches should be
applied, but rather what specific criteria is appropriate for Space Shuttle.
Current criteria for fail-safe design on the B-I program requires that
complete failure of a single principal structural element will not result
in catastrophic failure or inability to operate the airplane under limit
load conditions before a suitable inspection is performed. The inspection
interval compatible with this approach is based on the degree of inspecta-
bility of the structure. In specific application to the B-l, a fatigue life
of remaining structure (after failure of a single principal element) equal
to one-fourth of the aircraft service life is required for readily inspectable
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structure and equal to the entire aircraft service life for structure that
is not inspectable. A suitable safety factor to account for fatigue scatter
is applied.
Maintenance, refurbishment, and pre-flight checkout plans for Space
Shuttle are not presently developed to a level of detail that permits
defining a specific inspection interval for use as part of the fail-safe
design criteria. It is probable that this interval may be adjusted somewhat
to avoid undue structural weight penalties, but it is postulated that inspection
intervals more frequent than every i0 missions would be undesirable. The
primary factor to consider in setting fail-safe design requirements for
Space Shuttle is the level of residual strength required after failure of
a single principal element. The current Air Force approach requires that
the residual strength be equal to or more than limit load or maximum spectrum
load, whichever is greater. This approach is rational if very high confidence
is held that any given structure will exhibit at least the design strength
level, or if the basic design loads are considered to be rather conservative,
such that some allowance for strength variations is inherently provided.
However, if the premise is adopted that realistic limit loads will be defined
for Space Shuttle, then some factor of safety applied to limit load to define
the required residual strength level appears to be desirable. A number of
the potential critical design conditions for shuttle structure result from
planned operation of the vehicle within rather narrowly controlled limits.
Examples are thrust and inertia forces and tank pressures during ascent,
entry maneuvers, etc. Therefore, the probability of encountering flight
conditions that approach limit design cases is considerably higher for Space
Shuttle than for conventional aircraft.
Selection of a structural factor of safety is always somewhat arbitrary
and subject to individual Judgment--validation of the selection usually
depends on demonstration by satisfactory service experience. A basic factor
of safety of 1.1 is proposed to account for possible variation in strength
between vehicles due to material properties, workmanship and prior service
experience. However, it is also necessary to consider the potential
inaccuracies associated with the basic structural design and analysis. Fail-
safe investigations conducted in this study have illustrated that complete
verification of fail-safe capabilities by test may not always be practical.
For example, consider the case of a fail-safe wing design in which complete
failure of an individual spar cap is tolerated by providing sufficient
redundancy and strength in the remaining spars to carry the specified load-
ings without failure. Design of the spars to accomplish this goal depends
on rather complex analyses to predict the influence of failure of one spar
cap on the internal load distributions and resulting design loads in adjacent
spars. The presumed initial failure may reasonably occur at many possible
locations along each of the spar caps. Under these conditions it may not
be practical to completely verify by test that the required fail-safe capa-
bility exists in the structure because of the multiplicity of possible
damage situations that must be considered. Therefore, it is recommended
that the residual strength criteria for fail-safe design be specified in
two categories, depending on whether test verification of residual strength
is accomplished. A factor of safety of 1.2 is proposed for the case in
which crack arrest and residual strength is not verified by test, so as to
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provide additional allowance for uncertainties and inaccuracies that may be
present in the analysis and design procedures. A summary of structural
weight increase as a function of residual strength factor of safety is given
in Table 9-2 for those elements where a fail-safe design approach is feasible
and of practical interest, It can be seen that for the elements considered
Table 9-2. Structural Weight Increases for Fail-Safe Design Approach
Structural Element
Wing spar caps
Vertical stabilizer
skins
Crew compartment
skin (2)
Total
Percent of total
vehicle structural
weight
Weight Increase (1)
F.S. = 1.0 F.S. = 1.1 F.S. = 1.2
(kg) (ib) (kg) (ib) (kg) (ib)
495 1090
77 170
82 180
654 1440
0.53
365 805
77 170
77 170
519 1145
710
90
88
888
0.42
1570
2OO
195
1965
0.73
(1)Increase above structural weight required to satisfy basic static
strength or fatigue life requirements.
(2)Based on crack-arrest strap spacing of 30 cm (12 in.).
the total difference in weight between a residual strength factor of safety
of 1.0 and 1.2 is less than 400 kg (800 lb). If all of the indicated fail-
safe options are incorporated on the B-9U vehicle, the increase in weight is
approximately 0.7 percent of the total vehicle structural weight for a factor
of safety of 1.2 on residual strength. (The potential weight increase of
propellant tanks to provide fail-safe design of weld lands is not included
in this summary because the actual weight penalty, if any, will be highly
dependent on the proof test approach and proof factors selected for the tanks.
Also, this fail-safe concept is really an optional consideration that may be
pursued in addition to the basic safe-life design requirements for the tanks.)
There are undoubtedly additional structural elements beyond those considered
in this study for which the fail-safe design approach would be applicable and
may contribute to a total structural weight increase. On the other hand,
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test verification of fail-safe capability may be feasible, or the inherent
residual strength may approach 120 percent of limit load in a number of
cases (the multi-element fail-safe concept for wing spar caps is an example).
Therefore, it is estimated that fail-safe design to the proposed criteria
will result in less than one percent increase in structural weight of the
Space Shuttle vehicle. This is considered to be an acceptable performance
compromise to achieve the additional confidence in structural integrity
provided by the fail-safe design approach and associated criteria.
Another factor which merits specific attention in the fail-safe design
approach is the potential effect of failure of a single principal structural
element on the performance of other systems. There are some aspects of
Space Shuttle that impose additional restrictions beyond what would be
encountered in a conventional aircraft. For example, the integrity of the
thermal protection system is of critical importance to assure safe entry.
The TPS for the B-9U reference vehicle is basically an outer matallic shell
supported from the primary structure in a manner to minimize restraint to
differential thermal expansion. Failure of a single principal element of
primary structure would probably have little effect on the integrity of this
type of TPS. However, a thermal protection system employing reusable external
insulation bonded to the primary structure, such as is presently considered
for shuttle orbiter, might be much more seriously affected by a failure in
the substructure. Cracking or debonding of a portion of insulation as a
result of spar cap or skin plank fracture could have catastrophic consequences
during entry. Therefore, development and verification tests would be required
in this type of situation to assure that failure of a single principal
element of primary structure would not impair the functional integrity of
the TPS. Another example of this type of potential interaction is given by
the investigation of fail-safe design applied to the crew compartment.
Results of this study showed that the effects of cabin atmosphere leakage
and resulting pressure make-up system requirements overshadowed the basic
problem of providing structural reinforcement to prevent catastrophic rupture
of the compartment.
9.2.3 Safe-Life Design Criteria
The safe-life design concept to achieve damage tolerance involves the
selection of materials, stress levels, and detail structural configurations
such that the largest undetected flaw at a given inspection will not propagate
to critical dimensions prior to its discovery at a subsequent inspection or,
alternatively, during the servicelife of the vehicle. The major elements
of specific criteria to be considered in the application of this design
approach to Space Shuttle are:
The safe-life period to be provided. (The total service life
or a portion thereof based on periodic inspection.)
e Factors of safety to be applied to limit load to define the
residual strength required at the end of the safe-life period,
and the associated critical flaw size.
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® Factors of safety to be applied to the required safe-life
period to provide for uncertainties in the flaw growth predictions.
Requirements for statistical definition of fracture properties
and initial detectable flaw sizes used in the design analyses.
The detailed evaluations of this section involve a postulation of
proposed criteria for each of these major aspects, a discussion of the purpose
and rationality of the criteria, and an evaluation of the effect of the
proposed criteria on structural design, structural weight, and other factors
for the reference vehicle. In making such an evaluation, it is necessary to
establish a baseline of the types and sizes of initial flaws that will be
considered in the safe-life analyses. The selection of the most appropriate
NDE techniques and realistic definition of associated flaw detection capa-
bilities is therefore of fundamental importance in the evaluation process.
The flaw detectability threshold curves given in Figures 9-1 and 9-2 are
taken as a "best estimate" of NDE capabilities that will be available for
reliable detection of crack-like flaws in Space Shuttle structure. A summary
of the types of initial flaws of practical interest, the minimum detectable
sizes for applicable NDE techniques, and the resulting weight increases for
safe-life periods of 100 to 200 missions is given in Table 9-3 for the
reference structural elements of this study. The weight increases listed
in this table are obtained directly from the safe-life analyses of Section 7.
The values do not include allowance for the effects of factors of safety on
residual strength or crack growth predictions, but are intended to serve as
a guide to identify the most critical types of initial flaws and to select
the most appropriate NDE techniques for individual cases. These selections,
indicated by underlining in Table 9-3, are used as the basis for subsequent
evaluation of proposed criteria. The weight increases reflected in this
table and in the following detailed evaluations are based on crack growth
analyses in which retardation effects are not considered. As previously
discussed, the uncertainties associated with prediction of retardation effects
for Space Shuttle structure--particularly the influence of periodic exposure
to elevated temperature--prevent taking advantage of the potential benefit
in design evaluations at the present time.
Residual Strength
It is probable that structures subject to fracture failure due to pre-
existing flaws will exhibit as much scatter in strength properties as is the
case for more conventional modes of failure. Certainly, the uncertainties
in strength analysis prediction are no less than for conventional failure
modes. Therefore, it would appear to be prudent to include a factor of
safety in the definition of required residual strength to provide some allow-
ance for these uncertainties. For simplicity and uniformity of criteria,
it is desirable to establish the same definition of residual strength
requirements for both the fail-safe and safe-life design approaches. The
recommended criteria are as follows:
Residual strength shall be equal to or greater than i.i x limit load
for cases where this capability is verified by representative
structural tests.
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Residual strength determined by design analyses shall be equal to
or greater than 1.2 x limit load for cases where test verification
is not accomplished.
Test verification of residual strength would generally involve element
or small component tests in which an initial flaw is artificially induced,
the flaw is grown under fatigue loading to predicted critical size, and
the specimen is then loaded to failure to determine the actual residual
strength level. Care must be taken to properly model the structural geometry
and internal load distributions of the full-scale structure in the specimen
tests. Actual fracture properties of the test specimen would be determined
and used to reduce the test results to a residual strength based on design
fracture properties. Because of the cost and time associated with these type
of tests and the multiplicity of potentially critical structural elements,
and flaw types, sizes and locations, it will probably not be practical to
provide complete test verification of all critical structural elements for
which the safe-life design approach is selected. Therefore, it is considered
appropriate and probably necessary to define the dual design criteria.
The effect of the proposed criteria regarding residual strength on
structural design will vary widely, depending on the nature of the structural
element and the service load spectrum.
the sketch below. Case A
represents an element sub-
Jected to a limited, discrete
loading spectrum such that
the crack growth over the
service life from initial to
critical size is relatively
small. The basic critical
size aCR corresponds to
unstable growth or fracture
at limit stress level. If
!
this size is reduced to a CR
because of the factor of
safety specified for residual
strength, a significant re-
duction in crack growth life
is observed. (The reduction
in critical flaw size is pro-
portional to the residual
strength safety factor
squared.) An appreciable l
decrease in operating stress
level may be necessary to "_
meet the safe-life require-
ments for this type of
situation. Case B is an
example of the opposite
situation, in which a
structural element is
subjected to an extensive
Two example cases are illustrated in
L = Safe-life
acr = Critical flaw size at
limit stress
a_r = Critical flaw size for
required residual strength
= acr/(F.S .)2
Case A
Lo_
q_ _ _ | Case B
/
_ L _
Lo _
Cycles
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random load spectrum over the safe-life period and a large amount of crack
growth is involved from initial to critical size. In this case, the reduction
in crack growth life associated with a residual strength safety factor is
small and the influence on design of the element may be negligible. More
specific evaluations are presented in the curves of missions to failure versus
initial flaw size given in Figures 9-3 and 9-4 for the wing spar caps and the
orbiter aft support frame caps, respectively. Curves are plotted for residual
strength factors of safety of 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2, and cover the range from
100 to 1000 missions. Consideration is given to this expanded range for
service life because of the current interest in a 500 mission useful life
and to allow evaluation of the combined effects of factors of safety on both
residual strength and on safe crack growth life. It can be seen that the
wing spar caps correspond to example Case B, with only a small effect noted
of residual strength safety factor on allowable safe-life missions for a
given initial flaw size. This effect also decreases as the number of missions
increases. The resulting weight increases for various mission life require-
ments are also compared in Figure 9-5. It can be seen that the difference
in weight between a factor of safety of 1.0 and 1.2 on residual strength is
in the order of 230 kg (500 lb). This is a very small proportion of total
wing weight. The orbiter aft support frame corresponds more closely to
example Case A. The major portion of crack growth is due to the repeated
pressure cycles imposed on the LH 2 tank. The influence of random spectra
loads induced at the orbiter attach points is relatively small. The pressure
loading represents a limited, discrete spectrum over the service life and the
crack growth from initial to critical size is small. Therefore, the appli-
cation of a factor of safety to the required residual strength has relatively
much more significance than for the wing spar caps. However, in this case
the weight of affected structure is comparatively small, so that the net
effect on total vehicle structure weight is not large. A weight increase of
18 kg (40 lb) is calculated for the extreme of 1000 mission service life and
factor of safety of 1.2 on residual strength; this represents about 2.3
percent of the weight of the basic frame. If this same percentage increase
is estimated for all major fuselage frames, a maximum weight increase of
240 kg (530 lb) is projected for this portion of the vehicle structure.
A review of the effect of this proposed criteria on the other reference
structural elements indicates that no significant weight increases would be
incurred. The vertical stabilizer skins are not affected, because of the
inherent large margin on crack growth to critical size, even for a 1000
mission service life. The deepest initial flaws in propellant tank skins
that could escape detection by penetrant inspection will tend to approach a
semicircular shape (a/2c = 0.4 was used as a reference in this study). This
type of flaw will break through to leakage before failure and the stress
intensity in this condition is considerably less than critical value.
Therefore, an inherent margin on residual strength exists for the propellant
tank skins and the proposed safety factors will not cause a weight increase.
Evaluation of crew compartment skins indicates that a slight reduction in
operating stress, from 207 MN/m 2 (30 ksi) to 193 MN/m 2 (28 ksi) would be
required to achieve a safe-life of 1000 missions based on residual strength
safety factor of 1.2. However, the associated weight increase is negligible.
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A detailed listing of calculated weight increases for each of the
structural elements over a range of residual strength safety factor of 1.0
to 1.2 and safe-life requirements of 100 to 1000 missions is given in
Table 9-4.
Statistical Definition of Fracture Parameters
It seems apparent that some approach is necessary to assure that the
numerical values of fracture parameters used in the structural design and
analysis will conservatively represent actual conditions for any of the
flight vehicles. Fracture parameters of interest include fracture properties
such as toughness and crack growth rate and the definition of detectable
initial flaw sizes. The dispersion in values for a given parameter may be
quite different for various materials, structural configurations, and
environmental exposure. Therefore, it is considered to be more logical to
establish design values for the key fracture parameters on the basis of
statistical probability rather than by applying an arbitrary factor of safety
to typical properties. It is proposed that a statistical criteria equivalent
to "B" properties in MIL-HDBK-5--90 percent probability with 95 percent
confidence level--be used as the basis to establish design fracture properties.
This specific criteria is currently being applied by the Air Force to the
demonstration of NDE capabilities for flaw detection as applied to the B-1
program.
Considerable care must be exercised in obtaining and selecting the
basic data used in statistical definition of fracture properties. Differences
in type of test specimens, instrumentation, test techniques, and test environ-
ments may result in dispersion of test data that is not truly representative
of the variability of fracture properties being tested. These precautions
are particularly important if the test results from several investigators
are to be combined to form the data base for statistical treatment. In the
event that excessive data scatter or other circumstances make the application
of statistical criteria impractical for a given case, conservative design
values for fracture parameters should be estimated on a rational basis and
submitted to the procuring agency for review and approval.
It is of interest to examine the effect of the proposed criteria on the
structural design and weight of the reference structural elements considered
in this study. The values of fracture toughness or critical stress intensity
used in the study investigations have been selected as conseryative "lower-
bound" estimates. Although the values were not determined by rigorous
statistical methods, it is believed that they are reasonably compatible with
the proposed criteria and that no further adjustment of study results is
required. The crack growth rate data used in the study generally conforms to
typical or average characteristics, particularly for the 2219-T87 aluminum
alloy. An approximate statistical evaluation was made of the crack growth
rate data shown in Figure 5-9 to define a 90 percent probability of non-
exceedance design curve. This was accomplished by taking the deviation of
each individual data point (AK) from the nominal Forman curve, finding the
standard deviation of the total data array, and displacing the nominal
Forman curve by an increment of stress intensity compatible with 90 percent
probability of nonexceedance at 95 percent confidence level. A comparison
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of nominal and design curves for crack growth rate is given in Figure 9-6.
It can be seen that over the stress intensity range of interest, the design
growth rate is greater than nominal by a factor of approximately 1.5. The
effect of this criteria on structural weight can be estimated by applying
this factor to the required service life in the various comparisons
summarized in Table 9-4.
The curves of detectable flaw sizes for various NDE techniques, pre-
sented in Figure 9-1, are intended to be compatible with the proposed
statistical criteria. However, an evaluation has also been made of the
effect of arbitrarily increasing those initial flaw sizes by a factor of 2,
and results are also summarized in Table 9-4. These results certainly
represent a conservative upper-bound of the possible effect of the proposed
criteria regarding demonstration of NDE capabilities. Comparison of the two
cases also provides insight regarding the sensitivity of structural weight
to the criteria for initial flaw size.
Crack Growth Life
In addition to the effect of dispersion in material fracture properties
on crack growth rate and consequent safe-life from initial to critical
flaw size, the possible influence of uncertainties and inaccuracies in the
predictive analysis must also be considered. From typical growth rate data,
such as Figure 5-9, it can be seen that an error of l0 percent is predicting
the applied stress intensity may change the growth rate by 30 percent to
60 percent, or more, depending on the stress intensity range involved. Some
verification of crack growth predictions may be obtained from element or
small component tests, but it will seldom be feasible to verify growth
characteristics in full-scale structural tests. Therefore, a factor of
safety applied to the required safe life is considered desirable to provide
some allowance for uncertainties or inaccuracies in the analysis methods
and data. A predicted safe life of twice the required period of service
operation is recommended for general application. }lowever, it is also
appropriate to distinguish between structures that are accessible for
periodic inspection during operational service and those that are not. The
inspectable structure is certainly a more comfortable situation because the
opportunity exists to detect actual crack growth that may be greater than
predicted levels and accomplish repair before critical size is reached.
Therefore, it is proposed that in this case no factor would be applied to
the overall service life requirement; however, the life safety factor of
2.0 would be used, in conjunction with a maximum undetected flaw size
appropriate for the in-service inspection technique, to determine the required
inspection interval. The effect of this criteria on the weight of the
reference structural elements can be approximated from the comparisons
summarized in Table 9-4 for the various service lives.
Combined Criteria
Several elements of the proposed design criteria have additive effects
on the structural weight, so it is desirable to evaluate the overall effect
of the composite criteria on the reference vehicle. In applying the criteria,
it is conservatively assumed that residual strength is not verified by test
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for any of the reference structural elements, and that a safety factor of
1.2 is therefore applied. The wing spar caps, crew compartment skin and
vertical stabilizer skin are assumed to be inspectable during operational
service by ultrasonic and/or visual techniques. The major fuselage frames
and propellant tank skins are assumed to be not readily inspectable. The
corresponding weight increases for the reference structural elements and
for the total vehicle are listed in Table 9-5 for service life requirements
of 100, 200 and 500 missions. The weight increments are with respect to a
structural design based on conventional static strength requirements only.
The basic comparison is predicated on the flaw detection capabilities of
applicable NDE techniques as given in Figure 9-1. A comparison is also
summarized for the case where the initial flaw sizes are taken as twice the
baseline values.
It can be seen that for the basic case the total weight increase is
approximately 1.5 percent of the vehicle structural weight for a 100 mission
service life; this increases to about 4.5 percent for a 500 mission life.
The latter value is still considered to be tolerable, although it does
represent a significant performance penalty. It should be noted that almost
all of the weight increase is contributed by the wing spar caps. Considera-
tion of the fail-safe design approach for these members is obviously
warranted; this would satisfy the fracture control criteria and impose a
much smaller weight penalty, particularly for the longer service life
requirements.
If the baseline values for size of maximum undetected initial flaws
are doubled, the corresponding structural weight increases are about
3.5 percent of the vehicle structural weight for 100 missions and l0 percent
for 500 missions. The wing spar caps are still the largest single weight
item, but the fuselage frames and propellant tank skins contribute about
one-half of the total weight increase. This comparison illustrates the
importance to structural efficiency and to an effective fracture control
program of selecting the most appropriate NDE techniques and obtaining an
accurate definition of their flaw detection capabilities.
The preceding evaluations are based on safe-life analyses using initial
flaw sizes derived from inspection procedures and associated NDE capabilities
as a starting point. If proof testing of the propellant tanks is considered
as a primary technique to screen out initial flaws that could cause failure
during operational service, then some additional weight increase must be
combined with the previous summaries. However, as discussed under the
propellant tank safe-lzfe investigations (Section 7.7.3), it is difficult
to establish a practical and effective proof test approach for the tanks
because of the prevalence of the leak-before-break failure mode. Weight
increases resulting from proof test requirements were estimated for assumed
initial flaws of a/2c = 0.1 and service life requirements of lO0 to 200
missions. However, these estimates must be considered as "lower bound";
the weight penalty may increase greatly as the assumed initial flaw
approaches a semicircular shape and other complicating factors regarding
flaw growth or fracture during proof test are considered. This "minimum"
weight increase associated with proof test is calculated to be 1660 kg
(3680 lb) for both tanks and a required service life of 100 missions;
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Table 9-5. Summary of Structural Weight Increases* Resulting From
Application** of Proposed Safe-Life Design Criteria to
the Reference Vehicle
Required Safe-Life
(Number of Missions) i00 200 500
INITIAL FLAW SIZE CORRESPONDING TO BASELINE NDE CAPABILITY (FIGURE 9-1)
O
H
Z_
Wing spar caps
Fuselage frames
LH 2 tank skin
LO 2 tank skin
Vertical stabilizer skin
Crew compartment skin
3000
(6600)
15o
(320)
(kg) 1700
(ib) (3750)
(kg) 60
(ib) (140)
0
0
0
0
(kg) 176'0
(ib) (3890)
1.44
5100
(11,250)
340
(740)
0
0
0
0
Total 3150 5440
(6920) (ii_990)
2.57
Percent total vehicle
structural weight
INITIAL FLAW SIZE = 2 x BASELINE VALUES
4.35
_J
tJ
H
Wing spar caps
Fuselage frames
(kg)
(ib)
(kg)
(ib)
LH 2 tank skin (kg)
(ib)
L02 tank skin (kg)
(Ib)
3OOO
(6600)
770
(1700)
55O
(1200)
4310
(9500)
95O
(2100)
1950
(4300)
6050
(13,300)
1270
(2800)
3770
(8300)
1040
(2300)
90 500
(200) (ll00)
Vertical stabilizer skin 0 0 0
Crew compartment skin 0 0 0
Total (kg) 4410 7710 12,130
(ib) (9700) (17,000) (26,700)
Percent total vehicle
structural weight 3.60 6.30 9.90
*Increases are with respect to a vehicle designed to conventional static
strength requirements.
**Assumptions made in application of criteria:
(1) Wing spar caps, crew compartment and vertical stabilizer skins are
inspectable during operational service.
(2) Fuselage frames, propellant tank skins are not inspectable during
operational service.
(3) Test verification of residual strength not accomplished for any of the
structural elements (residual strength safety factor = 1.2).
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if a factor of safety of 2.0 is applied to the required service life the
weight increase becomes 2900 kg (6h60 lb). This is almost twice the value
of the weight increase from the other structural elements; the total
increase would be about h percent of the vehicle structural weight for a
lO0 mission service life requirement. This is a rather significant per-
formance penalty and it is associated with a proof test that does not
provide, under present knowledge, a rigorous fracture mechanics verification
of tank integrity. The weight penalty would probably be much greater for a
test that would provide a rigorous verification, if indeed such a test is
technically feasible at all. Therefore, the use of proof test to screen out,
by direct demonstration, all flaws that could propagate to failure during
operational service does not appear to be an attractive option for this
application. However, a proof test of the tanks to provide a conventional
strength demonstration is certainly desirable, and if this is followed by a
thorough post-test inspection it will provide a significant contribution to
the overall fracture control program.
In summary, this review has indicated that the basic safe-life design
criteria proposed in this section are reasonable and will not result in
unacceptable weight increase of the reference vehicle. However, the feasi-
bility of proof testing the propellant tanks to verify that no flaws exist
which could subsequently grow to failure during operational service appears
to be questionable, and therefore the requirement for such a proof test
should not be a mandatory part of the safe-life criteria.
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9.3 COMPARISON OF SAFE-LIFE VS. FAIL-SAFE DESIGN APPROACHES
A comparison between safe-life and fail-safe design approaches for the
wing spar caps and the vertical stabilizer and crew compartment skins is
summarized in Table 9-6. Factors considered in this comparison are weight
increase, required in-service inspection interval and the type of NDE
techniques required for both production line and in-service inspections.
Both lO0 mission and 500 mission service life requirements are considered.
The structural weight increases for wing spar caps designed for safe-
life are obtained from the results summarized in Table 9-5. The weight
increases for fail-safe design are based on the monolithic spar cap approach
(Section 8.1.2) and a residual strength safety factor of 1.2. The weight
increase for 100 mission service life is taken directly from the results of
the fail-safe analyses summarized in Section 8.1. The weight increase for
500 mission service life is approximated from consideration of the required
reduction in general stress level to achieve satisfactory fatigue life plus
any additional increment necessary to meet residual strength requirements.
This increment was determined to be small, only spar cap #5 required addi-
tional reinforcement above the fatigue design requirements. It can be seen
that the fail-safe approach is somewhat lighter than safe-life for a 100
mission service life requirement and a great deal lighter for a 500 mission
life.
The required inspection interval for the fail-safe design is based on
safe fatigue life of the remaining structure, after fracture of one spar
cap. This life was determined in the analyses summarized in Section 8.1.
The required inspection interval is the same for the 500 mission service
life as for lO0 missions, because at least one spar (No. 5) can be operating
at the same stress level after failure of an adjacent spar in both cases.
The wing spar caps designed for safe-life are assumed to be inspectable
during operational service and therefore no scatter factor is applied to
crack growth predictions from which structural weight increases are deter-
mined. The required inspection intervals for this case are approximated
in the following manner:
(a) It is assumed that a corner crack from a fastener hole is the
most likely and the most critical type of defect to be
detected, and that a portable ultrasonic unit will be used as
the primary NDE technique for in-service inspection.
(b) The baseline flaw size for ultrasonic inspection is 0.38 cm
(0.150 in.); however, it is assumed that a crack may be
completely masked until it propagates beyond the fastener
head. Therefore, an additional allowance of 0.25 cm (O.1 in.)
is added to the baseline value. This results in a reference
flaw size of 0.63 cm (0.25 in.) for in-service inspection.
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(c)
The predicted number of safe-life missions for this flaw size
and an operating stress corresponding to safe-life design for
either i00 missions or 500 missions is determined from the
appropriate parametric plots of Figure 7-12. This predicted
life is then divided by a scatter factor of 2.0 to determine
the required inspection interval.
The safe-life inspection interval determined by this approach is about
the same as for the fail-safe design under a i00 mission service life
requirement and considerably longer (less frequent inspection) for the
500 mission case. This is due to the reduction in spar cap stress level
required to provide safe-life for 500 missions.
The types of NDE techniques required for both production line and
in-service inspection are also compared. Obviously, the fail-safe design
approach permits the use of much less sophisticated NDE techniques. However,
if advantage is taken of this to reduce production costs and schedules, the
probability of having a failure in service will be much higher for the fail-
safe design than for the safe-life approach. Such a failure would not be
catastrophic, but it could result in significant "down time" and repair
costs for the vehicle during operational service. Therefore, the final
decision regarding the quality of NDE to be employed during production of
the fail-safe design must weigh these opposing factors.
It appears that the fail-safe design is advantageous for both the
100 mission and 500 mission service life requirements. However, for the
lO0 mission case, the weight difference is not large and the relative
importance of other factors may be decisive.
A comparison between fail-safe and safe-life design approaches for
the vertical stabilizer and crew compartment skins is not truly a valid
trade study because these structures inherently possess adequate safe-life
characteristics without requiring structural weight increase or the use of
extraordinary NDE techniques. Therefore, the decision involved is whether
an "add-on" of fail-safe provisions is warranted to achieve additional
structural reliability at the expense of some increase in production costs
and/or weight. This is a program management type of decision which
transcends the scope of this study.
The above discussion and comparisons lead to the conclusion that it is
not possible, or proper, to establish rigid and all-encompassing rules
regarding the selection between fail-safe and safe-life design approaches.
In most cases a specific trade study evaluation will be required between
the two approaches, with consideration given to the types of factors
illustrated in this section. The weighting of relative importance between
these factors will depend on the philosophy, goals, constraints and
financial/performance circumstances of the Space Shuttle Phase C/D Program.
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9.4 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED DESIGN CRITERIA
The following recommended criteria are intended to supplement and not
replace the conventional criteria regarding ultimate strength, yield strength,
stiffness, etc. The primary intent of the criteria is to provide assurance
that the service life requirements of Space Shuttle vehicles will be achieved
and that catastrophic failure of shuttle primary structure due to the propa-
gation of undetected crack-like flaws will be prevented.
Basic Approach
Safe fatigue life design shall be provided for all elements of the
primary structure and pressurized components of Space Shuttle vehicles. In
addition, damage tolerance shall be provided for critical components of
structure or systems that are susceptible to the fracture mode of failure
and that such failure could cause loss of the vehicle or Jeopardize crew
safety. Damage tolerance is commonly provided by either the fail-safe or
safe-life (safe crack growth) design approach, as described below.
(a) Fail-Safe Approach
This approach requires that the complete failure of a principal
structural element will not result in catastrophic failure or
inability to operate the vehicle under limit load conditions
before a suitable inspection is performed. Fail-safe designs
generally provide crack arrest features and sufficient redundancy
to maintain the required residual strength in the damaged
condition.
(b) Safe-Life Approach
This approach requires that the largest undetected flaw at a
given inspection (production line, in-service, etc.) will not
propagate to critical dimensions prior to its discovery at a
subsequent inspection or, alternatively, during the service
life of the vehicle. Critical crack dimensions are based on
the required level of residual strength. Safe-life can be
achieved through selection of materials, stress levels, detail
structural configurations, etc., without necessarily incurring
fail-safe features.
The choice of fail-safe or safe-life design approaches should be based
on results of trade study evaluations that consider the effects of each
design approach on vehicle weight, structural reliability, cost, inspection
requirements and other pertinent program factors. In general, the selected
approach should exploit the inherent fail-safe or safe-life features of
the vehicle and structure configuration.
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Fatigue Life Criteria
The nominal fatigue life of unflawed structure shall be determined by
analysis and test to be at least four times the required service life for
Space Shuttle. The predicted nominal fatigue life is based on average S-N
characteristics for the materials and structural assemblies and an average
service load/environment spectrum.
Development tests shall be performed as required to support the
structural design and provide assurance of meeting the fatigue life require-
ments. Full-scale fatigue life verification tests shall be performed for
fatigue-critical regions of the structure, as agreed to by the contractor
and the procuring agency.
The effects of periodic exposure to elevated temperature, thermal
stresses resulting from temperature gradients, and local discontinuity
stresses such as encountered in stiffened pressure vessels shall be accounted
for in the fatigue analyses and development and verification tests.
Fail-Safe Design Criteria
Fail-safe designs shall provide adequate fracture-arrest capability and
residual strength after failure of a principal structural element. All fail-
safe structure shall be accessible for periodic inspection during operational
service. The residual strength provided by the design shall be at least
1.1 x limit load if this capability is verified by structural test. If test
verification is not accomplished, the design and supporting analyses shall
be based on a residual strength at least 1.2 x limit load.
The residual strength evaluation shall account for critical compression
design loads, and the possible reduction in stability due to failure of a
principal structural element, in addition to the critical tension design
load cases.
For fail-safe designs in which fracture arrest is provided by geometric
boundaries, such that no crack front exists in the remaining structure, the
nominal fatigue life of the remaining structure shall be at least four times
the interval between regularly scheduled inspections.
For fail-safe designs in which fracture arrest is provided by structural
reinforcement, such that a crack front remains in the load-carrying structure,
the safe-life (safe crack growth) of the remaining structure shall be at
least two times the interval between regularly scheduled inspections.
Critical crack sizes used in determining safe-life characteristics shall be
based on the required level of residual strength, as previously specified.
Material fracture properties used in residual strength and crack growth analyses
shall be derived from applicable test data to correspond with MIL-HDBK-5 "B"
design properties (90 percent probability at 95 percent confidence level).
The above safe-life requirements may be waived in cases where failure
of a principal structural element would become immediately obvious by virtue
of fluid leakage, loss of pressure, etc.
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The effect of failure of a principal structural element on the perform-
ance and integrity of other systems shall be considered where applicable.
Where the fail-safe provisions involve a "leak-before-break" concept for
pressure vessels the consequences and potential hazards associated with
leakage of the contained fluid shall be critically examined. Verification
tests shall be performed as required to provide assurance that the structural
design concept provides acceptable failure modes that will not critically
impair the performance or integrity of other systems. Examples of specific
concern for Space Shuttle are the integrity of the thermal protection system,
loss of cabin atmosphere, leakage of propellants or cryogenics from internal
storage vessels.
Safe-Life Design Criteria
Critical primary structure and pressure vessels that are not fail-safe
shall be designed so that initial flaws will not propagate to critical size
during the specified service life of the vehicle. The critical flaw sizes
shall be based on the required level of residual strength, as specified below.
The critical flaw size for pressure vessels is defined as the point of
fracture or of break-through (leakage), whichever occurs first.
The residual strength at the end of the service life shall be at least
1.1 x limit load if this capability is verified by applicable structural
component tests. If test verification is not accomplished, the design and
supporting analyses shall be based on a residual strength at least 1.2 x
limit load.
The crack growth life from initial to critical size shall be determined
on the basis of a realistic and typical service load/environment spectrum
and design values of fracture properties for the material. This safe crack
growth life determined in this manner, using initial flaw sizes compatible
with the detection capabilities of production-line inspection methods, shall
meet one of the following requirements, as applicable:
(i) For structure that is subjected to regular inspections during
operational service, the safe crack growth life shall be equal
to or greater than the specified vehicle service life.
(2) For structure that is not subjected to regular inspections
during operational service, the safe crack growth life shall
be at least two times the vehicle service life.
Required inspection intervals shall be established for the first case
considering safe crack growth from an initial size that is compatible with
the detection capabilities of in-service inspection techniques; the safe
life shall be at least two times the regular inspection intervalJ Accessi-
bility for regular in-service inspection may require removal of access
panels, doors, etc. If removal of permanent type skins and fasteners is
required to perform an adequate inspection, the structure should be classified
as noninspectable.
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The character and location of initial flaws used as the basis of safe-
life analyses and verification tests shall be realistic selections consistent
with the material product form, processing history, thickness, and detail
design configuration. The assumed size of such initial flaws shall be
consistent with capabilities for reliable detection by the NDE techniques
that will be used during production line or in-service inspections. It shall
be demonstrated by representative tests that the selected NDE techniques will
provide at least 90 percent probability of detection, at 95 percent confidence
level, of flaws equal to or larger than the assumed initial sizes.
In defining the assumed characteristics of initial flaws that extend
only part way through the thickness of material, the following criteria shall
be observed:
(a) If the selected NDE technique interrogates only flaw length, the
depth of flaw shall be assumed to be a maximum of one-half the
flaw length.
(b) If the selected NDE technique interrogates only flaw depth, the
length of flaw shall be assumed to be a maximum of five times
the flaw depth.
Fracture properties data for the selected structural materials will be
obtained from approved sources or generated by test as required. The data
shall include evaluation of the effects of applicable temperature and chemical
environments and of variations in material product forms and processing para-
meters. The fracture properties (toughness, growth rate, threshold stress
intensity, etc.) used in residual strength and crack growth analyses shall
correspond to MIL-HDBK-5 "B" design properties (90 percent probability at
95 percent confidence level). In cases where valid statistical definition
of fracture properties is not possible because of data limitations or other
reasons, conservative design values shall be established on a rational basis
and shall be approved by the procuring agency.
If predicted effects of crack growth retardation due to peak loads in a
random load spectrum are used in design verification analyses, these predictions
shall be substantiated by tests of flawed specimens. These tests shall employ
a flight-by-flight loading spectrum which includes exposure to elevated and/or
depressed temperatures in the proper sequence and relative duration with
respect to the applied loads.
All Space Shuttle pressure vessels, including integral propellant tanks,
shall be proof tested. The minimum requirements for proof test are as defined
by proof factors listed in applicable contract specifications. In addition,
the contractor shall assess the feasibility of proof test to detect initial
flaws that could grow to failure during operational service. Empirical data
regarding flaw growth and fracture characteristics, appropriate for the
material, thickness, and environments of the intended application, shall be
generated as necessary to make this assessment. Proof testing based on this
approach shall be conducted as agreed to by the contractor and the procuring
agency. Structural design of the pressure vessels shall be developed to
accommodate a practical proof test to the appropriate requirements.
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APPENDI X
Sample Computer Print-Out
for Crack Growth Analysis.
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